JFJFP

JJP sent this paper to the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government.

It discusses the intertwined issues of the vastly increased incidence of antisemitism in the UK, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the identification of Jews with Israel and the position of the big Jewish communal organisations on the conflict. A rational response by the government is necessary in order to reduce the antisemitism, and most important, not to make it worse.

Executive Summary

Antisemitic incidents in the UK have increased nearly tenfold since 2000. The increase is closely correlated with violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That is not surprising. Israel, as the self-proclaimed Jewish state, is inevitably associated with Jews.

The major Jewish communal organisations overtly identify with Israel. They are largely silent about the Israeli occupation policies, yet criticise UK government decisions that favour recognition of Palestinian rights. Their attitudes reinforce peoples association of Jews with Israel and, inevitably, reinforce the growing antisemitic feelings.

It has become more and more obvious over the years that Israel’s occupation and settlement of Palestinian land is the root of the conflict. The Palestinians resist, Israel represses and it escalates into violence. Inevitably, many people also associate what Israel does with Jews. Equally inevitably, that leads to increasing expressions of antisemitism, sometimes pre-existing antisemitism and sometimes new antisemitism created by Israel. It is necessary to understand the process in order to minimise its abhorrent effect.

United Nations resolutions, International Court rulings and Human Rights NGO reports have established the illegality of one after another aspect of Israel’s repressive occupation system. They have made it less and less possible for people to believe the Israeli story of being the victim of intransigent Palestinians. The cumulative effect will itself have contributed to the growing feelings of antisemitism.

Israel’s war on Gaza in response to the Hamas attack on Israeli civilians on 7 October 2023 has been of a different order from the six previous assaults on Gaza. Severe as they were, the earlier casualties seem minor in comparison to the 72,000+ Palestinians killed in this Gaza war, most of whom have been civilians. People have been shocked to the core by the Israeli savagery. Inevitably, that has increased the already high levels of antisemitism.

In the absence of any other evidence-based conclusion, we conclude that the cumulative effect of Israel’s oppression of the Palestinian people and denial of their right of self-determination is the cause of the near tenfold increase in antisemitic incidents since 2000.

Opinion in the Jewish community about Israeli policies is actually sharply divided. While a big majority have feelings of attachment to Israel, in fact small majorities are now opposed to what Israel does. The big Jewish communal organisations do not reveal this division of opinion. Rather, their silence about it gives the false impression of big majority Jewish support.

The major Jewish communal organisations make contradictory recommendations about dealing with antisemitism. In one report they advocate education and understanding, but in a later report, they advocate deterrence and punishment.

People have the right to criticise Israel, as they do of any country, but not to engage in hate speech or racist speech. It is therefore necessary to have rational criteria to distinguish between legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitic speech. We recommend the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism.

We make a number of recommendations on dealing with the increased antisemitism, but we also think, realistically, that we will probably have to live with heightened levels of antisemitism as long as Israel continues to oppress the Palestinians.

Antisemitic incidents and spikes of violence in the conflict

There are two salient facts about antisemitism in the UK in recent years. First, the number of antisemitic incidents has increased steadily and substantially, in fact nearly 10-fold, since 2000. Second, the increase has been closely correlated with violence in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. This trend has been noted by the Community Security Trust (CST) in most of its annual Antisemitism Reports.¹

Big spikes in incidents occur after what the CST calls “trigger events in the Middle East”, which are predominantly large spikes of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These spikes lead immediately to large spikes in antisemitic incidents here, and then to a gradual increase in the trend level of incidents.

That is seen in the macro sense of the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005, the six major Israeli assaults on Gaza between 2006 and 2021; the long series of unarmed Palestinian protest demonstrations at the Gaza border with Israel from March 2018 to December 2019, which was regularly met with Israeli sniper fire; and of course since 7 October 2023. It is also seen in the micro sense of smaller attacks. The four charts in Appendix 1 show the correlation from 2000 to 2025.

The trend level of antisemitic incidents here has risen gradually from an average of 38 per month in 2000-2005, to an average of 154 per month in the year before the cataclysmic Hamas attack on Israel of 7 October 2023. Incidents jumped to 1,400 in October. During Israel’s subsequent unrelenting assault on Gaza, it has averaged 336 per month.

Understanding the correlation: Israeli identification with Jews and Jewish identification with Israel

The correlation is all-important in understanding the increasing number of antisemitic incidents. The reasons for it are not hard to fathom.

Israel is the self-proclaimed Jewish State. The state’s most recognisable symbol is the Israeli flag with the Star of David in the centre. Israeli leaders continually refer to the “Land of Israel” as the ancestral home of all Jews, justifying occupation of Palestinian land based on the Jewish kingdoms of 2,000 years ago. Some even say the Bible is their mandate. They try to deflect criticism by calling it antisemitic. Inevitably, people associate Israel with Jews.

Four of the best known British Jewish communal organisations publicly identify themselves with Israel. The Jewish Leadership Council’s Our Vision statement says “Embraces all its cultural and religious traditions and is engaged with Israel”²The Board of Deputies of British Jews has as one of its Aims, Purposes and Powers, “Take such appropriate action as lies within its power to advance Israel’s security, welfare and standing”³The B’nai Brith UK Bureau of International Affairs has “To support the State of Israel”⁴as one of its three goals. (B’Nai Brith UK operates under the umbrella of B’nai Brith International, based in Washington D.C., one of whose missions is “Advocating for Israel”.) The Union of Jewish Students (UJS) has as one of its core values, “Engagement with Israel: we passionately and proudly connect our students with over 3000 years of Jewish and Hebrew culture, offering opportunities to strengthen, celebrate and explore a personal relationship with Israel as part of an evolving expression of Jewish identity”⁵. The UJS website also has a Digital Israel portal section.

Chief Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis insists that being a Zionist is existential for Jews. He ends his essay, What is Zionism, Why the State of Israel is central to Jewish identity, published in the New Statesman on 24 October 2024, with this short sentence: “I am a Zionist because I am a Jew.”⁶

In these circumstances, it is inevitable that many people associate Jews with Israel. The UJS and the Chief Rabbi are probably particularly important in this. Student debates about Israel and the Palestinians are passionate. Lifelong beliefs are often formed in student years. The Chief Rabbi writes op eds in the national press and is frequently interviewed. Outside Judaism, he is taken as the religious spokesman for all Jews, although in fact he only represents the United Synagogue denomination, one of the five Jewish denomination groups. – and clearly he does not speak for secular Jews.

Understanding the correlation: Israeli policies of occupation, settlement and repression

It has become more and more obvious over the years that Israel’s occupation and settlement of Palestinian land is the root of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Following its victory over Egypt and Jordan in the 6-day 1967 war, Israel occupied Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, i.e. the parts of British Mandate Palestine they had not conquered in the 1948-49 war. A messianic, nationalistic fervour swept over much of Israel, reawakening the Revisionist Zionist goal of Greater Israel. Settlement of the occupied lands began quickly and was soon supported by the Israeli government with army protection of the settlements, infrastructure construction and financial assistance.

Settlement building progressed under all subsequent governments, and was systematically expanded from 1978 onwards. Even though building new settlements was prohibited as part of the Oslo Accords of 1993, Israeli governments kept increasing the number of settlers by expanding the existing settlements. As of 2023, there were 752,000 settlers, 504,000 in 141 settlements and 224 outposts in the West Bank, and 248,000 in 15 East Jerusalem settlements (called neighbourhoods by Israel). That comprises nearly 10% of the Jewish Israeli population. (There were also11 small settlements in Gaza that were unilaterally evacuated in 2005.) All the settlements are illegal under international law. The outposts are illegal even under Israeli law but the Israeli government hardly ever removes them.

The consequence of all this has been Palestinian resistance. The Palestinians resist, Israel represses and it escalates into violence including Palestinian attacks on both Israeli soldiers and civilians, Israeli assaults in the West Bank, and the six Israeli assaults on Gaza before 7 October 2023, all of which have disproportionately targeted civilians and caused massive casualties. Some 5,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis were killed in the Second Intifada between 2000 and 2005. The Palestinian death toll in the Gaza attacks before October 2023 was between 170 and 2,100, most of whom were civilians in every attack.

Therefore, it is no surprise that the association of Jews with Israel increasingly led to expressions of antisemitism, no doubt both bringing out pre-existing antisemitism in some people and creating new antisemitism in others.

Understanding the correlation: United Nations Resolutions, International Court decisions and Human Rights NGO reports

Starting a few months after the 1967 war, a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions, International Court rulings and Human Rights NGO reports recognised Palestinians’ rights to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and the illegality of the occupation and settlements project. Each successive ruling or report established the illegality of one after another crucial aspect of Israel’s repressive occupation system.

The crucial resolutions are:

The seminal Security Council Resolution 242, of 22 November 1967, following the 1967 war.

The preamble affirmed the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area can live in security”. Article 1 stated “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”.

A series of Security Council resolutions starting with Resolution 252 on 21 May 1968 up to Resolution 478 on 20 August 1980, ruling Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem illegal. For example, Resolution 478 ruled inter alia:

“Censures in the strongest terms the enactment by Israel of the “basic law” on Jerusalem and the refusal to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions”; and “Affirms that the enactment of the “basic law” by Israel constitutes a violation of international law and does not affect the continued application of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem”; and “Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and in particular the recent “basic law” on Jerusalem are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith”.

Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, 9 July 2004. The Court ruled, inter alia:

“The construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime, are contrary to international law “; and “Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto,” and “Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem.”

Security Council Resolution 2334, 23 December 2016. The resolution ruled, inter alia:

“the establishment by Israel of settlements in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace;” and “Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and that it fully respect all of its legal obligations in this regard;” and “it [the Security Council] will not recognize any changes to the 4 June 1967 lines, including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties through negotiations”.

International Court of Justice ruling, “Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem”, 19 July 2024. The Court ruled, inter alia:

“the State of Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful;” and “the State of Israel is under an obligation to bring to an end its unlawful presence in the Occupied”; and “the State of Israel is under an obligation to cease immediately all new settlement activities, and to evacuate all settlers from the Occupied Palestinian Territory;” and “the State of Israel has the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;” ⁷

On 21 November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Israeli Minister of Defence Yoav Gallant for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. The crimes cited in the warrants are:

“the war crimes of starvation as a method of warfare and of intentionally directing an attack against the civilian population; and the crimes against humanity of murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts from at least 8 October 2023 until at least 20 May 2024.” ⁸

Six respected human rights NGOs published reports between 2020 and 2022 concluding that Israel had created a system of Apartheid, defined in the International Convention on the suppression and punishment of the crime of Apartheid and incorporated in article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as the “crime of apartheid”. Three of the NGOs concluded that Israel had created apartheid in the West Bank, while Israel itself and East Jerusalem, although having some severely racist characteristics, did not reach the legal threshold of the crime of apartheid. The other three NGOs said that Israel, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza are one geographical area characterised by a system of apartheid. The JFJFP website lists these NGOs.⁹

Restricting our analysis to the West Bank, all the features of apartheid are present:

Israeli settlers vote in Israeli elections, take part in Israeli politics, stand for election to the Knesset and take part in the settlement planning process. Palestinians in the West Bank are not Israeli citizens and are denied democratic participation in making the Israeli laws that govern their lives.

Israeli settlers are governed by Israeli civil law but the Palestinians are governed by Israeli military law, under which they can be jailed for long periods without charge under “administrative detention”.

Israeli settlements have been able to expand continually because they have regularly been granted planning permission by the Israeli government, while Palestinians are very rarely granted planning permission to build. In fact, between 2009 and 2021, less than 2% of Palestinian building applications were approved.¹⁰

Land owned by Palestinian villages is often arbitrarily confiscated by Israel for settlement use.

When Palestinians build without permission, desperate to accommodate growing families, their new houses or farm buildings are often demolished by the Israeli army. In fact, from 2006 to 2026, more than 7,500 buildings were demolished.¹¹

Israelis have the use of a network of Israeli-only paved roads. Palestinians have to use a network of often unpaved roads that greatly increase their journey times.

There is a network of Israeli Army checkpoints throughout the West Bank that Palestinians have to go through which greatly impede their daily lives. As of 5 June 2024, there were more than 300 checkpoints. They do not affect the Israeli settlers.

The cumulative effect of these rulings and reports made it less and less possible for people to believe the Israeli story of being the victim of intransigent Palestinians who were not willing to countenance the Jewish presence in their land. That also must have contributed to the increasing antisemitic sentiment.

Understanding the correlation: 7 October 2023 and afterwards

The war on Gaza since 7 October 2023 has been of a different order from the six previous assaults on Gaza. Severe as they were, the earlier casualties seem minor in comparison to the 72,000+ Palestinians killed in Gaza since 7 October 2023. Just as the Hamas attack on 7 October was a crime against humanity and a war crime because it mainly targeted Israeli civilians, it is beyond reasonable argument that Israel’s subsequent assault on Gaza went well beyond what was justified to defend its citizens. All the scholars of genocide studies, holocaust studies, and international relations, who have spoken out publicly were calling it genocide two years ago. Appendix 2, finalised on 12 June 2024, lists the statements found by that time.

The United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, has reported to the General Secretary twice since 7 October 2023. In its first report, on 2 June 2024¹², it drew the devastating conclusion that Israel was committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. Its subsequent report, on 14 August 2025, drew the even more devastating conclusion that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza.¹³

Our government came as close as possible to calling Israel’s war in Gaza genocide without actually uttering the word on 20 May 2025. Foreign Secretary Lammy speaking in Parliament, called it “extreme“, repellent”, “monstrous” and “intolerable” – unexpectedly strong words from a Foreign Minister.¹⁴

Inevitably, Israel’s post 7 October war on Gaza has increased the already high levels of antisemitic incidents, in fact doubling them from some 125 a month before 7 October 2023 to 250-300 a month afterwards.

Understanding the correlation: Conclusion

In its 2025 Antisemitism Report, the CST comments “Answering why antisemitic incidents take place is not simple….In short, there is no single profile of an antisemitic incident victim or offender, nor is there a single explanation as to why antisemitism persists in modern society.”¹⁵

We think the CST has shirked from the conclusion to which its own data leads. The issue is not the continued existence of antisemitism. Like all racisms, it will always be with us to some extent. There will always be some people who are either misguided or who need an “other” to hate. The issue is the nearly ten-fold increase in antisemitic incidents since 2000.

In the absence of any other evidence-based conclusion, the sheer longevity of the correlation between antisemitic incidents and violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the increasing trend level of incidents, provide a clear answer. That answer is the cumulative effect of Israel’s oppression of the Palestinian people and denial of their right to self-determination.

Major Jewish communal organisations attitudes towards Israeli policies

Since 7 October 2023, the attitudes of the two best known Jewish communal organisations and the Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom have served to reinforce the antisemitic feelings that have been aroused.

The Board of Deputies of British Jews

The letter in the Financial Times on 16 April 2025, signed by 36 Deputies of the Board, was a watershed in Board posts about the war on Gaza. The letter was an anguished criticism of the Board for not speaking out against the cruelty of Israel’s war on Gaza. (See p.10 for a description of the letter and the Board’s response.)

Before the letter, there was not a single criticism of how Israel was waging the war in the 16 posts about the war on the Board website. There were, however, posts commending the UK for suspending funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Administration (UNRWA) on the basis of un-evidenced Israeli allegations of Hamas infiltration¹⁶, criticising the UK for partially suspending arms sales to Israel¹⁷, and criticising the Lancet for publishing a letter pointing out that the number of deaths caused by the effects of the war on Gaza will necessarily far exceed the number actually killed in the war¹⁸.

After the Deputies’ letter, the Board started criticising Israel’s conduct, despite taking and publicising swift disciplinary action against the 36 Deputies. In three posts between 26 May and 2 September¹⁹, the Board “condemned settler violence and extremist Israeli politicians”, acknowledged the dire need to ensure “humanitarian aid reaches civilians”, said “food must not be used as a weapon of war, by any side in this conflict.” and

opposed “calls for the forced displacement of Gazans”, but nonetheless reiterating its “unwavering support for Israel during its ongoing conflict”.

Welcome though these acknowledgements are, they were a long time coming. (Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Commission, called out Israel’s use of starvation as a weapon of war more than a year earlier.²⁰) No doubt the Board realised the 36 Deputies had struck a chord, within and outside the Jewish Community. But, in fact, the Board stopped short of calling out Israel’s continuous disproportionate targeting of civilians which has caused the humanitarian crisis.

The Jewish Leadership Council

The Jewish Leadership Council unfortunately felt no need to follow even the Board’s partial acknowledgements. In fact, it repeated its implicit defence of how Israel was waging war. On September 16, 2025 Claudia Mendoza, CEO of the Council wrote in Jewish News, “Israel’s inevitable military response against Hamas in Gaza”. On November 27, 2024, in an article in the Jewish Chronicle, Keith Black, Chair of the Council had written, “Since then, Israel has fought a war of defence,…”²¹

In four posts on its website, the Council repeatedly opposes UK recognition of the state of Palestine. The last one puts the “record levels of antisemitism” down to the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023, as “directly fuelled by the horrors of that day”, but without the slightest recognition of the far more extensive horrors of Israel’s subsequent war on Gaza. It also calls recognition “nothing short of a betrayal of the hostages” and says “It rewards terrorism”. And finally “Lasting peace will only come when Hamas disarms and relinquishes power in Gaza, and when the Palestinians establish truly democratic institutions”.²²The Council website also welcomes President Trump’s peace plan, but by ignoring the context of the long occupation, places the entire blame for the war on the Hamas attack.²³

The Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom

“Britain’s Chief Rabbi, Ephraim Mirvis, spoke at a public event at a synagogue last Sunday [4 January 2024] to extol the ‘outstanding’ performance of the Israeli military in Gaza” and to hope that “our heroic soldiers” would “succeed in their mission”. ^{24 .}Some 23,500 Palestinians had already been killed by that time, more than half being women, children and the elderly, not including many others presumably buried under the rubble. On 2 September 2024 he said that It “beggars belief that the British government…has announced a partial suspension of arms licences” for export to Israel.²⁵ On 1 August 2025, he was quoted in the Jewish Chronicle calling Prime Minister Starmer’s decision to recognise the State of Palestine “a profound betrayal of Israel’s quest to live free of terror on its borders”²⁶. However, he did recognise the tragic loss of Palestinian life and the need for humanitarian aid.²⁷

Common to all these posts is the complete absence of acknowledging the context of Israel’s long occupation of Palestinian land and denial of Palestinian rights, or of the Palestinians having an inherent right to self-determination. The only criticism of how Israel has waged its

war on Gaza was the Board’s belated statement opposing the use of food as a weapon of war and any forced Palestinian displacement.

It is these absences, combined with the explicit support for Israel and criticism of UK government decisions and UK court rulings that recognise Palestinian rights, which can exacerbate the antisemitic feelings aroused by Israeli policies.

Opinion in the Jewish community about Israeli policies

Repeated surveys have shown that opinion in the Jewish community about Israeli policies is actually sharply divided. While a big majority have feelings of attachment to Israel, that does not lead to majority support for Israeli policies. In fact, small majorities are now opposed to them. The sharp division has been evident since at least 2015, when City University published its seminal survey, Attitudes of British Jews towards Israel. The big Jewish communal organisations do not reveal this division of opinion. Rather, their silence about it gives the false impression of big majority support. Appendix 3 summarises the most pertinent findings of the surveys.

The depth of disquiet about Israeli policies, even within the Board of Deputies, was laid bare by the open letter signed by 36 members of the Board, published on 16 April 2025 in the Financial Times. The letter was an anguished and very deep criticism of the cruelty of Israel’s war on Gaza, clearly written because the Board itself would not criticise Israel. Among other things, the letter said “Silence is seen as support for policies and actions that run contrary to our Jewish values.” It also said many more members shared that view but would not do so publicly. The Board’s response to the letter, publicised 10 days later, was to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the signatories. The five leading signatories were suspended for 18 months and the other 31 were given “notices of criticism”.²⁸

Major Jewish communal organisations attitudes towards the incidence of antisemitism

The major Jewish communal organisations make recommendations about dealing with antisemitism but they seem to have contradictory attitudes about the issue. On the one hand, they acknowledge the correlation between spikes of violence in the Israel-Palestinian conflict and spikes in antisemitic incidents here, but not the long-term nature of the increasing trend level of incidents or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as causation of the trend. Their recommendations on dealing with the increase in antisemitism are also contradictory.

Board of Deputies Commission on Antisemitism

The Board set up a Commission on Antisemitism²⁹ chaired by Lord Mann of Holbeck Moor and The Rt. Hon Dame Penny Mordaunt DBE. The Commission’s report, dated 15 July 2025, made a series of practical recommendations on how to prevent an antisemitic environment from developing in workplace settings, professional associations and the arts. It also recommends an appropriate police response to alleged criminal acts in protests or direct action.

The emphasis of the workplace recommendations was on education and understanding, not on deterrence and punishment. The emphasis in the policing recommendation was on consistency across the country, and on treating direct action protests against Israel as a matter for criminal law, not by proscription as terrorism. Both aspects of the report are welcome.

The report states that information was gathered in oral evidence sessions, focus groups and conversations with people from many Jewish and non-Jewish organisations. However, there is no data in the report to back up the statements and apparently no survey work was undertaken. Therefore, there is no way to judge how representative the reported problems in the workplaces actually are.

Recommendations 6 and 7 regarding the NHS require comment. If implemented as the report evidently seeks, they would be unjust and divisive. It states there is “a specific unaddressed issue of antisemitism within the NHS”. Without saying so explicitly, those two long paragraphs clearly claim that Jewish patients feel uncomfortable, even intimidated, when they are treated by clinicians who wear identifiable Palestinian support “badges” or “stickers”, or when dealing with security staff wearing such symbols. Apparently, staff “attire” can also cause discomfiture. While undefined, this presumably means the keffiyeh (Palestinian headscarf), but might also include traditional female Muslim dress such as a niqab or headscarf. Despite affirming peoples right to express their opinions, the report claims “inappropriate” social media use is also a problem.

We have several comments about these recommendations.

There is bound to be great sensitivity about the Israel-Palestinian conflict in Jewish, Muslim and some Christian communities, especially since 7 October 2023, notwithstanding the range of opinions about the conflict in all three communities. This is part and parcel of peoples association of Jews with Israel and the self-identification of many Jews with Israel.

It is certainly possible that some Jews may be apprehensive when being treated by a clinician wearing pro-Palestinian symbols. Some Jews might even be apprehensive when a female clinician dresses in traditional Arab or Muslim fashion.

However, the reverse applies in Muslim communities and some Christian communities. Some Muslims and some Christians may be apprehensive when being treated by a clinician wearing Israeli symbols, such as an Israeli flag pin, or wearing a necklace with a Jewish symbol such as the Star of David or the Hebrew letter Aleph, or by a male clinician wearing a yarmulke, or with tzitzit (prayer shawl fringes) hanging out from under his shirt, or dressed in the black suit of a Hasidic man.

If the Ministry is to adopt any policy in this area, it must be even-handed, applying to Israeli, Jewish and Palestinian symbols, and to both Jewish and Arab traditional attire. We do not understand why the Commission did not appear to recognise this.

Before adopting any policy, the Ministry should undertake proper survey and/or focus group research to ascertain whether there really is a problem.

We cannot see a justification for government or employer concern with peoples social media posting unless posts exceed the bounds of protected speech. Again, that applies both to pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian posting.

After the Heaton Park Attack

The Board of Deputies, the Jewish Leadership Council, the Community Security Trust and the Union of Jewish Students produced this pamphlet³⁰ in response to the terror attack on the Heaton Park Synagogue in October 2025. The pamphlet “is a consolidated summary of urgent policy priorities of the Jewish community, following the antisemitic terrorist attack on the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation”. The first, very short section on security is clearly necessary.

However, we believe the bulk of the report is problematic. It is a zero-tolerance approach to antisemitism, based on deterrence, proscription and sanctions. While it recommends implementing the Commission’s recommendations, it actually seems to ignore them. That approach was understandable after the Heaton Park attack, but we believe it will be counterproductive. Four areas require comment:

Proscription and punishment of “hate speech” are part of the specific recommendations about protest demonstrations, social media, preaching in mosques, live performances, schools and universities. However, no distinction between hate speech and legitimate criticism of Israel is attempted, and the examples it gives are not all hate speech. “Khaybar, yaa Yahood” is clearly hate speech because it celebrates killing of Jews. “Zionists off our streets” is hate speech because it can’t be assumed that all, or even most, self-identifying Zionists are genocidaires who support Israel’s war on Gaza. Many will be liberal Zionists who support the existence of Israel within the 1967 borders but hate what Israel does. On the other hand, “global Intifada”, as widely interpreted, and celebrating “resistance” aren’t hate speech. They support resistance to Israeli policies, which is entirely legitimate. There is no reason to suppose they support terror attacks.

“Antisemitic harassment” in schools and universities is to be proscribed and those found guilty of it subject to disciplinary action. However, no definition of the term is offered, leading to the suspicion that robust criticism of Israel in debate or on campus protests will be called antisemitic harassment, just as the pamphlet conflates legitimate criticism of Israel with hate speech.

“Broadcast media”, especially the BBC, should have antisemitism training and address undefined shortcomings in coverage of the Middle East. Supposedly, OFCOM might need more enforcement powers.

The specific proposals about community relations require comment: “12. To promote social cohesion programmes”, which should “include supporting programmes to promote a positive understanding of Jewish identity and history”; “13. To show solidarity with the Jewish community through visits and engagement to institutions including synagogues and schools, as well as Jewish campus events.”; and “15. MHCLG [Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government] guidance to local government on community cohesion should include avoiding importing international conflict into local communities. Local politicians should reject divisive gestures and focus on dialogue and bridge building within communities. Local authorities should adopt the IHRA definition of antisemitism.”

Good inter-faith community relations is a laudable aim, but how can Muslim communities, and to a lesser extent some Christian communities, possibly be expected to relish positive engagement with Jewish communities when they see what Israel is doing and has done to Palestinians, but are told not to speak about it? Perhaps the Board and the other three sponsors of the report don’t realise how strongly Muslims, and some Christians, in the UK, Europe and North America identify with Palestinians.

The recommendation of “avoiding importing international conflict into local communities” is frankly a patronising means of trying to tell people not to concern themselves with what they in fact viscerally care about. We think actually trying to implement such a short-sighted recommendation will harm community relations.

Protect, Prosecute and Partner

The Board of Deputies and the Jewish Leadership Council produced these ten recommndations³¹ on 5 May 2026, following the Golders Green random terror attack on Jewish individuals. Recommendations 1 and 2 call for justified security measures in view of the recent series of attacks.

The other recommendations are a mixture of calls for various measures to suppress incitement and antisemitism underlying it. All of that, however, is based on assertions and assumptions, without evidence, that strident support for the Palestinian cause is not genuine. Supposedly, it is either an expression of underlying antisemitism or the result of people being manipulated by antisemites.

Recommendation 9 sums up the approach “Understand the link between hatred of Israel and violence on our streets. This is not about foreign policy, it is about showing an understanding of how the conflict is exploited by extremists who reject the very existence of Israel, and the responsibility of politicians and civil society not to be complicit in that extremism.”

The Board and the Council are or should be well aware of the evidence of what Israel has been doing to the Palestinians for 58 years that we have cited. The problem is that they are either unable or unwilling to face up to what Israel does and the inevitable consequence on peoples opinions about Israel. So, instead, they beat the drum of antisemitism as the cause of the criticism.

Criteria for distinguishing between antisemitism and legitimate criticism of Israel

The issue of antisemitism has in recent years become entangled with the right to criticise Israel. While criticisms of Israel can be hidden antisemitism, it is equally true that allegations of antisemitism can be hidden attempts to suppress criticism of Israel. Confusion between them has arisen because, since 2016, the big communal Jewish organisations have been actively promoting the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism (IHRA WD). The IHRA WD is worded in such a way as to create confusion

between criticism of Israel and antisemitism, and is used by its proponents to claim that much fundamental criticism of Israel is antisemitic.

Its provenance provides a clue to its nature. Despite being taken up by the IHRA, it was actually produced by a very small group of people working for or with big Jewish communal organisations that support Israeli policies. Attempting to parse the first sentence will illustrate the difficulty of the whole definition. “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews.” This is bewilderingly imprecise. Just two of the many questions that arise will suffice as illustrations: What is “a certain perception” supposed to mean? What is “may be expressed as hatred” supposed to include or exclude, since ‘may be’ implies ‘may not be’?

In May 2021, the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA) was created after a year of intensive consultations by an international group of eminent academics in the fields of Antisemitism Studies and related fields, including Jewish, Holocaust, Israel, Palestine, and Middle East Studies. It was created as a response to the faulty IHRA WD. Its purposes are to strengthen the fight against antisemitism by clarifying what it is and how it is manifested, and to protect the space for open debate about Israel and Palestine that has been constricted by the faulty IHRA WD.

The definition in the JDA is admirably clear: “Antisemitism is discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish)”. The basic test of whether a criticism of Israel is legitimate or antisemitic is in the language used. If the language refers to what Israeli governments do or did, or what Zionists historically did, and doesn’t ascribe the actions to Jews or Jewish people because they are Jews, then the presumption must be that it is legitimate criticism without additional evidence to suggest antisemitic intent. It might be badly argued or intemperate, but that does not make it antisemitic.

The JDA has now been endorsed by more than 400 scholars from many countries. The framers and endorsers do not all share the same political views on the Middle East. Jews for Justice for Palestinians supports the Jerusalem Declaration. Our website presents the arguments for it.³²

We note that the Commission on Antisemitism report is silent on the subject of criteria, and After the Heaton Park Attack has only this short sentence at the end of a paragraph, without elaboration or argument: “Local authorities should adopt the IHRA definition of antisemitism”. We believe this relative silence is because the big Jewish communal organisations realise that the shortcomings of the IHRA WD have increasingly been recognised, but they want it to be used because of its bias towards considering serious criticism of Israel as antisemitism. Therefore, it seems to us, they want its use to be assumed, almost automatically, without discussion.

We also note that in 2021, fully five years after the IHRA (WD) was promulgated, the CST, the Board of Deputies and Facebook jointly created the pamphlet Protecting the Jewish community from antisemitism on Facebook³³, for use by Jewish users of Facebook in reporting what they felt were antisemitic posts. The pamphlet defines antisemitism as “Antisemitism is discrimination, prejudice or hostility against Jews”. That is remarkably similar to the JDA definition, and completely different from the IHRA (WS) definition. It is a clear indication that the CST and the Board realised the IHRA (WD) is inadequate for distinguishing between statements that are antisemitic from those that are not, which supposedly is its main purpose. The pamphlet is still available on the CST website.

A rational response to the increasing antisemitism

We are left with two major paradoxes. First, Antisemitism, like all racism, is abhorrent. It should not be tolerated. But it is hard to see how the increasing antisemitic feelings in society can be meaningfully reduced when Israel continues oppressing the Palestinians and the big Jewish communal organisations fail to speak out against that oppression.

Second, good relations between communities of different faiths and cultures should be fostered. However, they will not be fostered if, at the behest of the big Jewish communal organisations, the government expects Muslims to suppress their feelings about what is being done by Israel to their brethren in Palestine. What was so notable in the furore surrounding the decision to ban Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters from attending their game in Birmingham was the assumption that the fears expressed by the Muslim communities could not possibly be genuine but were merely expressions of a deep-rooted antisemitism.

We suggest certain realistic parameters:

(1) The risk of physical attacks on Jews or Jewish institutions has to be minimised by appropriate security measures, and planned attacks or actual attacks have to be dealt with by the full force of the law. The same protection should be given to any religious group that requires it. The two CST categories of physical attacks are “Extreme Violence” (life threatening violence) and “Assault” (less than life-threatening violence). They are devastating to the targeted individuals and their families.

However, they comprised only 0.11% and 4.6% of the total 3,700 recorded incidents last year. The extreme violence percentage was about the same for the past 10 years, whereas the Assault percentage actually came down slightly last year.

(2) The most important issue, because it is the most common and the most difficult to deal with, is criticism of Israel which is alleged to be antisemitic. Such allegations, if justified, fall within the CST category of Abusive Behaviour, which is basically antisemitic speech. That includes “everything encompassed by verbal and written antisemitic abuse other than direct threats,… including antisemitic emails, text messages, social media posts and comments, as well as targeted antisemitic letters (that is, one-off letters aimed at and sent to a specific individual), irrespective of whether the recipient is Jewish.” ³⁴

In 2025, Abusive Behaviour comprised 83% of the 3,700 recorded incidents. It has been rising since 2010 when it was 75%, no doubt because of increased social media use. More than half the incidents in 2025 included Anti-Israel and/or anti-Zionist rhetoric.

(3) Criteria for distinguishing rationally between legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitic criticism are therefore essential. The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism provides such criteria and its use should be recommended.

(4) The emphasis in dealing with allegations of antisemitic speech in institutional settings. should be evaluative, educational and disciplinary, in that order. First, to judge whether the speech really was antisemitic. Second, if it was, to educate the person to understand why their particular comment was antisemitic. Third, only on repeated instances or on a blatantly antisemitic remark in the first instance, should a disciplinary procedure be invoked. Appendix 4 briefly describes how to deal with allegations.

(5) The Board of Deputies Commission on Antisemitism report provides a sensible framework for preventing antisemitic environments from developing in workplace settings, professional associations and the arts, providing its recommendations 6 and 7 are implemented with all affected communities. It also recommends an appropriate police response to alleged criminal acts in protests or direct action.

(6) The Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government should pay close attention to the surveys we have cited and consult with a variety of groups in the Jewish community, and not simply accept the word of the “official” communal leadership bodies that they represent the united, “authentic” Jewish voice. That is the only way to understand the true range of Jewish views about Israel and what it does. Appendix 5 lists the progressively-oriented denominational and communal groups and the advocacy groups campaigning for an end to the Israeli occupation.

(7) The Ministry should base its relevant communications with community organisations of other faiths on the actual divergent opinions in the Jewish community about Israeli policies. It should make them aware of the divergence. That is vital because, to repeat, the essential problem we face is the identification of all Jews with what Israel does, which creates an environment in which attacking Jews can be seen as a proxy for attacking Israel.

(8) The protection of freedom of speech is vital. The Ministry should not try to prohibit people from expressing strong, even intemperate opinions about Israel, as long as they are legitimate criticism of Israeli policies and within the bounds of protected speech. Nor should the Ministry try to persuade Muslim or Christian communities that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is so complex that people can’t reasonably make moral judgements about Israeli policies. Neither prohibition nor persuasion is justified. Trying either will only cause resentment which will lead to more antisemitism.

(9) The Ministry should encourage the Board of Deputies and other Jewish communal organisations to reflect the actual distribution of Jewish opinion about Israeli policies, both in their public statements and their private communications with non-Jewish communal organisations, and not to advocate suppression of people’s strong views about Israel. We suggest the Ministry should also encourage them to reflect on why Israel’s policies of occupation and repression are so widely seen as unjust and are judged to be illegal by authoritative bodies, and how that inevitably affects antisemitism here and in other countries.

Conclusion

The level of antisemitism will be hard to reduce, let alone reverse, as long as Israel continues to oppress the Palestinians and as long as the big Jewish communal organisations fail to speak out against that oppression. It is a truism that Jews in the UK, or elsewhere outside Israel, cannot be held responsible for what Israel does. However, that does not change the fact that Israel presents itself very clearly as the Jewish state and the big communal organisations continue to identify themselves with Israel. It makes it very hard for people not to elide Jews with Israel. Repeating the truism ad infinitum will not change the perception in many people’s minds that Jews support what Israel does.

However, even if Israel ended the Gaza war now and agreed to allow the Palestinians to exercise their right to self-determination, the memories of what Israel has done for the past 25 years, indeed for the past 58 years since commencing the occupation in 1967, would not be erased from people’s minds. They would not fade for a long time.

We fear that, realistically, we must expect to live with relatively high levels of antisemitism for years to come. The ability to minimise them lies with the Ministry and the big Jewish communal organisations.

Executive Committee
Jews for Justice for Palestinians
14 May 2026

Notes

1. The Community Security Trust is the British communal Jewish organisation that records and analysis antisemitism in the UK and provides security advice to Jewish organisations. It puts the increase starting in 1984 but we have only charted the period since 2000. Increases have also occurred in other European countries, but this paper is solely concerned with the UK.

2. https://www.thejlc.org/about

3. https://bod.org.uk/board-of-deputies-constitution/

4. https://www.bnaibrithuk.org/advocacy

5. https://www.ujs.org.uk/about_us

6. https://chiefrabbi.org/all-media/what-is-zionism/

7. https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204176

8. https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges

9. https://jfjfp.com/has-israel-created-apartheid/

10. https://passia.org/media/filer_public/64/b0/64b0b990-78b3-47f2-a0e6-24c77084ca87/factsheet_land_and_settlement.pdf p. 7

11. https://statistics.btselem.org/en/demolitions/pretext-unlawful-construction?structureSensor=%5B%22residential%22,%22non-residential%22%5D&tab=overview&stateSensor=%22west-bank%22&demoScopeSensor=%22false%22

12. https://britainpalestineproject.org/bp/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/UN-COI-Israel-Gaza-12-June-2024.pdf

13. https://docs.un.org/en/A/80/337