Why Trump’s 20-point plan for ending the Gaza war simply won’t work

Israeli forces at the Gaza Strip border, 28 September 2025

Michael Ratney writes in Haaretz on 30 September 2025:

U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan for the end of the Gaza war includes some positive aspects, including, finally, a commitment by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that “Israel will not occupy or annex” the Gaza Strip and that none of its Palestinian population “will be forced to leave.”

Trump’s Gaza Riviera comments earlier this year alarmingly – and perhaps inadvertently – injected the idea of forced population transfers into mainstream Israeli political discourse, and so it is reassuring to hear that it is now, at least in theory, off the table.

-There are also references in Trump’s newest plan to establishing Palestinian self-governance, even eventual statehood, and a role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza – references that are surprising given the extreme aversion to such concepts by Netanyahu’s coalition partners.

The truth is that implementing the White House plan in full would be vastly better than the grim and grinding status quo. But, unfortunately, none of the comments made by President Trump or Prime Minister Netanyahu on Monday should suggest that the plan will actually be implemented. And they certainly shouldn’t be seen as a fundamental shift in the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite Trump’s confidence.

A few days ago, we saw a leaked version of Trump’s plan and a post-war blueprint purportedly designed and to be led by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Both of these documents were almost fantastically ambitious – including a “Board of Peace” chaired by Trump himself that seems highly unlikely to ever get off the ground.

But the White House plan formally released on Monday was slightly different. Namely, it included bigger loopholes likely added to make it more palatable to Netanyahu and his far-right coalition partners. These same loopholes will also make it decidedly unpalatable to other, critically important partners in this process: regional governments in the Middle East, of whose support Trump touted in his press conference.

Two areas are particularly problematic. The Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza will be “based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF” and the International Stabilization Force created for Gaza, as well as the plan’s other guarantors and the United States. This essentially leaves any withdrawal from the Strip almost entirely up to Israel’s discretion. According to Netanyahu, that means that when it comes to Gaza, “Israel will retain security responsibility, including a security perimeter for the foreseeable future.”

The other problematic area relates to Palestinian statehood. The plan states that “while Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.” So even if the PA reforms, statehood is no guarantee. To most Palestinian ears, that sounds a whole lot like “never.”

In a joint statement issued after the Trump-Netanyahu press conference, the governments of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar and Egypt welcomed Trump’s efforts, but then zeroed in on the IDF withdrawal and Palestinian statehood, calling for “a security mechanism that guarantees…full Israeli withdrawal, rebuilds Gaza and creates a path for a just peace on the basis of the two-state solution.”

This reflects what’s missing in Trump’s plan: Even if is accepted by Netanyahu, the region doesn’t understand this as a true Israeli commitment to a full withdrawal from Gaza or genuine backing for a two-state solution.

The plan also presents a seemingly existential problem for Hamas, which, according to the text, is required to disarm. Desirable as that may be, from their perspective it effectively means surrender. For a group defined by its militancy, stubbornness, cynicism and pathological cruelty, that seems impossible – essentially the equivalent of asking Hamas to stop being Hamas. What is more, it asks Hamas to commit to disarmament as precondition – even before any of the other measures are implemented (and despite the fact that according to hundreds of Israeli ex-security officials Hamas’ military capacity was degraded to the point of no longer posing a strategic threat to Israel many months ago.).

With his popularity in Israel now greater than Netanyahu’s own and perhaps also greater than almost any other Israeli leader, Trump holds cards that could stop the Gaza war and improve the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Trump has more cards, in fact, than most U.S. presidents would hold (or at least contemplate playing) in such circumstances. Both Israelis and Arabs, not to mention many Americans, hoped he would leverage that influence for good.

But can he or will he force Netanyahu to accept a genuine PA role in Gaza and a path – however conditional – to Palestinian statehood? Could Trump still push Netanyahu to do so, if such a commitment would likely dissolve Netanyahu’s government? Can Trump somehow influence Hamas to give up its weapons and leave the Gaza Strip, and therefore accept defeat? Can he convince the Palestinian Authority to accept a circumscribed and largely technocratic role, at least initially, and a half-hearted Israeli commitment to Palestinian statehood? And can he persuade regional governments to lend their political and financial support to a laudable but still improbable plan?

Obsessing over all this was never where Trump wanted to devote his energies. And from Saudi Arabia to Syria, Arab leaders would likely prefer nothing more than to move on from a conflict that has defined their region for far too long.

Here, their predilections coincide. What Trump wants is largely what much of the region wants: de-escalation of the region’s conflicts replaced with an agenda driven by technology, investment and commerce. This of course includes a stable and decent post-Assad Syria; an end to the belligerence of Iran and its proxies; and eventually the expansion of normalized Israeli relations with the Arab and broader Muslim world.

But as long as the principal news coming from the Middle East is more carnage in Gaza – and Trump’s plan suggests that the carnage will continue – it is hard to be optimistic for any of this to occur.

Even a year ago, Saudi officials still spoke of normalization with Israel. Now their focus has turned to an initiative with France to champion Palestinian statehood. Suffice it to say that’s not where the Saudis planned to devote their energies, either.

In the end, any plan for Gaza’s resuscitation will require more than America’s leadership, Hamas’ disarmament, the PA’s acquiescence or the region’s support.  It will require Israel’s enthusiastic facilitation. But Israel’s approach to anything Palestinian is cautious, grudging, heavily caveated and politically conditioned.

Here is where Trump really has cards to play: Netanyahu doesn’t like saying no to Trump, certainly not in public. This time, Netanyahu found a way to say yes to Trump, or at least seemed to. And for the moment at least, Trump seemed to go along.

Ambassador (ret.) Michael Ratney was the U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Special Envoy for Syria and Consul General in Jerusalem.

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