Brian Brivati reports for the Britain Palestine Project on 8 November 2026:
The rains of 6–7 Nov 2026 flooded tents across Gaza. A month earlier the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned that 950,000 displaced people faced medium or high flood risk and that stocks could partly help only 18 per cent of families needing winter shelter; the UK Government repeated that figure to Parliament on 2 Nov.
Immediately, on the ground:
Reverse the policies that created this
Immediate actions by the United Kingdom Government
What happened on 6–7 Nov 2026
Heavy rain and high winds from Friday evening flooded tents from Jabalia and Gaza port in the north to Khan Younis in the south. Gaza’s government media office estimates 70,000 tents flooded in12 hours; Civil Defence logged 2,166 distress calls and could answer 218, citing fuel shortages and damaged equipment. Both are local figures, not verified by the UN (Reuters, Jerusalem Post).
Two bomb-damaged walls collapsed, injuring four people, and a building in Nuseirat partly collapsed. No deaths had been reported by Saturday; last winter UNICEF recorded at least 11 child deaths from hypothermia in Gaza (WAFA, OCHA 5 Nov, United Nations Children Fund). The UN points to the same causes. OCHA said on 7 Nov that months of funding shortfalls and restrictions had severely constrained preparations, and called for immediate entry of winter supplies, heavy machinery, engine oil and spare parts (OCHA 7 Nov).
Why rain became a catastrophe
Nearly 2m people need shelter assistance; 54 per cent of tents and makeshift shelters were in poor condition before the storm (IOM), and 71 per cent of households surveyed in June had flooded since last winter (NRC).
Israel disputes this: The Israeli army’s Co-ordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) says 91,000 new tents, with tarpaulins and 9,000 truckloads of clothing and blankets, have been delivered for winter (Jerusalem Post). The figures are undated and unitemised, and do not alter OCHA’s count of remaining need.
Three policy decisions caused this:
The Board of Peace: relief must come before politics
Resolution 2803 gave the Board explicit humanitarian duties and promised immediate full aid, including sewage rehabilitation (S/RES/2803). Surely this is why states voted for it. In September the Board costed 66 projects at US$2.45 bn, among them US$400m for insulated mobile shelters, US$80 m for winterisation and US$20 m for eight pumping stations (programme).
None of it reached a family before the rain.
By September only US$280m of US$17 bn pledged had been transferred, no start date was set, and the Palestinian administrative committee could not enter Gaza (Times of Israel); UNSCO found recovery far below the scale required (UNSCO).
UN agencies have delivered under the ceasefire, and the Board has delivered some cargo. But the plan the Security Council endorsed put immediate relief first; disarmament, withdrawal and new institutions came after.
That sequence has been reversed, and Israel now says so: on 8 Nov security officials said reconstruction equipment and mobile homes will not enter while Hamas refuses to disarm (Jerusalem Post). Fear of rearmament is a case for inspection and monitoring, not for leaving families in flooded tents. Rationing aid owed on need alone breaches the principles of humanity and impartiality, and 2803 itself. Dry shelter, working pumps and clean water are not rewards for political progress; they are the first test of the transition.
The Board will report to the Security Council on 15 Nov and its mandate is up for renewal in 2027. Israel’s expulsion of British officials from the International Gaza Support Centre in September, in retaliation for settlement sanctions (Al Jazeera), removed Britain from the coordination room, not from the Council. The UK voted for 2803 and declined to join the Board (Commons Library); as a permanent member it should:
Dismantling UNRWA removes Gaza’s flood response
UNRWA is the network that clears drains, removes waste, inspects shelters and finds the households most at risk. In October it unblocked 1,257 manholes, ran 678 drainage clearances, sheltered 65,000 people in 114 centres and prioritised 270 households in dangerous buildings for relocation, with pumps idle for want of engine oil (UNRWA 5 Nov, SitRep 237).
That network is being dismantled by law and by starvation of funds. The Knesset barred official contact in 2024 and in December 2025 cut water and electricity to UNRWA premises; the UN Secretary-General called this inconsistent with international law and said UNRWA supports implementation of 2803 (Knesset, UNSG).
Israel has blocked UNRWA’s international staff and supplies since March 2025, against the ICJ’s October 2025 advisory opinion. UNRWA has cut service hours by 20 per cent and carries a US$80 m deficit. On 5 Nov UNRWA rejected a reported plan to hand its functions to the Board, saying no other organisation can deliver at equivalent scale in Gaza (AFP, Europa Press). No transfer has been shown to reproduce UNRWA’s 10,500 Gaza staff, facilities, legal access and community trust; cutting first weakens prevention and rescue at once. The UK’s £23 m pledge in June needs political as well as financial follow through (Donor Tracker).
What the UK Government has said and done
In a written answer on 2 Nov, Lord Wood of Anfield acknowledged the 18 per cent figure of those who have been helped, said the UK was pressing Israel to admit dual-use shelter, fuel, water and health items, and cited £88m in humanitarian and early recovery support this year (HL4287). That sum covers Gaza and the West Bank; it is not a winter allocation, and no delivery figures have been published (Arab News). Last winter the UK funded tents for 12,000 people and matched £3 m of DEC donations. On 27 Oct a minister told the Commons that the Government ‘will use’ the new sanctions powers (Hansard) the question is when.
The new IHL sanctions regime: a clear first case
The Global Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Sanctions Regulations 2026 (SI 2026/1071), in force since 15 Oct, allow designation of anyone, anywhere, reasonably suspected of involvement in serious violations of international humanitarian law or obstruction of humanitarian assistance.
The UK Government deserves credit for this serious reform; Lord Wood told the Lords on 4 Nov that it lets the UK respond ‘where aid has been deliberately prevented from reaching civilian populations’ (Hansard). The flooding is its first test.
In November 2024 ICC judges issued arrest warrants for Israel’s Prime Minister and former Defence Minister, finding reasonable grounds to believe they bore criminal responsibility for the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare: a higher bar than the new Regulations set.
Since the ceasefire: the arbitrary denial of shelter materials, fuel and pumps; the exclusion of UNRWA’s international staff; the deregistration of 37 international NGOs; legislation to shut UNRWA down. Each obstructs humanitarian assistance. Those responsible for leaving Gaza’s displaced flooded this week, as children died of cold last winter, are exactly whom this regime was written for.
Sanctions Designations should follow the evidence, against published criteria: Ministers and officials who designed or enforce the restrictions; convoy-blocking groups such as the EU-listed Tzav 9, eligible for the urgent procedure; and members of Hamas or any armed group found diverting aid. Even-handedness answers both the regret motion and Lord Gold’s charge in the debate that the regime ‘applies only to Israel’. On 28 Oct, 75 MPs and peers, in a letter co-ordinated by Caabu and the Britain Palestine Project, asked for designations ‘before winter sets in’ (Caabu). Winter arrived nine days later.
This report is reproduced in its entirety