How Europe came to cautiously support Israel’s ‘dangerous gamble’ in Iran

A satellite image of Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility in January 2025

Liza Rozovsky writes in Haaretz  on 15 June 2025:

A conference organized under the auspices of French President Emmanuel Macron and dedicated to the Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution ended this weekend on a sour note.

The gathering in Paris was intended to serve as a launchpad for a peace initiative that would culminate in a broader conference at the United Nations General Assembly, co-led by France and Saudi Arabia. The aim – or ambition – was to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through international recognition of a Palestinian state.  However, following Israel’s strikes on Iran, the planned UN conference was postponed indefinitely. Dozens of Israeli and Palestinian peace activists who had traveled to the preliminary event in Paris were left stranded, with no clear timeline for returning home to their war-torn region.

Macron, who had originally planned to speak at the Paris gathering, canceled his attendance and instead hosted participants at the Élysée Palace. There, he officially announced the postponement of the UN conference, cautiously backed Israel’s strike and called for a return to diplomacy.

“We are not party to the assumption that military action is necessary,” Macron said. “However, the strikes diminished Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities and its ballistic capacity. Their outcome aligns with our strategic direction. Now we must return to negotiations.”  When asked whether postponing the New York conference signaled failure, Macron said there was no point in holding it without key Middle Eastern leaders, such as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas – both of whom could not attend.

Still, he insisted that the conference had already created “unstoppable momentum” and would be held “as soon as possible.” He reiterated his commitment to a two-state solution and suggested that, given the deadlock over a Gaza cease-fire, recognition of a Palestinian state should serve as a “trigger” to jump-start negotiations for a truce, hostage release and Hamas disarmament.

Nevertheless, the escalation in the Middle East appeared to offer Macron an opportune exit from a politically complicated situation. The U.S. had sharply opposed the French-led diplomatic initiative, warning UN member states that participation in the conference could lead to “consequences.” While no country withdrew its participation, several considered downgrading their level of representation.

Furthermore, intense Israeli pressure on France led Macron to hesitate until the last moment over whether to announce recognition of a Palestinian state at the conference. French officials sent mixed messages on the issue up to the final hours.

The U.K., which led one of the working groups for the conference, faced similar dilemmas, in part due to its close ties with Washington. Even Saudi Arabia’s role was uncertain: without French recognition of Palestine, Crown Prince bin Salman was unlikely to make the trip to New York.

Overall, France’s bold and rapid diplomatic push, intended to bypass Israel, encountered a formidable wall of Middle Eastern resistance. The latest outbreak of brutal regional violence may have quietly offered the Élysée a face-saving retreat.

Europe is curious

The reactions from Britain, France and Germany – the three Western European signatories to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal – to Israel’s strike were hesitant but ultimately positive. Their messages boiled down to three points: Iran violated its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and brought the attack upon itself; Israel has the right to self-defense; and Europe urges all sides to avoid further escalation while calling on Iran to return to talks with the United States.

“There’s been a sudden reversal in tone from European leaders toward Israel since Friday,” said Hugh Lovatt, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Just days ago, he noted, there was progress on potential EU sanctions against Israeli settlers and officials. But once Israel struck Iran, “these countries reverted to their more instinctive support for Israel and its right to self-defense.”

According to Lovatt, U.K. and French officials might claim they have always supported Israel’s right to self-defense and that sanctions talk was a response to Israeli actions in Gaza, which Europeans no longer view as self-defensive. The key question now, he said, is how long this renewed support will last.

Peter Lintl, a senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and an expert on Europe–Israel relations, agreed that Israel’s strike on Iran and Europe’s moderate response provided the Netanyahu government with a temporary reprieve from European criticism over its conduct in Gaza and the West Bank. However, he also said the issue would resurface.

Lovatt agreed, saying European leaders would inevitably return to addressing Gaza and the two-state solution. That was clearly reflected in Macron’s remarks, where he emphasized that shared concerns over Iran present an opportunity to end the war in Gaza.

“I told Netanyahu,” Macron said, “that if there is one issue uniting Israel and its neighbors, it is the Iranian threat. Now that this threat has reemerged as a top priority, it is in Israel’s political and security interest to agree to a cease-fire and ensure the hostages’ release.”

Despite Europe’s political backing, Lovatt noted, there is little confidence that Israel’s military operation will achieve its stated objectives. “Do these countries believe that Israel will accomplish its objectives? Most likely not. And even many Israeli officials would concede that they will not be able to fully dismantle the Iranian nuclear program. At most, it’s about delaying it.”

So why the public support? Lovatt points to two underlying factors. First, a strong pro-Israel sentiment among European policy elites, even when it clashes with international norms or stated EU policies. Second, a kind of “curiosity” about what Israel is militarily capable of achieving, partly sparked by its recent operations against Hezbollah.

Lintl believes Europe needs more time to articulate a coherent response. He notes that German governments have long viewed Iran as an existential threat to Israel. Germany’s delivery of submarines to Israel, for example, was based on the assumption that Iran might one day develop nuclear weapons.

Still, he added, “It’s too early to say what the overall reaction of Germany and other European countries will be – a more critical tone may come in the next few days along with stronger attempts at de-escalation.”

A dangerous gamble

A Western source familiar with Iran’s nuclear program assessed that even a highly successful Israeli strike – including serious damage to the underground enrichment facilities in Natanz and Fordow – would only set the program back by a few years, at most five.

“They now have better technology,” the source said. “They have knowledge about the plant centrifuges. They don’t need as many centrifuges as they used to. They can build a small plant somewhere, heavily fortified underground, maybe even in less than three years.”

The source added that even assassinating nuclear scientists wouldn’t erase the knowledge Iran has acquired. “They have three replacements for each one. You cannot eradicate knowledge this way. You see their huge universities with hundreds of students and professors… We can cause setbacks and delays, but it’s impossible to fully eliminate the program. It has advanced too far.”

He also suggested there may be a military rationale for why Israel did not target Natanz and Fordow directly. It’s logical to first dismantle air defenses before going after hardened targets, the source said. He believes Israel likely decided to strike only because it had access to munitions capable of seriously damaging those fortified sites.  “If Israel doesn’t have the capability to handle this, then it’s a really, really dangerous gamble. Because obviously, if they cannot carry out the attack and the U.S. does not join, then what will Iran do? They will rush to develop a nuclear weapon as quickly as possible.”

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