The not-so-secret history of Netanyahu’s support for Hamas
US President Bill Clinton has lunch with King Hussein of Jordan, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, and Chairman Yasser Arafat of the Palestinian Authority in the White House library, Washington, DC, 1 October 1996.
Ghousoon Bisharat writes in +972 on 11 November 2024:
When Israeli historian and human rights activist Adam Raz set out to write The Road to October 7: Benjamin Netanyahu, the Production of the Endless Conflict and Israel’s Moral Degradation, he knew he was tackling a blind spot in Israeli public discourse. The vast majority of Israelis, Raz believes, fail to grasp the full extent of Netanyahu’s involvement in bolstering Hamas before the current war, and in perpetuating an unending state of conflict.
Raz’s book, released in May of this year, sheds light on a controversial policy whereby Netanyahu’s governments for years routinely approved and encouraged the transfer of Qatari funds into Gaza to prop up Hamas. While noting that the Israeli media has devoted more attention to this policy in the aftermath of October 7, Raz told +972 that this is “just a sliver of the bigger picture,” which is rooted in Netanyahu’s broader opposition to a just resolution to the conflict. “People need to understand the full scope of Netanyahu’s strategy,” he said.
According to Raz, Netanyahu’s priority is not maintaining Israel’s security but preventing any real chance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the division of land, ending the occupation, or a two-state solution. Keeping the cash flowing to Hamas served this objective by ensuring the Palestinian national movement remained splintered between Hamas in Gaza and the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, thus allowing Israel to maintain its dominance over the whole of the land. Even after the devastating events of October 7, Raz warns that Netanyahu’s playbook remains unchanged.
This book isn’t a history lesson about the conflict, Raz emphasizes, but rather a damning exploration of a political alliance that continues to degrade Israel’s moral fabric. “I didn’t write this book, I yelled it on the pages,” he said.
I spoke with Raz about the long history of Netanyahu’s symbiotic relationship with Hamas and its recently-killed leader Yahya Sinwar; why the current war represents a continuation of, not a break from, the prime minister’s strategy vis-a-vis the Palestinians as a whole; and why even after more than a year of war and the death of Sinwar, for Netanyahu little has changed. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
While reading your book, I couldn’t help feeling that you’re a bit obsessed with Netanyahu — that there are no political and security elites in Israel, no national security interests, no public opinion, no media. You write as if it’s just Bibi-land. As a Palestinian, this feels like a way to remove the blame from other decision-makers and Israeli society writ large and instead place it exclusively on Netanyahu.
This is a book about Netanyahu. I didn’t set out to write the story of the occupation under Netanyahu, the history of Hamas, or the collision between the two national movements. It’s the story of the relationship between Netanyahu and Sinwar. I’m trying to understand the motivation of the two most important actors in this game, who have been holding their societies by the neck.
Israel is Bibi-land. Whatever is at stake in Israel, whether it’s the Palestinians, the Iran nuclear deal, or any other foreign policy issue, it’s all in Netanyahu’s hands. In my book you can read how this came to be, and how Bibi changed Israeli politics. It’s true that the security establishment was against Netanyahu’s policy toward Hamas, but in every crucial crossroads where he went head to head with them, Netanyahu won.