Unofficial civilian probe into October 7 finds Netanyahu led efforts to fund Hamas

Members of the civil commission of inquiry into the Hamas October 7 attack, 26 November 2024

Bar Peleg reports in Haaretz on 26 November 2024:

A civilian commission of inquiry into the October 7 massacre has concluded that the Israeli government and security establishment failed to protect civilians, placing personal responsibility on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for undermining decision-making forums and advancing policies that led to the failure.

The commission, which issued its report on Tuesday, highlighted Netanyahu’s role in fostering the “quiet for cash” policy that bolstered Hamas, silencing dissenters, and preventing critical discussions on security issues.

It also held him responsible for dysfunction in government ministries and their inability to respond effectively to the disaster’s aftermath. “Given that Netanyahu has served as prime minister for 15 of the past 16 years, it is no wonder his perspective became the exclusive one,” the report stated.

The commission also assigned responsibility to Netanyahu’s predecessors, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, for perpetuating the “quiet for cash” approach during their collective 18-month tenure, albeit to a lesser extent.  MK Benny Gantz, who previously served as chief of staff and later defense minister, was also criticized for reducing forces around Gaza and over-relying on technology.

Chaired by former Tel Aviv District Court Judge Varda Alshech, the commission was formed by survivors and civil organizations after the government refused to establish an official state commission of inquiry.   Members included former police chief Shlomo Aharonishki, retired Maj. Gen. Ilan Ben-Reuven, retired Brig. Gen. Yehudit Grisaro, Prof. Asa Kasher, and former Beit She’an Mayor Rafi Ben-Shitrit, whose son was killed in the attack.

The 70-page report called for the establishment of an official state commission of inquiry “with all requisite authorities” to uncover the full truth.

It detailed failures across the security establishment, highlighting the military and government’s overconfidence in intelligence, technology, and a “small and smart army” approach.  Decision-making processes were marred by arrogance, poor coordination, and inadequate preparation for scenarios such as Hamas’ mass invasion on October 7, despite prior intelligence indicating potential threats.

The report criticized the reduction of forces around Gaza, the de-emphasis on military exercises, and the abandonment of army spotters during the attack. Police and military leaders were faulted for their lack of coordination, which hindered efforts to save lives during the Nova music festival massacre in Re’im.

The commission also condemned the failure of the Shin Bet and Military Intelligence to provide an early warning of Hamas’ coordinated attack, despite clear signs such as irregular Hamas training exercises and heightened activity in Gaza leading up to the attack and on the night prior to October 7. “Even without intelligence, the military must be prepared operationally for any scenario,” the report stated.

Members found that an atmosphere of deference to Netanyahu over the past decade stifled dissent among professionals and cabinet ministers, while the National Security Council functioned as a political body serving Netanyahu’s perspective.

“This arrogance and structural blindness,” the report concluded, “led directly to Israel’s unpreparedness and the failure to protect its citizens.”

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