‘Lost decade’: What is the ‘major catastrophe’ facing the Israeli army?
Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip, a handout picture released by the Israeli army on 26 January 2024
Hilmi Musa writes (originally in Al Jazeera Arabic) in The Palestine Chronicle on 4 January 2025:
The Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, which started on October 7, 2023, has deeply shaken the Israeli state and revealed cracks in the Israeli military’s confidence. Despite the Israeli army’s overwhelming destructive power, the length and the complexities of the war, including the intense fighting in Gaza and Lebanon, have prompted Israel’s military leadership to reevaluate its strategy and rework its forces in light of the lessons learned from this devastating conflict.
Israel’s military, which has long emphasized its “small but smart” army doctrine, has come to a stark realization: ground forces are irreplaceable. The overwhelming reliance on air power and intelligence has proven insufficient to achieve decisive outcomes in this war, especially with Israel’s war objectives being thwarted in Gaza, where the situation has deteriorated into a full-scale humanitarian catastrophe.
The number of Palestinian casualties in Gaza has soared since the beginning of the Israeli assault, with at least 45,717 Palestinians reported dead, and 108,856 wounded as of early January 2025. Thousands remain unaccounted for, presumed dead beneath the rubble of destroyed homes. This ongoing violence, which has displaced nearly two million people, has exacerbated an acute humanitarian crisis. Basic needs such as food, clean water, and medical supplies are nearly impossible to access for the people trapped in the besieged enclave. The war, which Palestinians have dubbed “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood,” has resulted in the widespread death of Palestinian civilians, particularly women and children, leading human rights organizations to accuse Israel of committing genocide against the Palestinian population.
As for Israel’s military, the conflict has highlighted the vulnerabilities of its force structure. According to Maariv, the war has confirmed that no alternative exists to ground forces in warfare. It became clear that without a capable and sufficiently large ground army, Israel cannot secure its objectives or maintain an edge in warfare. While Israel’s air force and intelligence capabilities are vital, the war exposed how easily these can be overwhelmed without the support of well-equipped ground forces.
This shift in military thinking has led to the abandonment of the “small but smart” army theory that guided the Israeli military for more than two decades. The Israeli military now faces the urgent task of rebuilding and strengthening its ground forces. The first step in this process includes a substantial increase in the number of ground forces, especially in the armored corps, which has been identified as a key element of the military’s future effectiveness. The challenge is whether the Israeli army will double the size of its armored corps or pursue a more modest increase.
The Merkava Problem
When discussing the rebuilding of the armored corps, much attention is given to the production of Merkava tanks, specifically the Siman 4 model, which are manufactured in Israel.