Taking control of the Rafah crossing means that Israel is once again occupying Gaza

Israeli forces in eastern Rafah on 7 May 2024

Zvi Bar’el writes in Haaretz on 9 May 2024:

Egypt’s foreign ministry condemned the IDF’s incursion into Rafah and taking control of the Rafah crossing as a “dangerous escalation.”

“This move threatens the cease fire efforts and endangers the lives of millions of Palestinians who depend on the passage of humanitarian aid and on a safe way out for wounded and sick people requiring treatment,” the ministry said.

Egypt was notified of Israel’s plan to enter Rafah but the restrained, diplomatic response covers great rage and an even greater fear the move would not only sabotage the talks on releasing the hostages, but that Israel intends to expand the action in Rafah, pushing hundreds of thousands of Gazans to cross the border into Egypt.

Other voices in Egypt are demanding a stronger response. Dr. Mofid Shihab, the former higher education minister and former president of Cairo University, warned on the Saudi al-Arabiya network on Wednesday that Egypt’s army did not respond to the Israeli action “because it didn’t take place on Egypt’s land, but if Israel attacks in Egyptian territory, Cairo will not be able to allow it and may then enter into a military conflict with Israel.”

Israel does not intend to cross the border, but the close interface line between the forces increases the risk of an unintended military altercation that could lead to escalation. Meanwhile, Egypt is also looking into the legal meaning of large military forces entering the region, which according to the Camp David accords is supposed to be demilitarized. Egypt has so far refrained from a public diplomatic debate on the violation of the Camp David accords. One reason is that such a move could interfere with the negotiations in which Egypt has become chief broker now that Qatar has lowered its profile.

In recent years Egypt asked and received from Israel permission to bring large military forces equipped with heavy weapons and even operate its air force in Sinai as part of its war against the Islamist terror organizations. Reports at the time in Egypt told of Israeli military involvement in Egypt’s war and about close intelligence cooperation that helped to locate and destroy terror bases.

At the same time, Israel’s control of the Palestinian side of the Rafah crossing neutralizes to a considerable extent the main leverage Egypt had on Hamas. Before the war, when the crossing served as an open route for merchandise and people, it provided Hamas with a powerful means of control on Gaza residents’ lives. It was also an income source due to the “commissions” Hamas charged for every exit and entry permit. Egypt’s threat to close the crossing had considerable weight on Hamas’ conduct vis-a-vis Israel.

The coordination between Egypt and Hamas also yielded large profits to the Egyptian intelligence officials who control the Egyptian side of the pass. Residents who wanted to leave Egypt had to pay high sums of money, $5,000-$10,000 as “passage fees” to Egyptian officials and mainly to the Egyptian Halaa company owned by Ebrahimal Arjani, a loyal of President Sisi.  Arjani received the franchise to operate the people’s transportation from Gaza to Egypt and the transport trucks that brought merchandise to the strip. Since the beginning of the war, the company raised the price for its services dramatically. According to Middle East Eye, a British site dealing with the Middle East, the company made some $120 million in exchange for its services. It’s not clear how the aid cargoes passing through Rafah crossing will be arranged from now on, and mainly, how the passage of wounded and sick people from Gaza to Egypt will proceed.

The Rafah crossing has lost its power as an Egyptian leverage on Hamas following Israel’s taking it, but the move turns Israel into the one directly responsible for the management of at least part of civilian life in the Gaza Strip.

On Tuesday White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby said Israel’s operation in Rafah was limited in scale, scope and duration and “was designed to cut off Hamas’ ability to smuggle weapons and funds into Gaza.”

But a tactical gap separates Kirby’s statement from Israel’s goals. Israel cannot control the Rafah crossing as an isolated enclave without taking over the eastern part of the Philadelphi Corridor unless an agreed alternative is found for the agency managing the crossing. Israel, which doesn’t trust Egypt as a “border guard,” rightly sees the control of the Philadelphi Corridor as a critical move to prevent passing weapons to Hamas. But since the beginning of the war the Rafah crossing itself has not been part of this threat, as every truck going through it is carefully inspected by the IDF before it enters the strip.

Egypt suggested a few weeks ago to allow the Palestinian Authority to run the Gazan side of the crossing, or to reinstate the 2005 crossings agreement under which Gazan officials and foreign inspectors were supposed to run the crossing, while Israel had the authority to grant or deny access to the passage of people and merchandise.

But Israel is dead set against any proposal granting the Palestinian Authority a foothold in Gaza, all the more so as the authority itself is conditioning its involvement in Gaza on a wide diplomatic move that would lead to recognition in a Palestinian state.

Yaniv Kubovich reported here this week that Egypt, Israel and the United States have agreed that after the military actions end, an armed civilian company, probably American, will supervise the passage through the crossing, including the inspection of trucks. This is not a new idea, and private security companies are already operating in the Gaza Strip, providing protection for the aid organizations. They have already paid dearly for this service. In April three employees of the British security company Solace Global were killed in an Israeli air strike on the car of World Central Kitchen aid workers. Such security companies are employed in dozens of countries, many as sub-contractors of local or foreign governments like the United States, which operated such companies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The problem is that beyond the huge cost of employing a private security company, it’s not clear whether its official employer will be Israel or the United States. This is a significant issue as it will determine who is officially responsible for operating the Rafah crossing, who shapes the operation policy and no less important, what the company’s rules of engagement are in case of a Hamas attack or clashes with Gaza residents.

It seems that until an agreed solution for this issue is found, Israel is expanding and establishing its status as Gaza’s occupier, with all the implications of this status according to the international law.

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