Forcibly disarming Hamas will be a disaster. But peacekeeping experts have an alternative


The fate of President Trump's Gaza cease-fire depends on an international stabilization effort – tasked with disarming Hamas, protecting civilians, winning Palestinian public support and providing a political horizon. Its success or failure will determine if there'll be a different future – or more war Hamas militants standing guard during searches for the bodies of Israeli hostages in Gaza City, November 2025

Hiba Qasas, Bert Koenders and CJ (Kees) Matthijssen write in Haaretz on 10 November 2025:

Gaza today sits between a fragile cease-fire and the terrifying prospect of a return to all-out war. A narrow diplomatic opening has appeared – just wide enough to imagine a different future, tight enough to close with a single miscalculation. Whether Israelis, Palestinians and their international partners can pass through this eye of the needle will depend on how the coming stabilization effort is conceived and led.

Thanks to U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan and the Franco-Saudi New York Declaration, tentative first steps have been made away from full-scale war in Gaza and toward creating an international stabilization mission.

The first step will be putting in place the right mandate. The mission must meet a range of needs: provide security, oversee disarmament, protect civilians, unlock humanitarian access, assist in restoring basic services, help establish Palestinian governance and bring a political horizon into view.

To achieve all this, a military-heavy force designed purely to suppress violence won’t suffice. The mission must combine political, civilian protection, relief, service delivery and security elements, all delivered under clear leadership.

The primacy of politics

To remain effective, the mandate for the stabilization force should be focused enough to avoid “mission creep,” and enjoy the backing of sponsors who will keep the mission on track (with constant pressure on the parties to stay engaged).

Vigilant and benign external accompaniment of peace processes and transition arrangements has been vital in ending conflicts from Timor Leste and Northern Ireland to Colombia. In Gaza, the critical sponsors with leverage over Israel and Hamas are the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Qatar – but a broader UN Security Council Resolution would add important legal and political credibility to the enterprise.

Stabilization ultimately leads nowhere if no political horizon is in view. As past experience tells us, a good stabilization strategy begins with a clear diagnosis of the drivers of instability and embodies a practical, achievable plan to tackle these in a way that moves the situation towards a widely accepted political settlement. Despite a peace agreement in Mali, the absence of such a strategy, plus limited national commitment to conflict resolution and reconciliation, made stabilization support a thankless task.

Such experiences are why seasoned peacekeepers today recognize the primacy of politics as critical for mission success.

In Gaza’s case, the key players all require political reassurance to stop the cease-fire from unravelling. To answer these concerns, Palestinians should lead the transitional administration. Gaza and the West Bank need to be reunified, and the path to reaching a Palestinian state, with inclusive, accountable and effective governance, must be clarified. It is unrealistic to think Palestinian resistance will transform into peaceful coexistence on any other basis; nor will essential partners Egypt and Saudi Arabia back a stabilization process that lacks a political horizon.

Hamas militants standing guard during searches for the bodies of Israeli hostages in Gaza City last week.Credit: Jehad Alshrafi/AP
For Israel, this same political path must lead to full recognition, security guarantees and normalized relations with Saudi Arabia and other regional powers. More urgently still, the main fear of Israelis is that Hamas will not disarm. This is also essential for Palestine: Until Hamas renounces power and arms, Palestinians will not be widely recognized as partners for peace.

Avoiding a disarmament disaster

To disarm Hamas, establish security, defuse crises and protect civilians, the stabilization mission will require credible capabilities including Quick Reaction Forces. However, any attempt at forcibly disarming Hamas will be a disaster. No troop contributor will sign up for an extension of Israel’s existing counter-terror war.

In Colombia, amnesty and reintegration incentives were rolled out for FARC fighters well before the 2016 peace agreement, and the peace deal enabled those who reject violence to participate in society and politics going forward.

Hamas must give up power and weapons in Gaza – but it must be shown an exit it can walk through: an agreed process for surrendering arms leading to safe amnesty for those who did not commit crimes against humanity, and the chance to reintegrate into a civilian life worth living. Upon disarmament, monitoring mechanisms will be needed to track cease-fire compliance, human rights, illicit finance and arms flows.

Palestinian ownership is vital, not only to ensure that Hamas leaves the stage, but also because stabilization will quickly unravel if it is perceived as a new occupation. Iraq’s experience with “de-Ba’athification” – which shut huge numbers of capable citizens out of their jobs, driving them into the arms of a gathering insurgency – offers a sobering lesson. If stabilization fails to offer local people ownership and agency, failure looms.

An international stabilization mission in Gaza must be presented as a temporary necessity, with benchmarks leading to an exit strategy, and early-as-possible handover to the Palestinian Authority. The PA does need to reform, via inclusive dialogue and elections, but it can only attain governing competency and establish legitimacy if it is trusted and resourced to govern and deliver services, without unreasonable obstacles in its way.

Lessons from elsewhere

Public support is critical for mission success. The needs in Gaza are massive and must be met with urgency if the public is to accept the stability on offer. The public will not buy in to peace nor reject calls to violent rebellion unless stabilization offers them safety, justice, improved services and jobs, and opens political channels for tackling grievances and pursuing inclusive governance reform.

A core, urgent deliverable for the public is a sense of safety. To achieve this, community policing capabilities will be just as important as the military capacities that oversee disarmament and tackle flare-ups. In Northern Ireland it was the focus on community policing centered on trust, consent and respect for human rights that mollified a core grievance among Catholics and enabled confidence in the peace process to grow. Countries with strong community police and rights-based criminal justice systems should ensure the Gaza mission has these capabilities at its core.

To win over the public, the mission must be set up to communicate effectively. In Iraq, U.S. Army General David Petraeus made communication central to a strategy that brought violence down by 90 percent from 2006–2008. His approach was to be “first with the truth” – communicating clearly and proactively to all relevant stakeholders and the public what the Coalition was and was not trying to do to make the situation better. The Gaza mission will need a similar approach.

A Gaza stabilization mission will also find it hard to succeed unless two further options are now firmly rejected: First is the inclusion of a separate counter-terror track in parallel to the mission. Afghanistan and other experiences have clearly shown that aggressive security operations divorced from the wider stabilization structure could undermine the broader effort. Secondly, private military companies must not be able to use lethal force in Gaza, as this would inject unaccountable violence into the mix of an incredibly delicate situation.

Gaza’s fate now hinges on whether this support is shaped around three simple commitments: real security and recognition for Israelis, a credible path to statehood and accountable governance for Palestinians, and an international mission disciplined by the primacy of politics rather than the illusion of force alone.

If leaders use this eye-of-the-needle moment to lock in those commitments, Gaza can move beyond perpetual crisis. If they do not, this narrow opening will close, and the next war will not be for lack of warning but for lack of will.

Hiba Qasas is Founding Executive Director of Principles for Peace and Convener of the Uniting for a Shared Future Coalition, which brings together more than 500 leaders from politics, security, business, diplomacy, negotiations, media and civil society to promote peace in Israel-Palestine.

Bert Koenders is Former Dutch Foreign Minister and Development Minister, led UN Peacekeeping Missions as SRSG Ivory Coast and Mali and is Professor of Peace, Security and Law at Leiden University.

Lt.-Gen. CJ (Kees) Matthijssen is a former Lieutenant General in the Royal Netherlands Army, and Force Commander UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). He also served in Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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