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Posts

Bibi jumps into arms of far-right bruiser

Bibi’s mistake

Netanyahu hopes his new superparty will give him the stable majority he’s always wanted. But joining forces with the far right could turn out to be a political disaster.

By Michael Koplow, Foreign Policy
October 30, 2012

In an announcement last Thursday that shocked the Israeli political establishment, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman stated their intention to merge Netanyahu’s Likud Party with Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu. Despite the contention made by some — notably Haaretz editor Aluf Benn — that this move creates a war cabinet that will make it easier for Israel to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, it’s more likely the two men had domestic politics at the forefront of their minds. In birthing the new Likud Beiteinu, Netanyahu and Lieberman are hoping to create a monolith that will dominate Israeli politics for years to come.

Creating a workable majority in the 120-seat Knesset has proven to be difficult, and always requires a coalition of larger and smaller parties. In the current Knesset, Kadima has the most seats with 28, and Likud comes in second with 27, but these numbers are historically low for the top vote-getters. Two decades ago, Labor won the 1992 Knesset elections after garnering 44 seats and Likud came in second with 32 seats, while the previous election in 1988 had yielded 40 seats for Likud and 39 for Labor’s leftwing bloc. Netanyahu and Lieberman are gambling that their new Likud Beiteinu party will be an electorally dominant rightwing giant by combining the strength of their two parties while also picking up former Likud voters who have voted for Kadima in the past two elections. The hope is that a bigger party will have the strength to withstand hostage-taking demands from smaller parties and be able to push its agenda through the Knesset with a minimum of haggling and horse trading. That agenda is likely to include a renewed push for Haredi military service, more building in the West Bank, and a neoliberal economic policy — and Netanyahu wants to be able to carry his policies out with a minimum of resistance.

While this is nice in theory, it is unlikely to play out in the way that Netanyahu and Lieberman hope. To begin with, the current polls are not looking too promising and show Likud Beiteinu either slipping from its current combination of 42 seats or maintaining the exact same share of the Knesset that it holds now. Controlling 42 seats as a single party would give Netanyahu a lot of power and flexibility, and there is certainly plenty of time between now and the election for Likud Beiteinu to surge in the polls. There are, however, good reasons to believe that the new party is not going to surge, but is actually going to slip.

To begin with, Likud Beiteinu might have a real problem with the Russian voters who make up Yisrael Beiteinu’s base. A poll commissioned for Channel 99 showed only 59 percent of 2009 Yisrael Beiteinu voters casting their ballot for the new mega-party in 2013, with 22 percent undecided. It is very possible that Russian voters who voted for Yisrael Beiteinu because it served as a patronage party bringing benefits to Russian immigrants are rightfully wary that Likud Beiteinu will have the same focus, and are casting around for another party to fill that void.

Within Likud, there is a mirror-image problem of the party’s base of Mizrahi (Jews primarily from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen) voters being turned off by the elevation of the Russian Lieberman to the second-most powerful person in Likud. The party has long struggled with the problem of having a Sephardi grassroots and an Ashkenazi leadership, and the inclusion of Lieberman along with the concurrent exit of Communications Minister Moshe Kahlon, who is of Libyan descent, might very well drive some Likud voters into the arms of Shas, which represents ultra-Orthodox Sephardi voters.

Another reason to suspect that this new arrangement is not going to yield as strong a party as Netanyahu hopes is that it rests on an odd and somewhat counterintuitive theory of party strengthening. As a general rule, the best ways to create a newly large and powerful party are to co-opt the opposition and to create a big tent that welcomes many different factions. The Likud-Kadima coalition agreement in May — despite its quick demise — was actually a successful attempt at such a maneuver since it eliminated Likud’s largest opponent and built bridges between a rightwing party and a more centrist party. The merger deal with Yisrael Beiteinu, however, will not be successful at co-opting smaller centrist parties and it will not create a big tent, as both Likud and YB reside on the right side of the political spectrum.

What this means in practice is that we are likely to see Likud Beiteinu get the largest share of seats in the Knesset but with nothing approaching a mandate for action. Rather than smooth sailing for the ruling party, there will be the usual political gridlock and unstable coalition as the smaller parties extort Likud Beiteinu to fund their pet projects as a condition of joining the government. Lieberman is also an unusually polarizing figure, and his presence at the top will make it harder for a party like Labor to even contemplate joining up in a unity government.

There are also some real implications here for the new U.S. administration, whomever the next president might be. The fact that Netanyahu is not going to be in as strong a position as he anticipates means that he will not be able to afford alienating his settler base or risk an insurrection from Moshe Feiglin, Danny Danon, and the more revanchist wing of Likud. Lieberman, himself a settler, takes an extremely hard-line positions on settlements as well, and thus the new Likud Beiteinu is likely to frustrate any desires on the part of the United States for the Israeli government to either freeze settlement building or to make concessions to the Palestinians, who have been immovably intransigent. The formation of Likud Beiteinu might even deal the final fatal blow to the Palestinian Authority, as Lieberman has been waging a months-long campaign to discredit Mahmoud Abbas by calling him a diplomatic terrorist and is unlikely in his newly powerful position to agree to keep on bolstering the PA. This will create all sorts of headaches for the United States and means that any remaining optimism surrounding the peace process is misplaced.

Netanyahu and Lieberman are banking that their new party will be greater than the sum of its parts, but there is an excellent chance that it will actually be the opposite. Should that turn out to be the case, expect to see a continuation of the congestion that has marked Israeli politics and frustrated its diplomacy over the last decade.


Panicked Bibi Shoots Himself In the Foot in Merger with Lieberman

By Mitchell Plitnick, The Third Way
October 25, 2012

I’ve long suspected it, but now I’m convinced: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has lost his mind. His announcement today of forming a joint list with Yisrael Beiteinu and Avigdor Lieberman reeks of a panic not rooted in any sense of reality. And this time, it’s not about “the Arabs” or Iran, but about the upcoming election. It’s proof positive that the man running Israel, and who is going to continue to run Israel for the foreseeable future, is a frightened, perhaps even paranoid, reactionary man.

According to Yediot Akhronot’s web site, YNet, Bibi made the decision to do this because polls indicate Likud would lose a few seats in the next elections (sorry, the report is not available in English at this time). Netanyahu wants to be the leader of the next Knesset’s biggest party, not the second biggest as he currently is. So, he threw in his lot with Lieberman and his explicit fascism.

I think this move is going to backfire on Bibi in a number of ways. First of all, this is going to alienate a number of very high profile Likud members. Some will be seeing this as coming at their expense, especially those in top positions right now who will be bumped at least one rung, perhaps more, lower on the list and in their positions in the next cabinet. Others, like Dan Meridor, Benny Begin and more, are going to bristle sharply at having to work this closely with Lieberman. It would not surprise me to see several prominent Likud figures bolt.

Second, whereas before the so-called super-bloc of “center-left” parties was largely a media invention, Netanyahu has now given it much more impetus. While Yair Lapid and his Yesh Atid may still be more interested in making their own mark on the electorate, the more seasoned Labor and Kadima parties are going to find that they have little choice but to join forces now in some way. That won’t matter to Bibi…unless Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni re-enter the fray, which make Kadima meaningful again and would combine well with a Labor Party that Shelly Yachimovitch has kept at a steady second place in polls for months.

Third, Bibi has dealt a sharp slap in the face to Shas, the right wing Sephardic party. He is clearly trying to shed his dependence on religious parties in general, but he’s pushing Shas, a party which is very close to Yisrael Beiteinu in terms of Knesset representation and could gain some seats in January, completely out of his sphere. Their domestic program is absolutely at odds with Lieberman’s, and it was difficult enough for Bibi to keep them both in coalition. With Yisrael Beiteinu becoming a senior partner, Shas is going to have a hard time joining the government and explaining that decision to their constituents, who feel that Lieberman is their greatest political enemy.

More to the point, the return of Aryeh Deri, a far more liberal figure than current Shas leader Eli Yishai, to the head of Shas is now much more likely and, with it, the movement of Shas toward the center-left bloc is equally so. This changes the playing field, and is why, ultimately, this move seems so counter-productive for Bibi. Let’s imagine for a moment that Olmert and/or Livni come back and revives Kadima to some degree, whether as the party itself or in the form of a new party. That can attract Likud voters who are upset about the merger, and could even bring in people like Meridor and serve as a greater boon. Sure, some of their votes would then come from Labor, but a nice chunk would come from Likud. As a result, consider the following scenario, which is now absolutely realistic:

Labor comes away with 18-20 seats. Kadima gets 5. A Livni or Olmert-led new party gains 10-12. Yesh Atid gets 6-10. That’s 33-47 seats. Now add Shas, at 13-15.

The bloc of some combination of Labor, Yesh Atid, Kadima and a new party was optimistically projecting to about 35 seats. Now, there is real potential for that bloc to gain enough seats that Shas and Meretz can bring in enough seats to a coalition that a government could be formed. It is far from the most likely scenario, but it is also far more likely today than it was yesterday.

Does this mean anything outside of Israel? Not really. Bibi and Lieberman make Israel look very bad, but a Yachimovitch or Olmert or Livni-led government is unlikely to make any more progress toward an agreement with the Palestinians, or toward soothing relations with a changing Arab world and even less to see any real change in the attitude toward Iran. The rhetoric will be toned down, and the government will be more interested in the appearance of striving for peace. That’s about it.

It will matter to Israelis. A more centrist government will strive to address some of the economic and social concerns that many Israelis care about and which matter. But the global issues are not going to change.

But that’s not the point here. The takeaway here is how panicky a move this is. Netanyahu loves to speak in condescending, confident and calm tones in public appearances. But his political decisions, aside from their merits, have been consistently over reactive. The slightest threat to his agenda or his political ambitions and he pulls out the sledgehammer. That’s the man who controls the region’s only nuclear arsenal and most powerful military machine.

That should cause similar panic throughout the world.

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