Hamas militants in Gaza City in February 2025
Chaim Levinson writes in Haaretz on 9 October 2025:
With a 22-month delay, the war in Gaza is expected to come to an end. Granted that the details of the Israeli army’s withdrawal in the second phase haven’t been fully disclosed, but they too won’t change the overall picture. Contrary to the Bibi-ist clichés, Netanyahu hasn’t changed the face of the Middle East.
Peoples’ lives have been changed unrecognizably. Many Israelis have mourned the loss of loved ones, have been physically or mentally wounded and have lost property. But in the overall picture, no country has broken apart, no new power has surfaced and no ideology has been eradicated and replaced with another. The mess in the Middle East hasn’t been resolved.
On October 7, 2023, as an Islamist jihadist, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, decided to carry out a suicide attack and to sacrifice his life to harm the lives of others. When fighting a suicide bomber, the objective is to prevent him from blowing himself up, because that’s exactly what he wants. With the battles over, it’s clear that Hamas has survived two years of war. Granted that, it has lost its military capabilities and its rule over Gaza, but it’s alive as an organization.
Up to the last day of the war, Hamas managed to maintain its organizational structure, its political leadership, its command and control in Gaza. No one in its ranks dared to quit, to establish a competing organization, to conduct independent negotiations over a surrender or to sell hostages for money. The threat that it faces from pro-Israeli militias in Gaza appears negligible, and the militia members would be slaughtered the moment the Israel Defense Forces stops providing them with a defense. Hamas’ people will find a way to continue to be relevant in the future as well.
Hamas is ending the war with two main achievements under its belt. The first is restoring the topic of the Palestinians to the top of the global agenda. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s lifelong dream was to erase the Palestinian issue, splintering the Palestinians into separate groups and closing deals with Arab countries over their heads. That may have been why Sinwar set out on his plan – and he succeeded. The Palestinian issue is the most talked-about issue in the world and has attracted millions of new supporters.
Israel has been pushed into a diplomatic corner throughout Western Europe. While Netanyahu steadfastly argued that “a Palestinian state is a reward for terrorism,” Sinwar identified Western sentiment far better than the man who’s frequently hanging out at luxury hotels. Sinwar positioned Gaza as a victim – and popular sentiment is 100 percent on his side. The cease-fire is the seal of approval for the return – and big-time – of the Palestinian cause, this time with the prospect of an independent state, dictated by the president of the United States.
The second achievement is the emptying out of Israel’s prisons. For the observer on the sidelines, the sacrifice of tens of thousands of Gazans for 250 life prisoners looks like madness, but there is consensus in Palestinian society on the issue and it’s also the weak point of all the Arab countries and the Palestinian Authority.
From the Palestinians’ view, the prisoners are like our hostages – innocent people who were abducted from their beds in the middle of the night by the Zionist enemy and who suffer ceaseless torture. Their return is paramount. The Palestinian Authority, which reaches out to Israel, hasn’t managed to get them back but Hamas is about to do so. Beyond that message, it’s also an assurance to every jihadist: Go out and commit a terrorist attack, even if you’re given 100 life sentences. Ultimately, we’ll bring you home.
The main winner of the war is Qatar, which has fewer residents than Tel Aviv and more malls per capita. Despite being the Arab country with the smallest number of citizens, it’s an important world power. Israelis can repeat a thousand times that it’s a country that supports terrorism, but in the world of realpolitik, no one cares.
The Qataris formulated a strategy 40 years ago for survival in a region that covets its natural gas resources to become a global power in sports, education, investment and when it comes to diplomatic alliances. The war provided a final stamp of approval for that. Qatar’s leaders are among the few with access to the president of the United States at any given moment. And they’ll cash in on their central role in mediating the deal.
Israel is emerging from the war in a way that was described 52 years ago by the commander of the Israel Air Force at the time, Benny Peled: a shtetl with an air force. Israel’s strategic asset is its control of the skies over the Middle East and the power of its air force, particularly compared with the nonexistent air forces of the region. What the air force is good at – Israel is good at. And what it’s not good at, Israel isn’t either. October 7 was made possible in part because the air force was unaware of and unprepared for the possibility of a surprise invasion from Gaza. The shtetl culture held sway in the air force. Sometimes the air force can do too much, such as sending a missile into a building in the Qatari capital, Doha – one of the war’s stupidest acts.
Military power is deceptive power. It provides intoxicating, short-term achievements that are then supposed to be followed by diplomatic translation. Israel is poor in translating military actions into diplomacy, because it trips over its own feet amid failed politicians, conflicting interests and an inability to make decisions.
The war front that appears the most successful is the war against Hezbollah, both because the IDF and Mossad intelligence agency planned it well, and because it ended with a clear diplomatic act that limits Hezbollah’s power.
In Syria, Israel is moving toward a diplomatic agreement that should replace the army’s ineffective strikes in defense of the Druze. The war against Hamas is also only ending courtesy of a diplomatic agreement that was forced on Israel and gave it back its hostages.
On the other hand, the Iranian issue has remained open. Israel has significantly harmed Tehran, but there is no diplomatic arrangement that will anchor the military achievement. In the Six-Day War in 1967, Egypt was defeated, and that was followed by Israeli arrogance. The Egyptians, however, very quickly learned the lessons of their mistakes. They forged new diplomatic alliances and organized accordingly. Six years later, Egypt launched a new war that landed a blow on Israel, led to the peace treaty with Israel and put the country on the world map. Not all of the details regarding the situation in Iran can be published, but there too, they’re learning the lessons from the last war. There too, a deal is required.
This article is reproduced in its entirety