How Netanyahu has systematically foiled talks to release hostages from Hamas captivity

A protest in Tel Aviv calling for release of hostages, December 2023

Michael Hauser Tov writes in Haaretz on 10 July 2024:

The past six months, during which Israel negotiated a framework for the release of Israeli hostages being held captive by Hamas in the Gaza Strip – were riddled with hopeful moments that shattered one after the other. While Hamas impeded the talks, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly torpedoed their progress – particularly when it came to decisive moments.

Netanyahu believes that an agreement on a hostage deal will most likely lead to his government’s collapse – which he seeks to avoid at all costs. Defense officials who spoke with Haaretz said that in his attempt to derail negotiations, Netanyahu relied on classified intelligence and manipulated the sensitive information. This is how Netanyahu systematically foiled the negotiations to free the hostages.

January 17 – Preparations for First Paris Summit

Some six weeks after the deal that saw 125 hostages released, Israel began preparing to negotiate a new agreement. A central part of the negotiating team’s strategy – approved by the war cabinet, which has since been disbanded – was to refrain from discussing the number of Palestinian prisoners to be released for every hostage. It was assumed that this volatile issue could derail the negotiations, and negotiators sought to first create the appropriate conditions to discuss it. Contrary to the cabinet’s decision, Netanyahu began leaking information on prisoners’ release to reporters and present hardline positions. Some in Israel’s negotiating teams accused Netanyahu of cultivating public opposition to a deal.

On January 17, the war cabinet convened to discuss the deal, and for the first time the scope of the Israeli team’s mandate – the issues Mossad Chief David Barnea is authorized to discuss in the upcoming Paris summit, and the points he is allowed to compromise on. However, after the discussions ended, Netanyahu decided to toughen Israel’s stance without coordination with other cabinet members, and cancelled the decision that had been made.

January 24 – First Paris Summit Delayed

Netanyahu stalls in giving the Mossad chief a mandate to negotiate, causing a delay on the first Paris summit. In response, Qatar criticizes Netanyahu: Qatar’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson writes that Netanyahu is “obstructing and undermining the mediation process, for reasons that appear to serve his political career instead of prioritizing saving innocent lives, including Israeli hostages.”

January 28-31 – First Paris Summit and a Blitz of Press Releases

On January 28, Israel’s Mossad head met the mediators in Paris for the first time, and the progress achieved was described as significant. Yet upon Barnea’s return to Israel, Netanyahu published a series of five press releases, in which he emphasized the gaps that remain between the sides. Defense officials who spoke to Haaretz claimed that Netanyahu used information that was brought up in private security talks and left the door open to derail the deal.

Netanyahu said, among other statements, that “the reports about the deal are untrue and include conditions that Israel finds unacceptable. We press on until the total victory.” In a speech at the pre-army Bnei David preparatory program in the West Bank settlement of Eli, Netanyahu also said: “I hear talks about all kinds of deals, so I want to clarify: We won’t withdraw the Israel Defense Forces from the Gaza Strip and won’t release thousands of terrorists. None of that will happen.”

February 6 -Hamas Responds

February saw Israel make considerable efforts to reach a deal before the holy month of Ramadan begins. Shin Bet head Ronen Bar tried to push forward with a humanitarian deal, leveraging the urgent need for humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. That same month, Netanyahu decides on a new strategy: He permits the negotiating team to hold talks with the mediators, but forbids the members from presenting their position or from making proposals. Netanyahu only allows them to listen.

On February 6, Hamas releases a written statement in which it wrote it “treated the framework positively.” Netanyahu responds immediately, releasing a statement by “a senior Israeli official” saying that “Hamas’ answer to the hostage deal is actually negative” and adding that Israel has no intention in stopping the war. On that same week, according to Israel’s Channel 13, Netanyahu instructed Likud ministers to attack the deal that was taking shape.

February 13 – Cairo Summit

Talks over a deal press on, and Netanyahu considers whether to send Israeli delegates to Cairo. The prime minister also relays a message through reporters that Israel will not dispatch representatives to the talks if Hamas does not soften its stance. Ultimately, Netanyahu decides to greenlight the delegation to Cairo, but also attaches his personal adviser Ophir Falk, who was not part of the negotiating team. People close to Netanyahu explain that the PM “is making sure that the Mossad chief does not overstep his authority.” Later, Netanyahu seeks to prevent more delegations from departing for talks, contrary to the Shin Bet chief’s position.

February 23 – Second Paris Summit

On February 23, as the second Paris summit is about to begin, the head of the Missing and Captive Soldiers Division in the IDF, Maj. Gen. (res.) Nitzan Alon, was making his way to Ben Gurion Airport. On his way, Alon discovers that Netanyahu had spoken to Mossad chief Barnea and had considerably limited the mandate for negotiations, which was approved by the war cabinet. Alon considers canceling his trip, but ultimately travels to Paris.

March 16 – Qatar Negotiations Press On

After the failure of the second Paris summit, and a subsequent period of an impasse, war cabinet members and senior defense officials ask Netanyahu to convene the cabinet and authorize the Israeli team to renew negotiations. Netanyahu does not respond to these requests and does not convene the cabinet. Maj. Gen. (res.) Nitzan Alon sharply criticizes Netanyahu, saying that the mandate he received has been minimized to the extent that the opportunity for a new deal could be missed. Netanyahu says in response, he’s running a “give and take” and not a “give and give.”

April 8 – Interim Deal and Rafah Incursion

In early April, mediators exert significant pressure on Israel to advance an interim deal for the release of up to 33 hostages. At the time, Israel and Hamas were at the closest they had been to agreeing to a deal. Amid initial talks on the interim agreement, the Israeli army announces the completion of its Khan Younis operation and a full withdrawal of forces from the area.

In light of the negotiations, Religious Zionism head and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich holds an emergency party convention, and is summoned to a talk with Netanyahu on that very same day. Later, Netanyahu releases a statement saying that total victory over Hamas requires entering the southern Gazan city of Rafah, adding that “It will happen – there’s a date.”

In the following days, Netanyahu refrains from convening the war cabinet, despite significant progress reported in talks.

April 11 – TV Investigation

In an interview to investigative TV program ‘Uvda,’ a senior member of the Israeli negotiating team says Netanyahu bypasses the war cabinet after it approves the mandate to the teams, and prevents them from carrying out their assignments.

“I can’t say that without Netanyahu there would be no deal,” said the official, presented as D. “I can say that the probability of a deal would be higher.” D. continued: “Since December, definitely since January, it’s clear to everyone that we’re not conducting negotiations. It happens again and again: You get a mandate during the day, then the prime minister makes phone calls at night, instructs ‘don’t say that’ and ‘I’m not approving this,’ thus bypassing both the team leaders and the war cabinet.”

April 25 – Netanyahu Leaks Classified Information

A sensitive decision is made at a war cabinet meeting – what would be the minimal number of hostages that Israel would find acceptable as part of an interim deal. The number is classified as top secret, as Hamas would cling to the smallest number of hostages rather than a larger group. Given that the cabinet is united in its position to agree to the deal, Netanyahu is forced to allow the negotiating team to press on. That same day, Netanyahu meets with Minister Bezalel Smotrich and shares the sensitive number with him. Smotrich, who was not a member of the limited war cabinet, leaks it inaccurately to ministers and to the media.

At the same time, Smotrich increases pressure on the prime minister. In a statement, Smotrich says that “agreeing to a deal is a humiliating surrender. If you decide to raise a white flag, the government you head will have no right to exist.” Later, Netanyahu makes several statements, stressing that Israel is intent on entering Rafah and will not agree to stop the war. This position moves Hamas farther away from the negotiating table.

April 26 – Behind the Cabinet’s Back

Several hours after a war cabinet meeting, Netanyahu calls the negotiating team without the other cabinet members’ knowledge, and reneges on the agreements reached. In the call, Netanyahu seeks to cancel the mandate given to the team, but is told that the Israeli response has already been relayed to the mediators. Netanyahu then releases several statements saying he will not agree to end the war without achieving the goals he has set.

May 4 -‘Senior Diplomatic Official’ Announcement

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi at the Knesset, in June.Credit: Olivier Fitoussi
In early May, Israeli intelligence estimated that Hamas’ response to the deal that’s on the table will be positive. During a war cabinet meeting on May 2, Netanyahu surprises attendees by suggesting the IDF be ordered immediately to enter Rafah. All participants of the meeting oppose the idea, arguing that it would immediately derail the deal. The proposition does not pass.

On Saturday, May 4, Netanyahu releases a statement claiming – on behalf of a “senior diplomatic official” – that “Israel will under no circumstances agree to end the war as part of a deal involving the release of hostages.” The statement added: “The IDF will enter Rafah and destroy the Hamas battalions remaining there, whether there is a temporary truce for releasing the hostages or not.”

War cabinet members believe this statement was one of the reasons for the failure of the talks. Meanwhile, Netanyahu forbids the Israeli delegation from traveling to Cairo for another round of talks, without updating the war cabinet. The following day, at the weekly government meeting, Netanyahu brings to a vote the law shutting down the operations of Qatari television station Al Jazeera in Israel, despite the sensitive moment in the Qatari-led negotiations.

May 6 -Hamas Responds to Proposal

On May 6, Hamas responds to the mediators’ proposal for a deal. Even before the Israeli negotiating team formulates its answer, Netanyahu aides tell journalists off the record that the “gaps are immense” and that “Hamas’ response is delusional.” In the months ahead, Israel would accept significant principles that were part of this same proposal. These principles make up the basis of the current framework, formulated by Israel.

June 1 – Biden Speech

Israel relays a hostage-release framework to the mediators, but Netanyahu refuses to present it to the public. On June 1, U.S. President Joe Biden presents the framework in a public speech. This is the same proposal being discussed these days.

After Biden’s speech, Netanyahu releases several statements meant to impede progress. “Israel’s conditions for ending the war have not changed,” said one of his statements, “and they include destroying the military and governing capabilities. There will be no cease-fire if these conditions are not met.” Meanwhile, Netanyahu aides send messages to journalists, claiming – not in Netanyahu’s name – that “there is a slim chance for a deal – we’re headed toward a dead-end.”

June 3 – Talks on a Framework for a Deal

Israeli war cabinet earlier this year.Credit: Israel Defense Minister Spokesperson
Netanyahu arrives at a classified discussion at the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, after which he leaks his own comments at the meeting: That he does not agree to end the war as part of the framework presented by President Biden. War cabinet members are furious with Netanyahu for foiling the talks that just renewed after a long impasse.

June 23 – Deal Still on the Table

In a Knesset speech, Netanyahu says he is “ready for a deal that would return some hostages,” but is “committed to continuing the war.” Sources familiar with negotiations believe that Netanyahu’s statement sabotages the chances for a deal, because it means Israel does not intend to carry out the stages laid out by Biden. “Netanyahu made clear today he is not interested in releasing all the hostages and is unwilling to take the steps that Hamas seeks in return. In this situation, [Hamas leader] Sinwar has no motivation to make progress on a deal,” one source says.

That evening, Netanyahu gives an interview to the right-wing television show “The Patriots” on the pro-Netanyahu Channel 14, repeating the same messages. A senior member of Israel’s negotiating team calls Netanyahu’s comments about accepting only a partial deal as “a terror attack.” At that point, negotiations still hinge on a promise made by mediators that Netanyahu takes into consideration all stages of the deal – not just the first phase. A source familiar with the talks said that “Every time, Netanyahu uses intel to identify Sinwar’s vulnerabilities, and targets them.”

July 2 – Hamas Tends to Agree to Deal

Minister Bezalel Smotrich holds up a picture of Hamas leader Sinwar, at the Knesset this week.Credit: Olivier Fitoussi
Israel sees positive developments towards a deal with Hamas, but given the sensitivity, only Netanyahu and the negotiating team are made aware of this. Though cabinet members were not briefed, Minister Smotrich says in a speech that he “wouldn’t be surprised if Sinwar suddenly replies positively to the offer he received, because he is panicking and understands that we are close to victory.”

Senior defense officials subsequently accused Netanyahu of sharing classified information with Smotrich. The Finance Minister, on his part, denied he was briefed, saying that he simply “read a simple map which combines reports in foreign media and the progress in military pressure.” Contrary to his statements, the foreign media carried no reports on the deal in those days.

July 4 – Hamas Gives an Answer

Israel receives Hamas’ comments to the framework presented by Biden, and the negotiating teams describes them as “the best answer received” since negotiations began. But even before Hamas’ response is made public, Netanyahu’s office releases a statement attributed to a “senior security official” saying that “Hamas is still insisting on a fundamental clause in the framework. There are more gaps that haven’t been closed. Israel will continue the negotiations while continuing the military pressure.” This message contradicts the position held by Israel’s negotiating team – the professional authority on the matter.

July 7 -A Statement on Differences

Although these are crucial days in the negotiations, Netanyahu’s office publishes a statement (for the first time, in the PM’s name) detailing the differences that remain between Israel and Hamas. The statement also emphasizes Israel’s demands. Many in the negotiating teams as well in the political arena perceive the message as an admission that Netanyahu is not interested in a deal to return Israeli hostages from Hamas captivity.

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