Palestinians breaking down the border fence with Israel from Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip on 7 October 2023
Mondoweiss editors introduce the interview with Mousa Abu Marzouk on 6 October 2024:
Mousa Abu Marzouk is a Palestinian politician and senior member of Hamas who served as the first chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau from 1992 until 1996, and deputy chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau from January 1997 until April 2013, where he was succeeded by the late Ismail Haniyeh. Abu Marzouk has been a key figure in Palestinian politics and within the Hamas movement for decades, and continues to play a central role in the group’s politburo.
The interview was conducted via email between September 27 and October 3, 2024. The questions and answers are copied below exactly as they were written, except for minor typographical corrections.
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Could you describe to us what the “Al-Aqsa Flood” Operation that Hamas launched on October 7 was? What was its purpose, and do you think Hamas was successful in what it aimed to achieve?
Operation Al-Aqsa Flood is a purely military operation carried out by a military group from the Al-Qassam Brigades, consisting of an estimated 1,200 elite soldiers. Their objective is to confront the Gaza Division, which has been stationed around the perimeter of the Gaza Strip, imposing a strict siege since 2007. Hamas has called for the participation of the resistance in the West Bank, abroad, and from countries in the Axis of Resistance to achieve several key goals:
But the surprise that Hamas leadership did not anticipate was that the Gaza division of the Israeli army collapsed within a few hours, despite their possession of the most advanced weapons, including tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft, electronic devices, and espionage capabilities. They collapsed within hours, while we only had modest light weapons and dilapidated transport vehicles. However, we had strong men, training, high morale, a just cause, violated rights, missing freedom, and a desire to push back the oppression. This led to chaos we did not expect, entering the settlements and going further, reaching Sderot Rahat, and a radius of 40 kilometers away from the Gaza Strip. This chaos caused many people and factions to cross the separation line and capture both civilians and military personnel, as you have seen. Some even began carrying possessions from the settlements. In truth, all this chaos was the result of the Gaza division’s rapid collapse, something that Hamas did not expect.
As for the objectives that were achieved, they were far more than we anticipated, and here are some of them:
In an October 13, 2023 interview with the New Yorker, you said that on October 7 you were just as surprised as everyone else by the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, and you said that you were taken aback by its military success. On October 7, as the events were still unfolding, what was your initial prediction of the nature of the Israeli response? Did your predictions on that day differ from what actually happened in the subsequent months?
The October 7th operation halted Israel’s project of regional dominance after it was shattered by just a few hundred Al-Qassam fighters. Israel can no longer claim that it protects the region and the Gulf against Iran, and thus all efforts to integrate it into the region have failed as a result of this operation.
As for the goals set by Hamas, they have been solidified on the ground, and the national project is now closer to realization, while the Zionist project is further from execution, despite the balance of power and the American support for Israel. Yes, Israel was taken by surprise by the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, which was planned and executed by the Al-Qassam Brigades without the involvement of the political leadership. As I mentioned before, the real surprise was in the fragility of the Gaza Division and the inability of the Israeli army to address the weakness and rapid collapse of the division, followed by chaos that terrified the Israelis and sparked existential fears. This led to an irrational Israeli response, going beyond all bounds, as they sought to annihilate and displace the Palestinian people, by any means, beyond the borders of historic Palestine, whether to Sinai or elsewhere.
As for whether my predictions on that day differed from what happened in the following months, the truth is I did expect such an Israeli response, given my understanding of the Zionist background and the fanatic Jewish mentality. I have read the Old Testament several times and studied the history of the Zionist movement, though I did not expect the U.S. to be so brutal in supplying Israel with the lethal weapons that kill in this manner and to protect them in all international forums. While I know American society well, politicians are something else entirely.
Did you have greater expectations for the West Bank and its participation in the Al-Aqsa Flood moment? Were you hopeful for a more widespread uprising in the West Bank in support of Gaza?
Yes, I did expect greater participation from the West Bank, but there are two reasons that prevented this. First, the policies of Mahmoud Abbas and his corrupt authority, and second, the settlers’ aggression, their plans, and the protection they receive from the army. However, we still expect much more in the future.