Etan Nechin wrtes in Haaretz on 2 December 2025:
On October 13, 2025, US President Donald Trump arrived in Sharm el-Sheikh flanked by world leaders and cameras, proclaiming the “dawn of a new Middle East.” The occasion was the Gaza Peace Summit, a Red Sea spectacle meant to mark the first phase of a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas after two years of war.
Presidents, prime ministers and monarchs – from France’s Macron and the UK’s Starmer to Turkey’s Erdoğan and the Qatari emir – stood before a gleaming sign that read “Peace 2025,” their smiles fixed beneath the desert sun.
Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi co-chaired the event, joined by Turkey and Qatar in signing what was grandly titled The Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity, – a document heavy on ceremony and light on substance. “This took 3,000 years to get to this point,” Trump said mid-signature. “And it’s going to hold up, too.”
Just hours earlier, he addressed Israel’s Knesset, touting his role in securing what he called a “historic breakthrough,” as the remaining 20 living hostages crossed from Gaza into Israel. Across the region, the sound of fighter jets was replaced, briefly, by silence – a silence that felt like hope, or perhaps just exhaustion. Missing from the summit, however, were the two sides still at war: no handshakes between Israelis and Palestinians, no shared podium, no gesture of recognition.
Since the first talks between Israelis and Palestinians in 1989, there have been countless handshakes, signatures and declarations. Every generation of negotiators has promised that history would move forward. Yet somehow, it always returns to the same place.
That illusion of progress that circles back to stalemate is the subject of Tomorrow Is Yesterday: Life, Death, and the Pursuit of Peace in Israel/Palestine, a new book by veteran negotiators Robert Malley – who represented the Americans under former Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, was lead negotiator on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, and briefly Iran envoy in the Biden administration – and Hussein Agha, who for decades advised Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas.
The book is part joint-autobiography, part history, part political analysis and a confessional on how cycles of negotiations were doomed from the start. In a recent video conversation with Haaretz, Malley and Agha contextualize the Israel-Hamas cease-fire, the lessons of the past and what constitutes a win in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Let’s start with the present. How do you see the current cease-fire compared to earlier ones under Trump and Joe Biden? What’s changed? Has Trump succeeded where Biden didn’t?
Hussein Agha: The most important thing about this [current] cease-fire is ending the carnage in Gaza and releasing the captives. Beyond that, I’m not very hopeful that later stages will be implemented. Too many parties are involved, and I’m not sure who’s in charge.
So Trump hasn’t achieved anything?
Hussein AghaAgha: Trump has succeeded mainly through his personal influence and by bringing in states like Qatar and Turkey, which created a buffer between the US, Israel, and Hamas. You now have a broader coalition than before – beyond the usual US, Israel, Egypt, Jordan framework. The key figure in all this is Trump. I doubt Trump can oversee it consistently. He’ll probably intervene occasionally or send emissaries, but that won’t be enough. Plans rarely matter in the Israel-Palestine context. What matters are changes on the ground.
Robert Malley: You wanted to start with the present, but so many elements we’re discussing in Gaza are remnants of the past: a plan about the Palestinians without Palestinian input; both sides agreeing but trying to avoid the hard parts; a detailed text that will mean little on the ground. We’re seeing a semi-trusteeship – again, a throwback. Israel is using this to divide Palestinians, choosing who governs where.
What’s different is Trump’s unorthodoxy. Few people say no to him. Israel can’t, Arab countries can’t, even Hamas is going along. He treats the cease-fire as mission accomplished. There’s no clear plan. Still, his willingness to talk to Hamas and his disregard for political convention are novel. That’s what got us here. Beyond that, I share Hussein’s skepticism.
Same old, same old
To Malley and Agha, October 7 and its aftermath are not an aberration but a reckoning – “the past’s formidable revenge.” While much of the world rushed to condemn Hamas, even Israel’s staunchest allies, like Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, turned their outrage toward Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Yet, the authors argue, that anger was less about moral awakening than moral evasion. Critics “could break with a man without breaking with long-held beliefs” about Israel itself.
Nor do Malley and Agha spare the Palestinians in their book. They write that “October 7 was neither uniquely Hamas nor distinctively Islamist. It was Palestinian through and through,” noting how even Mahmoud Abbas, long critical of violence and convinced of its futility, hesitated to condemn the attacks.
So this is all a regurgitation of the past?
Agha: What I see today resembles something we haven’t seen: Gaza divided like Beirut during the civil war. We’ll see two Gazas: East Gaza, run by Israel, with withdrawals that aren’t real; and West Gaza, governed by a mix of Hamas and the PA under Turkish and Qatari supervision to prevent flare-ups. The IDF will control the east, largely emptied of Palestinians, where Israel could build a “model city” to project stability, while Hamas struggles to hold the west.
Malley: All these efforts to fragment Palestinian territory are age-old. The idea of creating a “new Gaza” as a model for the “old Gaza” mirrors the old notion that the West Bank would be the model for Gaza. It didn’t work then and won’t now. It’s a recipe for long-term division and fragmentation.
But do you see any real change since then? Has anything shifted in the fundamental dynamic between Israelis and Palestinians, or will things simply revert to the same pattern?
Agha: Palestinians have tried operations like this for 30 or 40 years, and they were all thwarted by Israeli vigilance. Even after October 7, there were similar attempts from the West Bank, but those failed because of [the Israeli] security forces. So this wasn’t about a failed conception. October 7 [and its aftermath] revealed the depth of resentment on both sides. Many Palestinians didn’t mind what happened on that day; many Israelis didn’t mind what followed in Gaza. Israelis focused on the hostages and their suffering, not on what was happening to Palestinians.
Now both societies are fully aware of the other’s hostility. You can’t paper over that with diplomacy. For decades, we tried to frame this as a neat territorial dispute: two peoples fighting over land. Divide it, and peace will come. But that was never the real conflict. This is about emotion, history, humiliation and trauma.
Robert Malley in 2021Malley: We admit failure. To claim we now hold the right solution would be arrogance, hubris. All we can do is bury the obstacle that remains – the illusion that led to October 7 and what followed. Palestinians didn’t suddenly decide to support violence; those feelings existed long before. And Israelis didn’t suddenly react out of nowhere; their fear and anger were deeply rooted too.
Outsiders on the inside
While Agha and Malley were part of negotiating teams, they were anything but insiders.
Agha, 76, was born into a prosperous Beirut family. He writes of himself that he’s part-Iranian, part-Iraqi, part-Lebanese and “by conviction, part Palestinian.” Agha grew up in a cosmopolitan Beirut among Jews. His cultural heroes: Franz Kafka, Marcel Proust, J. D. Salinger, and Isaac Bashevis Singer; Isaiah Berlin; Bob Dylan, Leonard Cohen, Billy Wilder and Jules Dassin. It was only later, he reflected, that he realized how many of his influences and friends were Jewish – a detail that would resonate years later, across negotiating tables.
He joined Fatah at 19, while studying at the American University of Beirut. Soon after, he became active in organizing demonstrations, was briefly declared persona non grata by Lebanese authorities for his role in a pro-Palestinian protest and fled to London. He later returned to Beirut with the help of Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt and Imam Musa Sadr.
As a student at Oxford, admitted in 1970, he led the university’s Arab society, promoted dialogue with Jewish and Israeli students and formed close friendships with figures such as journalist I.F. Stone and PLO envoy Said Hammami. His circles even stretched to Israeli leftists like Israeli Black Panther co-founder Charlie Biton, whom he published a journal titled “Miftah,” key with.
Agha’s long immersion in backchannel diplomacy made him one of the most trusted Palestinian interlocutors of his generation. In the early 1990s, Yasser Arafat tasked him with, in addition to advising, quietly observing the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation in Washington throughout the Madrid talks. Then he was part of the negotiating team in Oslo.
Agha and Malley write of Agha and his teammate Ahmed Khalidi, who were negotiators for Arafat during Oslo: “If you want to know what Arafat thinks he thinks, someone quipped, ask Arafat. If you want to know what he really thinks, ask the duo.”
Agha admits having a “predilection for dealing with right-wing Israelis” whom he found more convicted and less naïve than their leftist counterparts. From 2010 to 2013, he led secret negotiations on behalf of Mahmoud Abbas with Netanyahu confidant Yitzhak Molcho until those dissipated as well.
Agha has spent more than 25 years as a senior associate at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford.
Robert Malley, 62, comes from a unique background as well. Malley is the son of Simon Malley, a Jew of Syrian descent born in Egypt who later moved to France in 1969. Simon Malley was an influential journalist-publisher devoted to anti-colonialist national liberation movements. He championed Algerian independence, Nasser’s pan-Arabism and the PLO while opposing Zionism. Malley senior was so influential and controversial that in 1980, France’s President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing expelled him from the country. He edited the magazine from exile in New York and Geneva before returning after François Mitterrand was elected.
At 17, as a freshman at Yale, Robert Malley published his first article, a critique of Zionism. He also warned that “anti-Zionism and antisemitism were being once again confused,” an argument that has been especially contentious these past two years.
A year later, during a family trip to Algiers, Malley met a Palestinian for the first time. It was Yasser Arafat who had come to visit his father. Upon realizing that Robert and his siblings didn’t speak Arabic, he promised to speak English next time. That next time they would meet, Malley and Agha write, would be 17 years later, “in the presence of the president of The United States.” If his father was the eternal outsider, Robert became the outsider who made it inside. On the American peace team, he was the lone non-Zionist Jew among figures like Dennis Ross, Sandy Berger and Martin Indyk.
In time, Malley’s unorthodox instincts would pull him into controversy. Criticizing U.S. policy toward Israel got him branded anti-Israel; a meeting with Hamas made Obama drop him from his campaign. Obama would later appoint him as “ISIS Czar” in the battle against the Islamic State. In 2021 under Biden, his return to the White House as Iran envoy ended in controversy when he was accused of mishandling classified information, a violation of federal law. He was suspended and put leave. During a talk in September, Malley said the case has been closed.
Today, he teaches at Yale, where he’s a senior fellow at the university’s school of global affairs.
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat shaking hands with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak as US negotiator Robert Malley, (C) looks on at the 2000 Camp David SummitThis book is essentially a chronicle of failures. What, to you, is the core misconception about Israel-Palestine?
Malley: October 7 wasn’t about the Clinton or Kerry parameters. Palestinians didn’t act because they rejected some map, and Israelis didn’t retaliate because of any policy paper. It was about history – dispossession, fear, persecution, survival.
Agha: I call it a biblical conflict, not a diplomatic one. It’s not like a French-British border dispute. Outsiders tried to resolve it with documents and agreements, but they missed its nature entirely. It’s a conflict that needs prophets, not diplomats.
What drove Palestinians to October 7 wasn’t disagreement over borders or security arrangements – it was emotion, despair, humiliation. Without understanding that, you keep repeating the same formulas and getting the same results.
So we’re forever entrenched?
Agha: It’s important to compare the objectives of the Zionist movement and the Palestinian national movement. The Zionist movement was directed toward two things: First, to establish a Jewish state, and second, to bring as many Jews from the Diaspora as possible to live in it. Then, to normalize that state so it would become one among the nations of the world.
The Palestinian movement was not about statehood. The notion of a state came late to the Palestinians. The movement was about liberation, about return, about correcting an injustice that was done to them. For the Jews, the injustice was real, but it wasn’t done by Palestinians – it was done by Europeans, the West, Nazi Germany. For Palestinians, the quest was justice – to see it clearly done, not just paid lip service to.
The notion of liberation and freedom is different for Palestinians than it is for Israelis. The Israeli and Western concept of freedom is individualistic and political. For Palestinians, it’s more basic, almost primal – the desire to be themselves, on their own land, running their own affairs, without superior powers imposing outcomes they cannot accept.
When those lines never meet, you begin to feel helpless about how to bring them together. Conflicts like ours don’t end with texts or declarations – they end with societal change. Something like truth and reconciliation, where grievances are laid bare and from there you build a model that accounts for both sides’ needs.
Revisionism and recognition
The book exposes how negotiators, constrained by time and politics, focus on borders and security while leaving unspoken the deeper psychological and historical rifts. In this sense, the negotiation table is both literal and symbolic – a place where history is meant to be settled but is instead endlessly deferred.
In Israel, there’s a conception that Arafat never wanted a state, that he didn’t take off his uniform even after he signed Oslo. Was this your impression?
Malley: It’s strange to debate that today, when there’s not a single member of Israel’s cabinet who supports a Palestinian state. But yes, this debate keeps returning. Arafat was always a militant – his uniform, his rhetoric, the rifle in one hand and the olive branch in the other. That’s precisely what made him capable of selling the idea of two states, which, for Palestinians, had always seemed like betrayal. It took someone with his credibility as a fighter to say: This isn’t defeat, it’s an achievement if we can secure a state.
In the book, we write that Arafat was a liar and a cheat, but maybe that was exactly the kind of leader this conflict required. Everyone, including his own people, knew it. He had no army, no resources, no territorial base, and yet he kept it all together. Maybe that’s what it took. Maybe that’s what’s missing now.
Agha: He was a liar and a cheat, like all prophets.
And on the Israeli side – looking back at Oslo, there’s some revisionism on the left that Yitzhak Rabin never wanted a Palestinian state, Ehud Barak perhaps had intentions but hesitated, and Ehud Olmert came closest. From your perspective, did any of them truly want peace?
Agha: I think all Israeli leaders wanted some kind of resolution, though always within limits. Each had conditions – security first among them. Even Netanyahu, in his own way, wanted to manage the conflict. His Bar-Ilan speech wasn’t accidental. People say he never wanted a Palestinian state, but his position was: we don’t want to govern you or create a binational state. If you want to call what we give you a state, fine – but our security concerns must come first.
That’s changed now. The language and experiences have hardened. Polls show 80 percent of Israelis oppose a Palestinian state. But these numbers shift with circumstance. After Camp David, 70 percent supported a diplomatic two-state solution, then voted for [Ariel] Sharon, who didn’t.
Malley: I don’t pay much attention to motivations. I care about actions. And I don’t care much about titles – state or not. Netanyahu once said, “Call it a state if you want.” Jared Kushner recently said something similar: Let them call it whatever they like. But what matters is the lived reality.
Do Palestinians feel free? Do they govern themselves without outside control? On that, the gap remains enormous. Many Israelis see themselves as victors offering generosity – land to those they defeated. But from a Palestinian perspective, it’s not generosity, it’s restitution. They’re not being given land; it’s being returned.
You describe the Palestinian Authority as a “subcontractor.” Has that arrangement – Israel granting partial autonomy while maintaining control – become an obstacle to real peace?
Agha: If the Palestinians had achieved something they could live with, security coordination would have been inevitable, even necessary. But when that coordination becomes the only relationship – when Palestinian forces help Israel arrest militants but can’t protect their own people – it becomes toxic.
No Palestinian feels proud of an authority that helps Israel restrain Palestinians while doing nothing about settlers attacking them. This imbalance deepens resentment. After Oslo, some Palestinians said life was better before – when they could move freely, go to Jaffa, meet Israelis. Now they can’t, and the only connection is through security control.
Malley: Palestinians are governed by an authority dependent on Israel for movement, funding, and even permission to operate. It doesn’t represent freedom; it represents dependency. From Israel’s view, it’s been very effective. From a Palestinian view, it’s a catastrophe.
Agha: After Oslo, when hope still existed, Israeli and Palestinian security people cooperated closely. They built friendships, criticized their own leaders and worked together. Some of those relationships even survive today, but once politics failed completely, it turned hollow and bitter.
Recently, countries have recognized Palestine as a state. Some see it as symbolic, others as meaningful. Do you think these recognitions matter?
Malley: Recognition changes nothing without Israel’s acceptance. It’s symbolic, not practical. It might make some Europeans feel better – like they’ve done their part – but it doesn’t alter the situation.
Agha: It’s a substitute for genuine action. Governments say, ‘We’ve recognized you – now work it out.’ It lets them feel virtuous without actually doing anything to change conditions on the ground.
You were part of the negotiating team during the early two-state efforts, yet now Washington boycotts such summits, even as American public opinion shifts dramatically. How do you understand that change?
Malley: There’s no question that US public opinion has changed, especially among younger people, and mostly among Democrats, though not only them. People see Gaza’s images and ask how this can be justified. Others wonder why the US spends billions supporting Israel while calling for a cease-fire it undermines.
Whether that translates politically is unclear. Do voters prioritize it? Will politicians respond? Hard to say. But the change is real – and unprecedented in my lifetime. Even in local politics. A few years ago, Zohran Mamdani wouldn’t have been electable with his positions on Israel. Now, his stance isn’t disqualifying; in fact, it energized voters.
If Washington recognized Palestine, it would matter far more than any European gesture. Based on your experience, why has America failed to play a constructive role?
Malley: The U.S. has enormous leverage and claims a deep interest in resolving this conflict. But look at the record since 1993 – things are far worse now. So by any measure, its role has been negative, even if unintentionally so.
Part of the problem was misunderstanding the conflict, reducing it to text and treaties. And part of it was self-interest. The “peace process” served American goals: managing Arab relations, isolating rivals, shielding Israel from consequences. It gave the appearance of engagement without the cost of real pressure. The process itself became the point.
Netanyahu and his allies touted victories over Iran and Hezbollah. Gaza is destroyed. Doesn’t this create a new dynamic?
Agha: Israel can claim tactical or military successes. But Clausewitz defined victory as imposing one’s will on the enemy. By that measure, Israel hasn’t won any of these wars. Hezbollah still holds territory and influence despite pressure and returning to guerrilla tactics. Hamas is still there. You can kill every Hamas fighter in Gaza and it would still exist, because it’s rooted in the society. Iran is still standing, still arming, still projecting power. It will reemerge, only now having learned from its mistakes. It misread and mishandled situations, but it adapts.
The IDF’s former spokesperson, Daniel Hagari, recently said Hamas is “an idea.”
Agha: Yes, but ideas don’t act on their own; they need people. Hamas endures not only as an idea but because its social base remains. It’s embedded in the population. This version of political Islam is neither jihadist nor “moderate.” It has deep cultural and social roots. It’s not going anywhere.
Meanwhile, Israel itself has suffered a shock unlike any of them. A Palestinian friend told me recently, “Israelis have killed us, but we’ve fucked them up.” You can kill people and they come back. But when you break a society’s sense of invincibility, it’s harder to repair.
There’s no total victory here, only exhaustion.
Malley: It’s a long movie. We’re still in the first act.
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