
Jared Kushner speaking as his wife Ivanka Trump (R) and US special envoy Steve Witkoff (L) look on during a gathering at Hostages Square in Tel Aviv on 11 October 2025
Aaron David Miller and Lauren Morganbesser write in Haaretz on 26 October 2025:
Emerging from his first meeting with newly minted Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in June 1996, an exasperated President Clinton exploded: “Who’s the fucking superpower here?” Turned off by Netanyahu’s brashness, his Democratic successors, Barack Obama and Joe Biden, might well have asked the same question. Donald Trump seems to be the first American president to finally answer it.
In an unprecedented display of presidential resolve, Trump, pressing his 20-point Gaza plan, reportedly told Netanyahu last month, “Take it or leave it. And ‘leave it’ means we walk away from you.” When it comes to Netanyahu, a source close to the president added, “Donald Trump has had enough, for many reasons.” Whether he will maintain that firmness with both Israel and Hamas – and he must, if his Gaza plan is to survive its initial turbulence – remains to be seen.
The long and winding path that would lead a U.S. president to display that kind of toughness sets him apart from all of his predecessors, with the exception of Eisenhower, who once threatened Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion with sanctions unless he withdrew Israeli forces from Sinai.
Trump’s first term was a veritable sugar high for Netanyahu, delivered by a president who cast himself as the most pro-Israel president in U.S. history. He recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, moved the U.S. Embassy there, and affirmed Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. And yet, even then, their relationship was never one of mutual trust, let alone affection.
In 2018, Netanyahu antagonized Washington with talk of an alleged green light from the White House for West Bank annexation, and again in 2020 as Trump announced his “Deal of the Century.”
It was clear that sooner or later, Trump’s patience with an Israeli prime minister always looking to exploit his own political advantage might wear thin. After Netanyahu called to congratulate Joe Biden on his electoral victory in 2020, Trump lashed out, saying “Fuck him” and threatening that Netanyahu “has made a terrible mistake.” That breach required Netanyahu to make an apology pilgrimage to Mar-a-Lago to set matters right.
Still, as Netanyahu welcomed Trump back for a second term by agreeing to a second cease-fire agreement in January 2025, Trump’s preternatural pro-Netanyahu policies continued. The president reversed all of Biden’s wrist slaps against the Netanyahu government – dropping sanctions against Israeli settlers, lifting Biden’s hold on the export of 2,000-pound bombs to Israel, and announcing billions in further military sales to Israel in his first months in office.
Trump also all but acquiesced to Israel’s escalation against Hamas, even when Israel unilaterally broke the cease-fire Trump had brokered.
Even so, a few months into his second term, the Vulcan mind meld that seemed to bind Trump and Netanyahu on so many issues seemed to be weakening. What has become evident this time around is Trump’s willingness to act independently of Israel in ways that none of his predecessors dared. A more astute Netanyahu might have seen this as a signal that Trump’s patience should not be taken for granted, and that Israel no longer had carte blanche to do what it wanted without cost or consequence.
In March, Trump’s envoy for hostage response Adam Boehler held direct talks with Hamas without a green light from Israel, which would ultimately lead to the freeing of Edan Alexander, the last living American hostage in Gaza.
In April, with Netanyahu sitting beside him at the White House, Trump announced that the U.S. was engaging in nuclear talks with Iran, something the prime minister feared and opposed. In May, Trump declared the Houthis had “capitulated,” saying that the U.S. would stop bombing Yemen – a decision he made without notifying Israel in advance. That same month, Trump undertook his first major trip to the Middle East without stopping in Israel.
What finally brought matters to a head was Israel’s September 9 strike on Doha – the proverbial straw that broke Trump’s back. We still don’t know exactly what Trump knew about Israel’s strike on Hamas’ leadership in Doha or when he knew it. The White House claims it was only notified when missiles were already in the air, while Israeli officials maintained that the administration was aware earlier, even if “the timeline to stop it would have been tight.”
It seems unlikely that Netanyahu would have proceeded without at least a flashing yellow light from Trump. But Trump’s key advisers, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, felt Netanyahu had betrayed them. According to Kushner, Trump reportedly felt the Israelis “were getting a little bit out of control” and that it was “time to be very strong and stop them from doing things that he felt were not in their long-term interests.”
The Qataris were beyond furious, threatening to break off their mediating role and retaliate against Israel. The strike on an American ally hosting the region’s largest U.S. military base – at a time when Hamas was deliberating a U.S. plan for Gaza – was not only embarrassing, it might have jeopardized the Abraham Accords, Trump’s signature Middle East achievement. Gulf states increasingly saw Israel as a threat to their interests. Indeed, this marked the second time Qatar had been struck over an Israel-related issue; in June, Iran had targeted the Al Udeid U.S. base in Qatar in retaliation for American attacks on its nuclear sites.
The Israeli strike on Doha accelerated the administration’s efforts to crystallize its Gaza endgame initiative and compel Israel to accept it. The way Trump dealt with Netanyahu had no precedent in the history of U.S. peacemaking. As in the past, Israel got a look at the 20-point plan in advance. But this time, Trump reportedly wanted no “yes, buts” from Netanyahu.
He forced Netanyahu to issue an apology to Qatar and pressed him hard to accept the deal.
When Trump received what was a clear conditional response from Hamas, he treated it as a yes, ignoring Netanyahu’s complaints and pressing him on why he was “always so fucking negative,” telling him to “take it.” Trump was in no mood to negotiate and made it clear that neither Hamas nor Israel wanted to disappoint him. Suffice it to say, Netanyahu had no choice.
This was a very pro-Israeli plan, but Netanyahu would have preferred no plan at all, and hoped Hamas would reject it. In the end, Trump gave him no choice – an almost unprecedented dynamic in the relationship between an Israeli prime minister and an American president. With his eyes on coalition politics and looming elections, Netanyahu couldn’t afford to say no and risk a break with a president who had given him so much support. He would need Trump not as a bystander, but as an active campaigner in what would almost certainly be Israel’s 2026 elections.
Two features stand out in Trump’s unique risk-ready, tough-minded, transactional approach.
First, his unsentimentality. Trump may have been staunchly pro-Israel, but he lacks much of the emotional investment and identification with Israel’s history that constrained past presidents. Trump isn’t Bill Clinton, who wrote in his memoir “My Life” that “by the time he was killed, I had come to love [Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin] as I had rarely loved another man.”.
Nor is Trump Joe Biden, a self-described Zionist whose long career in the Senate gave him decades of experiences with Israel and who seemed in love with the people, its security, and the very idea of a Jewish state. His remarks three days after the October 7 Hamas attack, and his identification with Israel’s “black hole” of loss, made clear that this president would find it difficult to pressure Israel after what its people had suffered.
Freed from all of that, President Trump was much better positioned to bring pressure on Netanyahu should Bibi appear to be playing him, making him look weak, or getting in between the President and something he wanted.
Then there was the politics, perhaps the key factor historically restraining presidents from pressing Israel. Trump himself was uniquely positioned to escape the political fallout. First there was his control of the Republican Party. Simply put, Netanyahu could not play politics in Washington. There would be no repeat of 2015, when Netanyahu circumvented Obama by addressing Congress at a Republican Speaker’s invitation.
Indeed, given the growing public opposition to Israeli policies in Gaza, Netanyahu had no higher court of appeal in Washington or among the American public should the president want to get tough. In the summer, growing numbers of mainstream Democrats called openly for restricting or conditioning U.S. military assistance to Israel to end the war; and even influential voices in the MAGA world were critical of unchecked American support for Israel.
Moreover, how could anyone criticize such a stalwart defender of Israel, now pushing a tough-minded Israeli prime minister to do what most Israelis and Americans wanted him to do: end the war in Gaza? Trump, after all, owned the very constituencies Netanyahu had spent years cultivating – evangelicals and conservative Republicans. Indeed, Trump was far more popular than Netanyahu himself.
The question now is whether Trump’s firmness with Netanyahu is a one-off headline or the start of a more sustainable trend. Trump is known for moving quickly from one issue to another, claiming to have resolved seven conflicts, and, in the wake of the cease-fire in Gaza, adding number eight to that list.
So far, it seems Trump isn’t prepared to take no for an answer. Despite reports that rogue Hamas forces were behind the recent cease-fire violations, Trump did not respond by aligning with Israel but instead pressed it to maintain humanitarian aid efforts. With Witkoff and Kushner dispatched to Israel and Vice President Vance and Secretary of State Rubio following, it seems as if Trump is taking charge of decision-making in Gaza.
The real question is how serious Trump is about tackling issues that would truly end the war in Gaza: taking Hamas’ weapons away, establishing an international stabilization force, setting up a credible transitional governing structure, and creating a pathway for the reconstitution of Gaza.
Beyond that, does Trump envision an initiative to tackle the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and perhaps secure himself his long-sought Nobel?
One thing, however, is unmistakably clear: None of this peacemaking is self-implementing. Success will depend on a president who truly owns his Gaza initiative, pressing a tough-minded Israeli Prime Minister hard to see it through, and prepared to impose real costs and consequences if he does not.
Aaron David Miller is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment and a former State Department Middle East analyst and negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations.
Lauren Morganbesser is a fellow at The Cohen Group. The views expressed in this article are her own
This article is reproduced in its entirety