‘Tectonic’: Israeli annexation of the West Bank is now a legal reality
Israeli soldiers point their weapons at the camera, during a weekly settlers’ tour in Hebron, February 2026
Dahlia Scheindlin writes in Haaretz on 10 February 2026:
Israel’s security cabinet, an inner club within the government, approved a series of measures on Sunday [8 February] regarding the West Bank that an uninitiated observer would find head-spinning. The new measures cancel Jordanian land acquisition regulations in the West Bank (yawn); they cancel the requirement for a transaction permit for Israeli land purchase (huh?). The cabinet decided to expand Israeli authority in Areas A and B (what’s that again?) and transfer planning and building authorities around the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, and at Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem, from the Hebron municipality to Israel’s Civil Administration (does it matter who picks up the trash around a holy site?)
Are these decisions really so important in light of massive regional developments – U.S.-Iran talks alongside the ongoing specter of a fresh war, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington, the desperate situation in Gaza, or the five-year-old Palestinian cancer patient barred from treatment in Israel? And even if we do focus on the West Bank, isn’t the spike in settler attacks – firebombing, vandalism, destruction of water lines, livestock or whole Palestinians villages – more urgent?
These issues are all urgent. But to understand Israel’s big-picture policy regarding Palestinians, the administrative bureaucracy matters more than the big headlines about violent settlers. The full implications are spelled out at length in a detailed analysis by Peace Now. As for the political impact, Prof. Yael Berda, a Hebrew University sociologist who researches the bureaucratic mechanisms of occupation, says the security cabinet changes are no less than “tectonic.” Why?
The culmination of annexation
First, analysts (including Berda and me), activist groups and international courts have warned Israel of de facto annexation for years, with little resonance or reaction. Foreign governments who reject annexation and settlements as a gross violation of international law found they could avoid taking action if Israel didn’t actually declare it.
This has long bothered anyone who opposes Israel’s annexationist path on the ground. One message from an alarmed colleague said sarcastically that the government would surely argue that these are simply pinpointed technicalities; that they’re “protecting antiquities” or working to prevent “water crimes” in Areas A and B, where Palestinian authorities are supposed to be in control.
That critic was wrong: This government and its closest allies have been more explicit and open about their aim to own all of Mandate Palestine forever than any other government in Israel since 1967. Israel’s leaders aren’t trying to fudge this – they’re shouting it from the rooftops.
The far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich (who is also a minister of de facto annexation), who led the cabinet decisions together with Defense Minister Israel Katz, said this was a historic day for the settlements of Judea and Samaria.
Energy Minister Eli Cohen, a member of the security cabinet, openly told Army Radio on Sunday that this was a matter of de facto sovereignty. The Yesha Council posted on its Telegram channel that the decisions “entrench de facto sovereignty” – clearly repeating a unified talking point. Yossi Dagan, head of the Samaria council, told the far-right outlet Arutz Sheva that this is a checkmate, and the “mate” would be “full sovereignty over the settlements and open lands. … I thank Smotrich and call to continue through to full sovereignty over Judea and Samaria.”
Such open declarations are not new. In July 2025, 71 lawmakers called to apply sovereignty “over Judea and Samaria, and the Jordan Valley.” Since the current coalition holds only 68 seats, the resolution had some opposition MKs as well. In October, the Knesset voted on two actual bills to apply Israeli law to part or all of the West Bank. One was submitted by Avigdor Lieberman, from the opposition; both passed their early-stage votes.
The current changes are worse; they effectively remove even the bureaucratic constraints on land grabs and settlements, and take large bites out of the nominal authority Palestinians had in the bits of land called Areas A and B.
Berda says it’s no longer a matter of workarounds to the Oslo agreements, which originally aimed to draw down Israel’s occupation; this means upending the whole system. “We’ve been trying to point out that it’s de jure annexation and not just creeping or de facto, but now we don’t have to argue it. They’re saying it and they’re doing it.”
Second, there is barely any opposition. As noted, some opposition parties support annexation in one or more forms. Hadash leader Ayman Odeh protested passionately on X, with no impact. “Barely” comes from Israel’s left-wing Zionist party leader Yair Golan, head of the Democrats. In general, Golan has rarely wanted to touch on the future of the Palestinians, preferring instead to harangue Netanyahu for his failures.
However, some days earlier, Golan gave a tiny statement condemning settler violence and the government’s role, as well as stating that: “We will stop financing illegal activities. We will strengthen and embrace those communities adjacent to the fence, and there will be a border demarcation, to preserve Israel with a firm Jewish majority.”
That’s it: “border demarcation.” If you blinked, you would have missed it. He can barely say “two-state solution” and prefers not to discuss Palestinians.
It’s hard to argue, when his party is winning between eight and 12 seats in credible polls. That’s an improvement on the current four seats for the Zionist left-wing party in Knesset. But leadership does not mean slavish devotion to polls. It means vision and the courage to state your convictions. The right wing has this down. The left – not so much. Third, despite what Israelis think or hope, this is not merely Israel’s domestic little problem with the Palestinians. The move could play into the tense dance with Israel’s greatest ally.
Reports say the White House reiterated its opposition to annexation following the cabinet’s decisions. Following the Knesset votes in October, Trump was asked about annexation and told Time Magazine: “It won’t happen. It won’t happen. It won’t happen.” Vice President JD Vance called the move “stupid” and an insult. Trump also made the stunning claim that: “I gave my word to the Arab countries… Israel would lose all of its support from the United States if [annexation] happened.”
But there is a weird parallel to Trump’s geopolitical dance with Iran here. Just as Trump summarily abandoned his promise to help the Iranian demonstrators who died for their freedom, will there be any repercussions for Israel crossing his will? It looks like a case of TCOA – Trump Chickens Out Again. This is pronounced “T’koa,” just like the West Bank settlement.
After all, if Trump was bargaining with Arab states in the fall, why not bargain with Netanyahu now? “Listen,” Trump might tell Netanyahu in their meeting this week, “I never cared about the Iranian protesters, and it’s not in my interest to bomb now. I’ll let you annex, Bibi, annex, but in return, you need to show public adulation for my clever restraint with Iran, and I don’t care how much it hurts.”
On the other hand, Trump and Netanyahu might meet and decide that the U.S. bombs Iran, and Trump flips to allow annexation by simply standing by. Flips and obfuscation would be as much in character for Trump as the cold quid pro quo of the first scenario.
Unchained
The bottom line is that for Israel, declaration is the new obfuscation – other countries can’t pretend they didn’t know. “They always said they’d act when Israel annexes,” said Berda. “We argued, are you waiting for Israel to plant a flag there and say it’s mine? Well, now it’s doing that.”
But letting Israel do what it wants, no matter how much cajoling, chiding and global handwringing happens – is no less in character for the U.S. and the international community as a whole.
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