JJP submission to University of East London on its antisemitism policy

On 9 December 2024, JJP made a submission to the University of East London consultation on its antisemitism policy. We argued that UEL should drop its endorsement of the IHRA WD (while acknowledging that it only endorses the two sentence definition itself, not the rest of the IHRA WD), and instead adopt the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism. We also argued that the UEL antisemitism procedures should concentrate on education and advice about what constitutes antisemitism, and resort to discipline only in serious or repeated cases.

Our submission is below.

Response by Jews for Justice for Palestinians to Consultation on University of East London’s Antisemitism Statement

UEL poses three questions.

• Do you consider that the University should continue with adopting the IHRA definition of antisemitism?  

• Should the University consider adopting other recognised definitions of antisemitism such as the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA) and the Nexus definition? 

• Could the University’s position on tackling antisemitism be made sufficiently clear within a policy and statement on anti-discrimination? 

Our brief answers are as follows:

1. NO
2. YES
3. Maybe

We elaborate these answers below

Question 1: Do you consider that the University should continue with adopting the IHRA definition of antisemitism? 

We will discuss the brief, two-sentence definition, which the University adopted, in the context of the whole IHRA Working Definition document (henceforth IHRA WD), which we acknowledge the University did not adopt. This is because the proponents of the document advocate that it should be used as a whole and it is often considered in that way. We argue that neither the definition itself nor the whole document is fit for purpose.

We provide a short statement of our objections to the IHRA WD in our document JJP Policy Statement: Definitions of Antisemitism (see Appendix 1)

European Jews for a Just Peace (EJJP) of which we are a member, has lobbied consistently for many years against the document in the European Union and the United Nations. We cite here the EJJP advocacy to the Director General of UNESCO in March 2023, that UNESCO should maintain its position of not adopting the IHRA definition. EJJP’s letter and the

accompanying analysis are in the appended document: Letter to Unesco and Analysis of IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism and Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, for UNESCO, 27 March 2023 (see Appendix 2).

Both the JJP statement and EJJP advocacy make clear that the IHRA definition of antisemitism is inadequate, confusing and unhelpful. It has proved itself in practice to promote misinterpreting criticism of Israel as antisemitism. It thereby presents a threat to free speech in universities and other public institutions and spaces.

The serious problems with the IHRA WD can be summarised as:

• The “working definition” consists of these two sentences: ‘Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.’ This is bewilderingly imprecise. It can be understood in different ways and therefore is fundamentally unhelpful in judging whether particular comments are antisemitic. Just two questions will suffice as illustrations: What is “a certain perception” supposed to mean? What is “may be expressed as hatred” supposed to include or exclude, since ‘may be’ implies ‘may not be’?”

• The statement that ‘criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic’ leaves open what kind of criticism is to be considered antisemitic. That is because it is in the negative and because ‘similar’ is so imprecise.

• The specific reference to Israel in seven of the eleven examples elides Jews and Israel. Together with the absence of any examples of legitimate criticism of Israel, this creates a strong bias towards seeing criticism of Israel as antisemitic.

• The eleven examples of antisemitic statements include some that would clearly be antisemitic but others where the judgement would depend on context, without specifying which examples are context-dependent, which adds a further level of ambiguity.

• Two examples in particular lend themselves to interpreting fundamental criticism of Israel and protest against Israeli policies as antisemitic. They are “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g. by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour.”, and “applying double standards by requiring of it [Israel] a behaviour not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.” The first example is a non-sequitur because there is no logical connection between the two clauses. The second implies that Israel, being democratic, behaves like established democracies, and so should be treated in the same way. But, of course, whether it is behaving like other democracies is very often the question at stake. In issues relating to the occupation or the Palestinian citizens of Israel, it is normally not the case.

• Attempts to ban protest meetings where BDS and/or antizionism will be advocated have become common, as have allegations of antisemitism against individuals who have advocated them, despite the fact that boycott is a time-honoured, legal and non-violent way for people to protest against a government they consider immoral, and antizionism has been ruled to be a protected characteristic under the Equality act 2010 (see e.g. here).

• The justification routinely given is that one of these two examples has been violated. That is one of the most deleterious effects of the adoption of the IHRA WD. Yet, since June 2016, there have been at least 27 rulings by courts of law in western countries that BDS advocacy is legal and is not antisemitic. (See appended list, BDS court rulings. Appendix 3)

In addition to what is contained in the above we would like to add 4 brief points:

2. 1. • We in Jews for Justice for Palestinians and EJJP have a long history of opposing this definition and its almost identically worded predecessor, the European Monitoring Committee on Racism and Xenophobia Working Definition of Antisemitism which was first circulated for discussion in 2005, We were highly critical of the definition and the document in which it was embedded and were assured by the EUMC that it was merely a draft, for comment and amendment. This never happened, despite the wide-ranging critiques offered at the time. Indeed, the document was never adopted by the EUMC nor by its successor the Fundamental Rights Agency and was quietly removed from its website around 2010.

You can find our 2005 correspondence with the EUMC here. (downloaded in Appendix 4)

2. 1. • Indeed, while the EUMC never adopted the “working definition” it did provide another definition of antisemitism in its report EUMC – Manifestations of Antisemitism in the EU 2002 – 2003, pp.12-14, a definition which trod carefully to avoid conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism. This definition, no longer available on the original website, is reposted here: When criticism of Israel is anti-semitic – the real EUMC definition (downloaded in Appendix 5)

There is much of value there still, though we believe the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism covers the ground more than adequately (see answer to Question 2 below)

2. 1. • We would also like to draw your attention to the fact that the person who drafted the original definition, Kenneth Stern, disowned it in 2017 as a witness at the US Congress, charging that it was being used for an entirely different purpose from that for which it had been designed (viz. simply the collection of comparative statistics across countries) to curb freedom of speech. You can find his argument elaborated here (downloaded in the Appendix 6, “Why the man who drafted the IHRA definition condemns its use”)
      • Together with the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, Jewish Voice for Labour and Free Speech on Israel, JJP commissioned Hugh Tomlinson QC to produce a legal opinion on the IHRA WD. You can find the full Counsel’s opinion on the IHRA definition here (downloaded in Appendix 7). It concluded among other things that a public authority would be acting unlawfully if it applied the IHRA WD to prevent or sanction such activities as describing Israel as an apartheid state or supporting policies such as BDS.

Question 2: Should the University consider adopting other recognised definitions of antisemitism such as the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA) and the Nexus definition? 

We support the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism. This is dealt with in detail in the EJJP submission to UNESCO, referred to at the start of point 1 above. It is also dealt with in ourJJP Policy Statement: Definitions of Antisemitism (App 1).

The JDA consists of the preamble, the definition, general guidelines, examples of comment on Israel and Palestine that, on the face of it, are antisemitic, and examples of comment on Israel and Palestine that, on the face of it, are not antisemitic.

• The definition states “Antisemitism is discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish).” This is precise and very difficult to misinterpret.

• The general guidelines provide historical context, identify the similarities between antisemitism and other forms of racism and the particularity of antisemitism, identify for forms antisemitism can take, and specify that Holocaust denial or minimisation is always antisemitic.

• The two sets of Israel/Palestine related examples provide a basis for differentiating logically between legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitism.

• The guidelines support the legitimacy of criticising Zionism, fundamental criticism of Israeli policy, and advocacy of Boycott, Divestment & Sanctions (BDS) in protest against Israeli policy.

While JJP would disagree with one or two of its formulations, the JDA is a sound and fair-minded document. It is consistent with the right to free speech, which is protected by Article 10(2) of the Convention on Human Rights, under which public authorities are under “a positive obligation to create a favourable environment for participation in public debates for all concerned, allowing them to express their opinions and ideas without fear, even if these opinions and ideas are contrary to those defended by the official authorities or by a large part of public opinion, or even if those opinions and ideas are irritating or offensive to the public” (Tomlinson Para 16,see our Appendix 7).

JJP prefers the JDA to the Nexus definition for two reasons. First, although the Nexus Definition is adequate, it does not have the historical scope or the scholarly breadth of the JDA. The JDA was developed by an international group of eminent academics in the fields of Holocaust history, Jewish studies, Middle East studies and philosophy. It has been endorsed by more than 360 scholars from several countries. Second, The Nexus Definition was developed in and for the American context by a small group of leaders of American progressive Jewish organisations.

You may also find the University College London Report of the Academic Board Working Group on Racism and Prejudice (downloaded in Appendix 8) helpful in your deliberations

Question 3. Could the University’s position on tackling antisemitism be made sufficiently clear within a policy and statement on antidiscrimination? 

In order to tackle allegations of antisemitism effectively, we believe the University should incorporate the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism in its policy on antidiscrimination. There are two reasons. First, it is necessary to understand the historical particularity of antisemitism. Its complexity and sometimes contradictory nature has made it hard to define. Second, the difficulty has been exacerbated in recent years because it has become entangled with the right to criticise Israel. This has arisen largely because the Israeli government and the Israel lobby have been aggressively promoting the IHRA WD, which is biased towards seeing fundamental criticism of Israeli policy as hidden antisemitism.

While criticisms of Israel can be hidden antisemitism, it is equally true that allegations of antisemitism can be hidden attempts to suppress criticism. The University policy must have criteria which distinguishes logically between the two. The JDA was written expressly to provides this criteria, and does so. The IHRA WD does not. It does the opposite.

The basic test of whether a criticism of Israel is antisemitic is in the language used. If the language refers to what Israeli governments do or did, or what Zionists historically did, and doesn’t ascribe the actions to Jews because they are Jews, then the presumption must be that it isn’t antisemitic without additional evidence to suggest antisemitic intent. It might be well or badly argued, temperate or intemperate, but that does not determine whether it is antisemitic. This principle underlies the specific guidelines of the JDA.

Different kinds of situation can arise in which antisemitism is alleged.

• Debates on social media often become heated. That is particularly true in debates about Israel and Palestine, and especially when young Jews, Palestinians (whether Muslim or Christian), or other Muslims are involved. Antisemitic remarks, or indeed Islamophobic remarks, can be made in the heat of the moment. They might or might not reflect the true feelings of the people who make them.

• Antisemitic remarks may reflect a misunderstanding of history rather than deep personal animus.

• Remarks about Israel could be antisemitic by associating Israel with particular situations unrelated to Israel, or with all the ills of the world as if Israel is mainly responsible for them. This could be said without ever uttering the words Jew or Jewish.

• Antisemitism can be found on the political left or the political right. Where it exists, it is usually on the extremes. On the left, it is usually associated with hatred of capitalism and seeing capitalism as exploitation. On the right, it is usually associated with ideas of cultural uniformity, racial purity and the ethnic state.

• Antisemitism can be explicitly manifested in age-old antisemitic tropes, such as greedy Jews, malicious Jews, conspiracy theories about Jews controlling worldwide media or finance, or Jews causing wars.

The primary purpose of antidiscrimination policy should be to encourage tolerance and understanding, not to punish transgressions. Within that, the purpose of antisemitism policy – insofar as it relates to concerns about Israel – should be to encourage historical understanding of why Zionism emerged, the oppression of Palestinians by Zionists and Israel in the creation of the State of Israel, the continuing oppression of the occupation, and the recurring violence that results from it. Part of this, often a difficult part, is acknowledging that Israel’s actions are the responsibility of Israel, not of the half the world’s Jews who choose to live outside Israel. This made doubly difficult by the frequency with which Israel’s political leaders claim to be acting on behalf of Jews worldwide, a difficulty compounded by the frequency with which many Jewish communal bodies (such as the Board of Deputies of British Jews) claim to “stand with Israel”.

Allegations of antisemitism have to be investigated objectively and carefully.

• The first step is to make a judgment as to whether a remark or act really was antisemitic. It is important to recognise that the fact that some might “take offence” at a statement does not constitute proof of antisemitism. A few years ago many took such offence at the designation of Israel as an apartheid society. Some indeed still do, though virtually every single human-rights organisation of substance worldwide has now made this judgment.

• If it is judged to be antisemitic, the second step is to judge how serious it is. Situating it in the various kinds of situation listed above will be necessary, as will consideration of whether it is the person’s first “offence” or a repeated offence and whether the person, having heard the judgment of antisemitism, acknowledges the judgment or doubles down on the original statement.

• Only then should it be decided what recommendations are appropriate. These should range widely, from simply discussion and advice outside the disciplinary procedure for less serious or first offences, to minor sanctions within the disciplinary procedure for serious offences, and ultimately to severe sanctions for the most serious or repeated offences. It goes without saying that a fair procedure must conform to the requirements of transparency and due process.

In this regard, we would like to draw your attention to the University of Warwick, Report by the Assembly Working Party on Antisemitism and Racism (AWP) (see Appendix 9) adopted overwhelmingly by the Assembly on 28 February 2024. (The Assembly is an official body set up to make recommendations to the Senate and Council of the University. It has no formal power but some moral authority. All academic and administrative staff of the university are automatically members.)

That report is cautious about adopting definitions which they argue seem to promise the removal of ambiguities and to offer an easy decision mechanism but are in fact unable to meet that promise. We in JJP understand these reservations but believe the JDA is constructed to encourage careful consideration of allegations, and do recommend its adoption. We see it as playing a very helpful educational role in helping people think about the issues concerned.

The report makes two further points which we feel are directly relevant to your concerns:

1. It argues “Any definition of antisemitism, including any definition that is adopted or endorsed by the University, is normally relevant to a disciplinary process only insofar as it is relevant to establishing that the civil or criminal law has been breached. Definitions of antisemitism do not provide an independent or free-standing ground of complaint concerning expression.”

2. It stresses that any body considering “complaints concerning expression or academic scholarship … should have a robust understanding of the rights of academic freedom and free expression and legal limits on those rights. No disciplinary proceedings should commence against members of the university on the basis of expression where there is no reasonable prospect of finding that there has been a violation of the criminal or civil law. Such a body should be given training on domestic and international obligations with respect to free expression and academic freedom, as well as training on the proper role of definitions of antisemitism and other forms of racism and discrimination in interpreting the law.”­

JJP Executive Committee

8 December 2024

APPENDICES

1. JJP Policy Statement: Definitions of Antisemitism

2. Letter to Unesco and Analysis of IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism and Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, for UNESCO, 27 March 2023

3. BDS court rulings

4. EJJP – Correspondence with EUMC, 2005

5. : When criticism of Israel is anti-semitic – the real EUMC definition (file entitled The real EUMC definition)

6. “Why the man who drafted the IHRA definition condemns its use”

7. Hugh Tomlinson QC, Counsel’s opinion on the IHRA definition, (PDF entitled TomlinsonGuidanceIHRA)

8. University College London Report of the Academic Board Working Group on Racism and Prejudice

9. University of Warwick, Report by the Assembly Working Party on Antisemitism and Racism (AWP)