Francesco Salesio Schiavi writes in The New Arab on 27 October 2025:
The push to implement an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) in Gaza is gathering pace at the United Nations, with diplomats preparing a Security Council resolution that would grant the mission a UN mandate without turning it into a classic peacekeeping force.
The model under discussion, led by France, Britain, and the United States, borrows from Haiti’s multinational security mission: robust powers to police armed groups, but outside of the UN’s traditional blue-helmet architecture.
At the centre of the plan is Egypt, expected to lead the force given its shared border, intelligence links, and Arab legitimacy – though Cairo is still haggling over mandate, duration, and leadership, and has signalled preferences that range from a US-headed mission to insistence on Turkish participation under a clearly capped deployment.
Washington and European capitals are courting Muslim-majority contributors – with Indonesia publicly willing to deploy in large numbers and Azerbaijan floated as a politically convenient partner – while Israel pushes back hard on any Turkish boots on the ground.
Parallel to the security track, negotiators are sketching a civilian architecture: a Gaza International Transitional Authority of Palestinian technocrats, overseen by an international “Board of Peace,” to sequence disarmament, policing, and reconstruction.
Yet the biggest hurdles remain unresolved: who decommissions Hamas’s weapons, under what verification, and with which rules of engagement – all against a reconstruction bill north of $67–70 billion and a volatile ceasefire that could unravel the day any mandate proves too weak or too political to enforce.