Qatari cash to Hamas key to Oct. 7 attack preparation, Shin Bet probe finds

A tank attacked at the Gaza border by Hamas on 7 October 2023

Yaniv Kubovich and Jonathan Lis report in Haaretz on 4 March 2025:

An investigation by Israel’s Shin Bet security service has found that the policy of maintaining “quiet” in Gaza, as well as the transfer of Qatari funds to Hamas’ military wing for its buildup, were among the main factors that enabled Hamas to prepare for the October 7 attack.

According to the findings of the Shin Bet investigation – which analyzed the organization’s performance on October 7 and in the years leading up to the Hamas attack – the Shin Bet had previously recommended that Israel take proactive action against Hamas and avoid being dragged into rounds of fighting.

The Shin Bet even noted in September 2023, just one month before the Hamas attack, that “we are entering an unstable period,” recommending targeted assassinations of senior terrorist figures in Gaza.  It also attributed significance to “disturbances on the Temple Mount, the treatment of Palestinian prisoners, and the perception that Israeli society had weakened due to the erosion of social cohesion [in the wake of the judicial overhaul]” as factors that contributed to Hamas’ growing strength.

Sources close to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu slammed the Shin Bet investigation, saying that its findings “do not reflect the magnitude of the organization’s failure and the immense shortcomings of its leadership.”

The Shin Bet claimed in the probe that over recent years, it did not believe that Hamas was deterred and that it criticized the “arrangement-based reality.”

The investigation said that in October 2021, when Ronen Bar assumed the role of Shin Bet Director, a strategic report was sent to Israel’s political leadership warning that the existence of an organization in the spirit of the Muslim brotherhood with both “military capabilities and ties to the Shiite axis [Iran] in Gaza should not be tolerated.”

The report recommended targeting Hamas through “a combination of military strikes, reducing smuggling, and an Egyptian reconstruction mechanism that prevents military buildup.”

The investigation also found that the Shin Bet for years failed to identify Hamas’ plan to attack Israel despite possessing the information, an ongoing failure that led to shortcomings in intelligence-gathering and decision-making on the night before October 7.

The Shin Bet further argued that the military should have been responsible for war warnings, while the Shin Bet should have been responsible for warnings about terrorist attacks. At the same time, the Shin Bet believes that its research division “clearly warned about the intelligence deficit that would embolden various adversaries, including Hamas.”

The investigation further claims that the division of responsibility between the Shin Bet and the IDF was not suited to the situation on the ground.

According to the Shin Bet, restrictions on the organization’s operational freedom in Gaza, “which was treated as a closed area,” also hindered intelligence-gathering in the years leading up to the attack, including the recruitment of agents.

Regarding the decision-making process within the security service in the hours preceding the attack, the Shin Bet found that although the IDF had “two indications of unusual activity” during the night between October 6 and 7, 2023, these were not conveyed to the Shin Bet.

The road leading into Kibbutz Kfar Azza, 7 October 2023

A few hours later, after the activation of SIM cards by several Hamas brigades, the Shin Bet issued a warning to security agencies. The security service qualified the warning by saying that “this is an unusual aggregation of factors, and given additional indicative signs, it may suggest an offensive operation by Hamas.”

According to the Shin Bet, the warning was issued “within a timeframe that allowed for raising alert levels and adjusting deployment in the area,” though it did not indicate “the scale or timing of the attack.”

The investigation found that already on the evening of October 5, an initial report was disseminated to relevant military officials about an indication of SIM card activation in the northern Gaza Strip, and that by the night of October 7, approximately 45 such activations had occurred. However, for comparison and to provide context for the decision-making process on the night of October 7, the investigation noted that during the Jewish High Holidays in 2022, 38 SIM cards were activated, and during Ramadan 2023 – which took place over March and April of that year – 37 SIM cards were activated.

An hour and a half after the activation of the SIM cards, at 4:30 AM, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar convened a discussion with the organization’s regional heads, during which it was decided to send a combat team to the south in response to a potential kidnapping attack. However, this measure did not correspond with the scale of the events unfolding on the morning of the attack.

According to the investigation, this reflected the “lack of information at that time, both due to the absence of the attack plan on the decision-makers’ table and due to a shortage of sensors and coverage gaps.”

A Shin Bet statement on the investigation noted that “the majority of the investigation includes classified intelligence materials, tools, and methods, and therefore there are limitations on fully disclosing it.” However, the security service emphasized that “given the magnitude of the disaster, it is of great importance to share the main findings with the public.”

Sources close to Netanyahu criticized Shin Bet chief Bar for presenting an investigation that “does not answer any questions.” Netanyahu’s associates said that he “failed completely in dealing with Hamas in general, and on October 7 in particular.”

The sources also said in response to the investigation that Bar made mistakes in interpreting the intelligence picture in the days leading up to the Hamas attack. “This was evident in the situation assessment on October 1, where he recommended offering civilian benefits to Hamas in exchange for buying quiet, and in the intelligence briefing provided to the prime minister on October 3, in which he firmly stated that Hamas sought to avoid conflict with Israel.”

Netanyahu’s associates also claimed that Bar refrained from waking Netanyahu the night of the attack, calling it “the most basic and expected decision one could imagine.”

Sources close to Netanyahu also claimed that Shin Bet did not present Netanyahu with Hamas’ “Jericho Walls” operational plan – “not in the regular situation assessments nor on the night of October 7, despite the Shin Bet knowing about the plan since 2018.”

In response to Netanyahu’s associates, National Unity Party leader Benny Gantz said: “Instead of taking responsibility, apologizing, and establishing a state commission of inquiry, the prime minister is throwing mud at the Shin Bet.”

According to Gantz, “While the IDF and Shin Bet are investigating, taking responsibility, apologizing to the residents of the south, and presenting lessons learned – Netanyahu is hiding behind briefings and busy searching for scapegoats.”

The remarks by Netanyahu’s associates mark a new phase in the tense relationship between the prime minister and the head of the Shin Bet, and another attempt to pressure Bar to resign from his position. Despite the harsh criticism in the statements, which reflect Netanyahu’s long-standing sentiment, the prime minister chose not to actively dismiss Bar, hoping he would resign on his own.

Netanyahu has repeatedly made it clear that he personally holds the head of Shin Bet responsible for the flawed security conception of Hamas prior to October 7, emphasizing that it was Bar who decided not to wake him in the hours leading up to the attack, despite the warnings that had accumulated.

This article is reproduced in its entirety