Amid fragile ceasefire, the Gaza tribunal on genocide will bring us closer to justice
Protesters hold a flag during a demonstration in support of Palestinians in Gaza, following a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, in London on 18 January 2025
Richard Falk reports in Middle East Eye on 29 January 2025:
On 1 November 2024, a coalition of concerned individuals and organisations launched the Gaza Tribunal (GT) in London in response to the international community’s failure to halt the genocide in Gaza.
After more than a year of carnage, its convenors launched this civil society initiative with an urgent mission: to stop the killing in Gaza and establish a permanent, reliable ceasefire – something the United Nations and other parties involved failed to do.
The guiding aspiration of the tribunal was to represent the peoples of the world in their endeavour to overcome this horrifying spectacle of daily atrocities in Gaza and resist the temptation to accept our collective helplessness in the face of such totalising devastation.
It also seeks to hold Israel – along with complicit governments, international institutions and corporations – accountable for their roles in the violence.
In line with this mission, the GT has worked to ensure political independence from governments and active politicians, refusing to accept governmental or compromised funding. With the three-phase ceasefire agreement now being implemented, the tribunal remains more critical and relevant than ever.
Complementary role
From the start, a key question facing the tribunal was what particular role it would play, given that both the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) were already investigating criminal charges against Israel.
How could a civil society tribunal add anything to the work of this respected judicial process, an organ of the UN enjoying a preeminent status when called upon to resolve legal disputes among governments?
What could be our added value? Who the hell did we think we were?
In response to the perception of irrelevance, the tribunal views its function as distinct from these international bodies.
Through its operations, the tribunal will reach conclusions about the central issue of genocide and related criminality much faster than the ICJ, which is expected to take several years to issue a final judgment.
A key justification for this type of tribunal is its freedom from legalistic rules that limit the scope of inquiry, allowing it to address underlying questions of justice directly.
Additionally, the GT will produce accessible and readable texts that are informed by international law but not burdened by its technicalities, making them far more accessible to the public through media outlets and political gatherings.
In sum, the tribunal is not seeking to compete with the ICJ but rather to play a complementary role that appreciates the ICJ’s contributions while offering its own distinctive impact that addresses some of the limitations of a strictly legal approach, however authoritative.
Continued relevance
An additional concern, along similar lines, arises from the ceasefire process, which, if upheld, will be seen as the end of the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza by many but as the beginning of a fragile and ambiguous future by the convenors of the tribunal.
The issues of continued relevance in light of the ceasefire are different and can be summarised as follows: issues of accountability, complicity and the fulfilment of the basic rights of the Palestinian people are outside the scope of the ceasefire.