Why Israel’s generals are now openly briefing against Netanyahu

IDF soldiers looking at Gaza from the Israeli border, May 2024

Anshel Pfeffer writes in Haaretz on 12 May 2024

The briefings to the Israeli media on Saturday afternoon were synchronized.

Hiding behind “senior officers in the Israel Defense Forces” or “members of the General Staff,” the message went out to the news organizations. The troops were being sent in for a second time to Jabalya, a third time to Zeitoun and other locations in the northern part of the Gaza Strip because Hamas had returned. And Hamas had returned because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had refused to provide a “day after” strategy for an alternative force to take control of the power vacuum in Gaza once Hamas’ military structure had been dismantled.

It wasn’t entirely a new message. The generals have been grumbling about the army having to go into Gaza without an overreaching strategy from the government from the earliest stage of the campaign – even before the ground maneuver began on October 24. But this is the first time these complaints have not just been made in off-the-record conversations, but as part as what can only be a coordinated briefing against the prime minister.

Netanyahu can hardly complain. He has been briefing against the generals from the start of the war. And in a much more orderly fashion. They, and the heads of the intelligence services, have been set up by him and his media proxies as being solely responsible for “the concept” that allowed Israel to be taken by surprise on October 7. Not him, the man who was in favor of allowing Hamas to entrench itself in Gaza – including with the help of Qatari funding, at his urging – in order to serve his agenda of sidelining the Palestinian Authority and averting any concessions that could lead to Palestinian statehood.

Naturally, Netanyahu was ready with his counter-briefing. This came in two forms. There was a more measured response for respectable journalists from a “senior political source,” who explained that those demanding a strategy for the “day after” in Gaza while Hamas still has military power are “detached from reality.” No alternative force can be envisaged until Hamas is destroyed militarily.

What this message was hinting at, the less respectable mouthpieces were only too happy to spell out: If the IDF’s defeatist Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzl Halevi is not prepared to destroy Hamas, he should resign and make room for officers who are not “captive to the concept.”

This could have been a legitimate debate on how to conduct the war. There are valid arguments on both sides. The IDF claims it has delivered and now Netanyahu is squandering its gains by lack of a follow-up plan. Netanyahu and those who support his stance say it is pointless trying to organize an alternative to Hamas in Gaza until Hamas been totally degraded as a fighting force.

Upon closer examination, though, both arguments have gaping holes in them and are largely self-serving.

Netanyahu has made sure that not only is there no alternative force getting ready to take control of parts of Gaza, but until now, in the eighth month of the war, there has not even been any serious discussion on it and talks with the potential candidates (the Palestinian Authority, relatively moderate Arab states or Western allies).

His avoidance of the issue is primarily political. He is afraid of the far-right parties in his governing coalition who would nix any suggestion that stands in the way of their ultimate goal – reoccupying Gaza for good. That isn’t Netanyahu’s goal. His is to remain in power.

The generals have indeed been trying to get Netanyahu and the war cabinet to furnish them with a clearer strategic framework from the beginning of the war. They were rebuffed at every turn, including when the General Staff set up its own team to try to formulate its own strategic ideas. But they should have realized that Netanyahu was not going to give them what they needed, and made their tactical plans accordingly.

They pushed to go big with the ground maneuver, to send entire armored divisions into Gaza City and uproot nearly 2 million civilians. It was their war plan that Netanyahu signed off on. They were aware there was little prospect of having anyone prepared to come in and help run Gaza, yet they proceeded as if there would be.

The time for the generals to confront Netanyahu about the lack of a strategy was before embarking on the ground maneuver. They have grounds to blame him now for squandering the tactical gains, but they also shoulder part of the blame. The debate on the “day after” is an essential one, but it’s taking place seven months too late.

This article is reproduced in its entirety