From Lions’ Den to Lone Wolves: Israel Thought It Had Quelled West Bank Violence. It Was Wrong
Tuesday’s terror attack near Ariel, in which three Israelis were killed and several others were injured, defied trends detected by military officials in the West Bank in recent weeks. Since the October 25 Israel Defense Forces operation in Nablus, in which militants from the city’s Lion’s Den group were killed, there had been a significant decline in the intensity and scale of the violence. Defense officials believed they had eliminated the organization, which had been a major headache for the IDF and the Shin Bet security service during the summer and fall.
The attack this week, which was perpetrated by a lone assailant, underscored the difficulty of imposing scholarly statistical explanations on unfolding events. The ground is ripe for a renewed flare-up at any time; a random “success” by a terrorist, or an operational failure by Israeli forces, would be sufficient to cause an event whose effects would ripple out in the form of attempted copycat attacks, in an unbroken cycle.
In the past few months, the focus of the events in the West Bank has been the Jenin refugee camp and the casbah in Nablus, from which the violence spread to the entirety of both cities and the surrounding roads.
In Jenin, a rather loose association of young men who styled themselves “sons of the camp” – militants from Fatah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad who abandoned the binding organizational framework and coordinated shootings against the IDF and the Border Police during arrest raids in the camp. The deaths of young Palestinians during these operations spurred some of the retaliatory attacks in Israel, including the murder of three Israeli civilians by a Palestinian gunman on Tel Aviv’s Dizengoff Street in April.
In Nablus a more institutionalized and mainly better-branded group, the “Lion’s Den,” was established. Its ideological identification was tenuous, but its sharp understanding of the rules of social-media marketing stood out. The group’s members became TikTok heroes in the territories and acquired a large number of followers on Instagram (about 160,000 at its peak).
Documenting and spreading videos of their actions was sometimes more important than the shootings themselves. When the Palestinian Authority showed that it was loath to confront the new rules of the casbah, Israel went into action. A series of clashes and targeted killings that culminated in the October 25 operation has, for now, ended the activities of the Lion’s Den.
As of midweek, 26 of the group’s members who remained alive had turned themselves in to the Palestinian security units. The development is playing out as a reprise of the Israel-PA agreement on wanted individuals in 2007: The militants lay down their weapons and in return the PA grants them protection (in some cases in the form of protective custody). Israel does not intervene, though it probably hasn’t promised to ignore unsettled scores, such as with the killers of soldier Ido Baruch last month near the settlement of Shavei Shomron. Concurrently, the IDF arrested another five of the wanted men. In some cases, it appeared that they preferred to turn themselves in without a fight.
Following the operation in Nablus and several extensive, high-friction operations in Jenin the number of incidents declined, together with the intensity of the resistance when the IDF entered deep into the “hot zones” of cities in the northern West Bank.
What has not declined, it turns out, is the scale of activity of the lone wolves. In Hebron, at the end of October, a resident of the city murdered an Israeli civilian and wounded several others. And Tuesday’s assailant came from a village near Ariel armed only with a knife, but nevertheless managed to murder three civilians in a killing spree that went on for a quarter of an hour.
Both assailants have a similar background, one that is not unusual in attacks of this sort. The Hebron killer, it emerged, had terminal cancer and his doctor had just told him that he intended to end his active treatment because there was no longer anything to gain from it. The assailant in the Ariel attack was 18, had a brother who died of cancer three years ago and was becoming more observant of his Muslim faith. Some people close to him said he suffered from despair and a feeling that he had lost his way.
The man, who worked as a cleaner in the Ariel industrial zone, exploited a weakness in security at the site. In some places, local governments and security firms employ guards with insufficient training and qualifications, since they can pay them much less. (Security guards with combat experience can command more than double the salary).
The assailant stabbed one guard, wounding him. A second guard fired into the air and did not pursue the perpetrator. In the course of the incident he also stole two cars, with which he rammed into people, stabbing several people, a few of them seriously, in between, before he was shot and killed by soldiers.
Despite the attack – the deadliest in about six months – the IDF Central Command did not request additional reinforcements this time. Following the IDF’s operations in Nablus and Jenin, a sense that things are relatively under control there persists. That appraisal will be put to the test in the days ahead, in the event that copycat attacks materialize. In the background are frequent incidents of violence between settlers and Palestinians in adjacent villages, particularly in the West Bank’s Samaria region. Nearly every terrorist attack in which Jews are murdered is followed by acts of revenge.
The IDF vehemently rejects the right-wing demands – voiced also by the head of the Samaria Regional Council, Yossi Dagan, after the attack at Ariel – to embark on an extensive military operation until the acts of terror are brought to a complete halt. The army views this as an unrealistic option, based on a solution that is not relevant. We will have to wait and see whether this firm professional viewpoint will continue to be held even after the right-wing government is established.
In the same spirit, and for the same reasons, all the security agencies oppose bringing about the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, which the settlers and their supporters view as a “terrorist authority.” The coordination with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is still seen as a security asset that is helping to curb the violence in the territories.
On Tuesday night, an unusual incident occurred in another arena: an attack by an Iranian drone on an oil tanker owned by a company belonging to the Israeli businessman Idan Ofer, off the coast of Oman. Israel tried to link the strike with an attempt to destabilize the region ahead of the World Cup in Qatar, which begins Sunday. Iran, which denied any involvement in the event, claimed that it was actually an Israeli “false flag” incident meant to complicate Tehran’s relations with its Qatari neighbors.
It now appears that the Israeli (and U.S.) claims of Iranian responsibility are credible. The drone strike was part of a violent exchange of messages between the sides and is unrelated to the soccer tournament. Israel inflicted considerable damage on the Iranians in a series of recent airstrikes in Syria that were attributed to Jerusalem. Iran is signaling ti Israel that it can expand the arena of confrontation to encompass the seas, a front the sides had abandoned completely more than a year ago.
Unexpected red line
All week the exchange of messages – nonviolent – continued between Benjamin Netanyahu and Bezalel Smotrich. The prime minister-designate, who last week seemed to consider giving in and appointing the Religious Zionism chief as defense minister, changed his mind. American pressure tipped the scales.
The Biden administration is very uncomfortable with the idea of Itamar Ben-Gvir, a disciple of Rabbi Meir Kahane, becoming public security minister. But the possible appointment of Smotrich, a religious zealot in his own right, as defense minister is perceived in Washington as an Israeli finger in the eye. And it appears to be a red line for the Americans.
Netanyahu apparently didn’t expect the intensity of the U.S. administration’s objections. For now, Smotrich is insisting on either the defense or finance ministries. But the closer the deadline for forming a government looms, the more the bloc will put pressure on him not to obstruct the right’s dream of returning to power.
This is the background to the odd suggestion to appoint as defense minister Arye Dery, the head of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party. Supporters of the idea note Dery’s vast experience as a member of the security cabinet, going back more than 30 years. But there are two obstacles.
First, Dery’s second corruption conviction – this time for tax evasion, earlier this year – casts a shadow, though the parties are assuming they can get around this with new legislation if necessary. (This could also be the case if Dery gets a different portfolio.)
Second, Dery, his family and many leading members of his party dodged any form of military service or did abbreviated service. This casts a heavy shadow on the idea of letting Dery make life-and-death decisions, however judicious and restrained he may be. It’s probably the bigger obstacle.
If Netanyahu makes good on the rest of his coalition partners’ demands, the defense portfolio will revert to Likud. In that case, the leading candidate will be Maj. Gen. (res.) Yoav Gallant.
With Gallant there are no questions about his ideological views, and of course not about the nature and length of his military service. His main handicap is the story from 2011, when he had to forgo the post of IDF chief of staff amid reports that he had improperly taken possession of land near his house in the north.
The IDF hierarchy has changed completely since then, but there still seems to be some bad blood with Gallant. That’s not a great opening for the next chief of staff, Herzl Halevi, who starts work in mid-January.
Likud very much opposed the decision by outgoing Defense Minister Benny Gantz to complete Halevi’s appointment process before the election. By doing so, he created an irreversible situation that Netanyahu won’t contest. The position of IDF chief of staff is too deep in Israelis’ hearts for Likud to intervene now.
Gallant might bring in a surprise candidate as director general of the Defense Ministry: Brig. Gen. (res.) Amit Edri. Gallant appointed Edri, a logistics officer who served under him in the army, as director general of the Education Ministry when Gallant held that portfolio.
Another candidate, Maj. Gen. (res.) Eyal Zamir, will probably prefer to head the National Security Council. Some former top officials under Netanyahu – Zamir as military secretary, Ron Dermer as policy adviser and Yossi Cohen as Mossad chief – are being mentioned as candidates to return to key posts.
If Edri, whose relevant experience is limited, is appointed, he may need a longer handover period than usual. The Defense Ministry’s current director general, Amir Eshel, has announced his intention to leave but will remain for a stretch if necessary to ensure the handling of sensitive issues such as passing the defense budget and crafting the IDF’s next multiyear plan.
Of the IDF’s top officers, only one was considered close to Gallant in the past. Central Command chief Yehuda Fuchs was Gallant’s operations officer when he headed Southern Command. Fuchs was later tapped to assist Chief of Staff Gallant, until that appointment was canceled and the two went their separate ways.
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