B’Tselem Annual Report 2011
The extracts posted here include most of the Preface and the section on the ‘separation barier’. The list of Contents for those who want to read more in the original is at the end.
Throughout the year BʹTselem conducts in-depth research and produces publications regarding specific human rights issues. TIt is an opportunity to take a step back and look at the big picture. This publication gives an overview of the broad spectrum of issues regarding Israelʹs human rights performance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip over the past year.
The picture is harsh – not because of dramatic events or a sudden deterioration, but precisely because of the routine. This year, we enter the 45th year since Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip. What was supposed to be a temporary situation appears firmly entrenched with no change in sight.
In the West Bank, two and a half million Palestinians live under Israeli military occupation while settlers live in enclaves of Israeli law within the same territory. Individual acts of violence by extremist settlers periodically capture the headlines, and discriminatory and inadequate law enforcement is indeed a concern. However, the major human rights violations result from the settlements: their extensive exploitation of land and water, the massive military presence to protect them, the road network paved to serve them and the invasive route of the Separation Barrier, which was largely dictated by the settlements. Israeli civilians living in the West Bank are also subject to violence. This year, five members of the Fogel family were shot and stabbed to death in their home in the Itamar settlement, and a father and his infant son were killed when their car crashed after rocks were thrown by Palestinians.
In the Gaza Strip, some one and a half million Palestinians are almost completely isolated from the outside world. While people can now leave Gaza through Egypt, they cannot travel to the West Bank, with harsh implications for family ties, the economy and educational opportunities. Israel fully controls the movement of goods. It allows import of humanitarian aid and consumer goods, however raw materials for construction, industry and agriculture are much more limited, and exports are minuscule. As a result, most Gazans remain dependent on humanitarian aid rather than being able to support themselves as they did previously.
Human rights are universal; every individual has the same rights and all authorities must be held to the same standards. As an Israeli organization, BʹTselem devotes most of its efforts to monitoring our own government and military. On the Palestinian side, there are several courageous and credible Palestinian organizations monitoring the human rights performance of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip.
Human rights violations are inherent in a military occupation and the protracted nature of Israelʹs occupation only exacerbates human rights violations. Our job at BʹTselem is to ensure the fullest respect for human rights in the present circumstances, but it is clear that as long as the occupation continues, Palestinians will never fully enjoy their rights. By the same token, an erosion of the Israeli democracy is also inevitable in a situation of prolonged occupation. Israel controls the fate of millions of people who have no part in the democratic system. This is a dangerous situation for any democracy, and highlights the importance of watchdog groups on
government and military behavior in this context.
And yet, these watchdogs have come under increasing attack recently. The Israeli government has supported a series of measures against democratic institutions and critics of government policy. Some of these proposals specifically target human rights organizations like BʹTselem, focusing on our sources of funding.
Such attacks only demonstrate the importance of our work. I am so proud to be part of BʹTselem, a vital part of Israeli civil society that in spite of the many challenges works tenaciously to safeguard human rights on the ground. It is especially gratifying to know that we are part of a community of Israelis, Palestinians and people around the world who share our vision of a future where all Israelis and Palestinians will live in safety and dignity. I am confident that ultimately, working together, we will make this vision a reality.
BʹTselem The Human Toll:
Killing of Palestinian and Israeli Civilians Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces
From 1 January to 31 December 2011, Israeli security forces killed 115 Palestinians, 18 of them minors (under age 18).
One hundred and five Palestinians were killed in the Gaza Strip. Of these, 37 were not taking part in hostilities, 49 took part in hostilities, and 14 were the object of targeted killing. Regarding the remaining four persons, BʹTselem does not know if they were taking part in hostilities. In addition, one Palestinian policeman was killed while in a building belonging to the Hamas navy.
Nineteen of the fatalities were shot near the Gaza perimeter fence; 11 of them took no part in any hostilities at the time. Israeli security forces also killed two Egyptian non-combatants along the Gaza perimeter fence.
In targeted‐killing operations, 18 Palestinian were killed; 14 were the object of the attack, four were bystanders.
Eighty two Palestinians were killed in aerial bombing attacks (this figure includes four of the Palestinians killed near the perimeter fence and all the Palestinians who were killed in the targeted‐killing operations). Twenty of the 82 Palestinians were not taking part in hostilities.
Palestinians killed in the Gaza Strip
…………………………………….. 2010 2011
Did not take part in hostilities 18………37
Took part in hostilities…………46………49
Palestinian police ……………….. 0………. 1
Object of targeted killing………. 2……… 14
Unknown ………………………….. 2………. 4
There are no ongoing hostilities in the West Bank, so it is irrelevant to classify Palestinian fatalities according to whether or not they took part in hostilities. In 2011, Israeli security forces killed 10 Palestinians in the West Bank: one in an exchange of gunfire with soldiers, two after they apparently tried to attack soldiers at a checkpoint, four during arrest operations, one while driving his car, one by soldiers’ gunfire after Palestinians threw stones at them, and one as a result of a soldier firing a tear‐gas canister that hit him in the head from short range while he was throwing stones. In addition, a Palestinian minor, resident of East Jerusalem, was killed during
clashes with security forces and with security guards of the Jewish settlement in Silwan. The identity of the shooter remains unknown.
Investigations: exception rather than the rule
Over a decade ago, at the beginning of the second Intifada, the Military Advocate General’s Corps announced that, contrary to prior practice, it would not open an investigation by the Military Police Investigation Unit in every case in which soldiers killed a Palestinian civilian. Instead, the unit that was responsible for the death would conduct an operational inquiry, whose findings would be forwarded to the Military Advocate General. Based on these findings, and other information he obtained, the MAG would decide whether to order a criminal investigation.
April 2011: A welcome change
In October 2003, BʹTselem and the Association for Civil Rights petitioned the High Court of Justice to require the MAG Corps to order an MPIU investigation in every case in which soldiers killed a Palestinian who was not taking part in hostilities. The organizations rejected the argument that the situation was one of “armed conflict.” In fact, much of the military activity in the Occupied Territories consisted of ordinary policing actions. Furthermore, international law also governs situations of armed conflict, prescribing the circumstances in which soldiers are allowed to open fire, which weapons may be used, and so forth. Not every civilian death in an armed conflict constitutes a violation of the law. However, only a criminal investigation into such cases can determine whether soldiers respected the laws of war.
In April 2011, before the court ruled on the petition, the MAG Corps informed the High Court that, given the relative security calm in the West Bank, it decided to change the investigation policy, and that, “every case in which a civilian is killed from now on, as a result of an action of IDF forces in Judea and Samaria will result in an immediate MPIU investigation.” There are two exceptions to the policy change: the previous policy will remain in force in cases in which a person is killed in the West Bank in an action “of a real combat natureʺ (for example, an exchange of gunfire) and regarding all civilian deaths in the Gaza Strip.
Following the announcement, the court denied the petition. In the opinion, Supreme Court President Dorit Beinisch wrote that the point of departure in the matter of investigation of deaths is “the centrality and importance of protecting the right to life. . . Even in times of violent encounters, the rules requiring combatants to respect human life, and, to the extent possible, to respect the basic rights of civilians not taking part in hostilities, apply.” President Beinisch noted that, “the investigation affects protection of the right to life – the investigation enables, first and foremost, prosecution in appropriate cases and holding persons responsible who do not act in
accordance with the law. Furthermore, a criminal investigation acts to safeguard the future-looking component of the obligation to protect life, in that it deters potential violators, prevents disregard for the right to life, and contributes to an atmosphere in which the rule of law is maintained.”
The new policy is partial and conditional BʹTselem welcomes the change in policy. However, the new policy is based on the situation on the ground – the relative calm in the West Bank – and not on an acknowledgement of the obligation to investigate all civilian deaths, even during hostilities. As the state’s announcement indicates, if the situation changes, the MAG Corps will revert to its previous policy, which it applied during the second Intifada. Thus, the announcement does not ensure that Israel will meet its lawful obligations.
Another problem is that the operational inquiry remains the basis from which to decide whether to order a criminal investigation into civilian deaths in the Gaza Strip, and into those cases where civilians were killed in combat activities in the West Bank. The operational inquiry is not the proper tool for determining whether to open a criminal investigation; it is intended to learn lessons to improve operational activity, and not to examine criminal responsibility of the soldiers involved. In addition, even when an MPIU investigation is opened, it takes place after the operational inquiry.
This chronology is liable to thwart the the criminal investigation since, in the course of the operational inquiry, the soldiers involved describe the events together, which could enable them to coordinate their stories.
A decade without accountability
Despite repeated requests by BʹTselem to receive information on cases it has submitted for investigation, the MAG Corps only transmits partial information on these cases. The partial information provided indicates a lack of accountability in cases of civilian deaths.
From September 2000 to April 2011, when the MAG Corps changed its investigation policy, BʹTselem demanded a criminal investigation into 304 cases in which soldiers killed Palestinians.
Investigations were opened in only 73 of these cases. Of these, as far as BʹTselem knows, indictments were filed in nine cases and 23 investigations were closed with no measures taken against soldiers; in 27 cases the MPIU completed the investigation but the case was still awaiting the decision of the Military Advocate General; and 14 cases are still under investigation. As for the remaining cases, BʹTselem was informed that, regarding 168 cases, no investigation would be opened and that in 44 cases, the MAG Corps had not yet decided whether to open an MPIU investigation. Regarding 14 cases, the MAG Corps told BʹTselem that the files could not be located, and five files had been transferred to other investigative bodies.
Since the change in the investigations policy, MPIU investigations were ordered in all four cases in which Palestinians were killed in the West Bank. As far as BʹTselem knows, the MPIU is still investigating all of these cases.
Wheels of justice grind slowly, then grind to a halt: the killing of Firas Qasqas
Firas Qasqas, 32, was killed on 2 February 2007 by soldiersʹ gunfire in a-Tira, a neighborhood in Ramallah. He was a resident of Batir, outside of Bethlehem, and had gone with his family to visit relatives in a-Tira.
According to information obtained by BʹTselem, on that afternoon, Qasqas and two of his brothers-in-law went for a walk in an open area near the houses of the neighborhood. They saw a group of soldiers some 500 meters from them. The two brothers-in-law reported that soldiers opened fire at the three men, who were unarmed and had done nothing to endanger the soldiersʹ lives. A bullet struck Qasqas in the back, killing him.
BʹTselem wrote to MAG Corps several times, demanding an MPIU investigation into the circumstances of the killing. About a year passed before MAG Corps ordered the investigation. BʹTselem assisted the MPIU in taking testimonies of the two men who were with Qasqas when he was shot, and provided the MPIU with all the relevant material the organization had in the matter.
As far as BʹTselem knows, the investigation ended in April 2009. Yet despite BʹTselemʹs repeated requests that the MAG Corps decide whether to indict, no decision was made for almost two years. In February 2011, BʹTselem petitioned the High Court of Justice in the matter. In August, the State Attorneyʹs Office informed the court that it decided to prosecute the officer who was responsible for the killing of Firas Qasqas, subject to a hearing which was to take place in November.
However, the decision to indict was subsequently reversed. In January 2012, over four years after the incident, the State Attorneyʹs Office informed the court that, as a result of the hearing, it had decided not to file an indictment against the officer, and to close the file. The District Attorney’s Office wrote that, although the shooting did not comport with the open‐fire regulations, “a unique operational situation was involved, in which the soldiers, including the major [the officer], were in real danger.” The State Attorneyʹs Office concluded that, “even in the event the order to shoot was mistaken, it did not amount to negligence” and that, “there is a significant lack of evidence to prove the causal connection between the shooting and the alleged death of Firas Qasqas.”
BʹTselem intends to appeal the state’s decision.
Mistaken identity? Soldiers shoot ‘Omar al-Qawasmeh to death in his bed
‘Omar al‐Qawasmeh, 66, lived with his wife and son in Hebron. Living on the floor below them was Wa’il al‐Bitar, an activist in Hamas who was wanted by the Israeli military. Al‐Bitar was released from a Palestinian Authority prison on 6 January 2011. Around 3:45 P.M. the next day, soldiers broke into the house of the al‐Qawasmeh family. They had reached the bedroom door without anybody in the family even knowing they were in the house. Two soldiers shot ‘Omar al-Qawasmeh to death. BʹTselem’s investigation indicated that he was shot while lying in bed. According to the medical report, he was shot in the head, chest, and limbs. His wife told BʹTselem that, immediately after the shooting, one of the soldiers told her to show him her husband’s identity card and asked whether the apartment was Wa’il al-Bitar’s. Subsequently, the soldiers arrested al‐Bitar outside his apartment, without any resistance from him.
The IDF Spokesperson’s announcement, made the same day, stated that, “during the course of a night arrest of wanted persons, a Palestinian who was in the house of one of the terrorists was killed.” In fact, as noted above, al‐Qawasmeh was killed inside his own apartment. In a subsequent announcement the IDF Spokesperson presented findings of the operational inquiry whereby “the initial gunfire at the civilian was done following a surprising and suspicious movement he made, causing the soldier to feel his life was in danger, especially given the information that the forces had as to the activity and dangerousness of Wa’il Bitar, a senior activist in Hamas, who was the object of the arrest and was in the building.” The announcement expressed regret for the death of ‘Omar al‐Qawasmeh, but emphasized that the shooting was carried out in accordance with the open‐fire regulations. Nevertheless, OC Central Command
decided not to extend the service in the standing army of one of the two soldiers who shot al-Qawasmeh.
The action taken by OC Central Command was insufficient and reflects an appalling disregard for human life. It is clear from the chronology of the events and the responses of the IDF Spokesperson that the soldiers entered al-Qawasmeh’s apartment by mistake. Even if the soldiers believed that the man in front of them was the person they wanted to arrest, and even if he made a suspicious movement, the soldiers were not justified in opening fire with the intent to kill him. There were many soldiers in the apartment, and they could have prevented the danger he posed – if indeed he posed any danger – in other ways.
BʹTselem wrote to the military advocate for operational matters, demanding a criminal investigation into the death of al-Qawasmeh. In January 2012, a year after the incident, the MAG Corps informed BʹTselem that they had decided a year earlier, two weeks after the incident, not to open an investigation.
Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians
In 2011, Palestinians killed 11 Israeli civilians.
Eight were killed in the West Bank: five members of the Fogel family – the parents and three of their children, aged 11, 4, and an infant – were stabbed and shot to death in their home in the Itamar settlement;
A man was shot by a Palestinian policeman when he entered the area of Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus (which is under control of the Palestinian Authority) without prior
coordination with the Israeli military;
and Asher Palmer and his infant son were killed as a result of stones thrown at the car in which they were traveling on Route 60.
Another Israeli civilian, was shot to death in the Jenin refugee camp – the identity of the shooter and the background of the shooting remain unclear.
Three people were killed inside Israel: two in rocket attacks from Gaza – one in Beersheva and the other in Ashkelon – and a 16-year-old boy was killed by an anti-tank missile fired from Gaza at a bus inside the Sha’ar Hanegev Regional Council.
In addition, six Israeli civilians and one Israeli soldier were killed in an attack near Eilat. The identity of the perpetrators has not been announced. In an exchange of gunfire in that incident, several persons, whose identity is not known to BʹTselem, were killed, among them apparently some of the perpetrators. The soldier was killed by friendly fire. Another soldier was killed, also by friendly fire, in an exchange of gunfire with Palestinians along the border with Gaza.
Two foreign citizens were killed: one was abducted and hanged by Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip, and the other was killed by an explosive charge laid by Palestinians in Jerusalem.
Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians
Two Palestinians were killed by settler gunfire in the West Bank. In both cases, settlers went to the vicinity of Palestinian villages and apparently opened fire after Palestinians had thrown stones at them. A third Palestinian, a resident of East Jerusalem, was stabbed to death in the center of Jerusalem by an Israeli.
Death penalty by Palestinian Authorities
In 2011, Palestinian Authority courts in the West Bank sentenced one person to death, and Hamas courts in the Gaza Strip sentenced eight persons to death (one of them an Israeli, who was tried and sentenced in absentia). Hamas executed three persons: Muhammad Ahmad Abu Qanis, 51, and his son Rami, 22, who were convicted, on 29 November 2004, in the Magistrate’s Court in Gaza for collaboration with Israel and for causing the death of Palestinians and were executed by hanging, and ‘Abd al‐Karim Muhammad ‘Abd Sharir, 35, who was convicted on 29 October 2010
for collaboration with Israel and was executed by firing squad.
Since the Palestinian Authority was established, in 1995, 71 persons have been sentenced to death in PA courts for the crimes of collaboration with Israel, treason, and murder. Since June 2007, when Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip, another 27 people have been sentenced to death for similar offenses.
Under Palestinian law, execution of a death sentence requires the approval of the president of the Palestinian Authority. Mahmoud Abbas has refused to approve executions, so none has been carried out by the Palestinian Authority since he took office, in January 2005. Prior to this date, the Palestinian Authority executed 13 persons who were sentenced to death. The Hamas government reinstituted capital punishment in 2010, claiming that Abbas’s presidency had ended, that the Hamas government no longer recognized him as president, and that his approval was not needed. From then until the end of 2011, eight executions were carried out in the Gaza Strip.
Out of all cases in which death penalties were handed down in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, two were reduced to a prison sentence, and in five cases, the person was released. Eight persons sentenced to death were killed inside prison, and three were murdered after they escaped from prison during Operation Cast Lead. Five persons facing execution escaped and were not caught,six were sentenced in absentia and are not in custody, and in two cases, BʹTselem does not know where the person is being held.
PA and Hamas prisons currently hold 47 persons who have been sentenced to death and live in uncertainty as to whether they will be executed.
BʹTselem strongly condemns capital punishment, which is immoral and breaches the right to life. Capital punishment must be stricken from the statute books, regardless of the details or nature of the crime. The Palestinian Authority and the Hamas government must eliminate capital punishment. Until then, the Hamas government must not execute any person sentenced to death.
Annexation in the Guise of Security: The Separation Barrier
Route of the Barrier reveals territorial aspirations of the State
In 2002, following a series of attacks inside Israel, the government decided to build a physical barrier between Israel and the West Bank. However, the route of the Separation Barrier was not only based on security, but also on other completely extraneous considerations. In fact, one of the major considerations in setting the route is the desire to annex parts of the West Bank to Israel.
The planned route, 85 percent of which runs inside the West Bank, encircles settlements such as Ma’ale Adummim and Ariel, and also encircles a few Palestinian communities. Upon completion, 9.4 percent of the West Bank, containing eight Palestinian communities and about 90 settlements, outposts and Israeli industrial areas will lie west of the Barrier. In at least 12 places, the barrier is routed hundreds and even thousands of meters from existing settlements, allowing for future settlement expansion. The desire to annex territory to Israel is the primary reason for the Barrier’s length – which at 708 kilometers is over twice the length of the 320-kilometer-long Green Line, the armistice line between the West Bank and Israel.
So far, 437.5 kilometers of the Barrier have been constructed (62 percent of the planned route), directly harming hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, who remain in enclaves or are separated from their farmland. Another 58 kilometers is currently under construction and the remaining 212 kilometers either await government approval or are in planning. All the sections under construction or awaiting approval are located inside the West Bank.
The state has the right and obligation to protect its citizens from attacks, but if it requires a barrier to do so, it must construct it along the Green Line or inside Israel. It is not allowed to use the Barrier’s route to expand the area of settlements or its sovereign territory. Therefore, Israel must dismantle all parts of the barrier that were built inside the West Bank.
The seam zone: Separating Palestinians
Israel’s policy of including as many settlements and as much unsettled land as possible on the western side of the barrier isolated much land and created enclaves between the Barrier and the Green Line, an area officially referred to as the “seam zone.” Some villages are completely surrounded by the barrier, cut off from the rest of the West Bank. Thousands of Palestinians have been separated from their farmland and water sources on the western side of the Barrier. The tens of thousands of Palestinians who worked these lands have lost their source of livelihood. Israel has built 66 agricultural gates along the Barrier that are intended to serve farmers and farm laborers, but the gates are opened infrequently or on a seasonal basis, and only some of the landowners, those who manage to obtain a permit from the Civil Administration, are allowed to cross. Farmers who obtain permits have trouble working their land because they generally are not allowed to bring in farm equipment or laborers to assist them. The procedure for obtaining a permit is cumbersome, and, to aggravate matters, the Civil Administration has yet to publish in Arabic the criteria for obtaining a permit.
The Civil Administration reported that in 2010 it issued 30,985 permits to enable Palestinians to enter the seam zone. Some 70 percent of permit requests were granted. Of the permits that were issued, 61 percent were for short periods of up to three months. Since 2007, the Civil Administration has imposed a quota – it does not grant more than 70 percent of the requests for a permit, regardless of the number of requests submitted.
The Civil Administration has consistently reduced the number of long‐term permits (over one year) to enter the seam‐zone areas. This policy makes it impossible for Palestinians with farmland west of the Barrier to develop modern agriculture or raise diverse crops that require intensive cultivation. Having no option, they limit their farming to olive orchards, which require relatively little cultivation. In April 2011, the High Court of Justice rejected a petition by ACRI that challenged the legality of the permit regime in the seam zone. The High Court held that, subject to a few changes that had to be implemented, the permit regime is proportionate and maintains a proper balance between Israel’s security needs and the needs of the local population.
Bil’in: State takes four years to carry out High Court decision
In July 2011, the military completed relocation of the Separation Barrier in the Bil’in area, four years after the High Court of Justice ordered that the Barrier be rerouted to run closer to the Modi’in Illit settlement. The rerouting returned 700 dunams (0.7 sq km) of farmland to the villagers; 1,500 dunams (1.5 sq km) of their land remain west of the Barrier.
East Jerusalem: Harmful route in complicated reality
Given the complex reality in the Jerusalem area, any route that is chosen for the Barrier will inevitably violate human rights. East Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Israel annexed this area and included it as part of the Jerusalem municipality, however for years this did not affect the daily life of Palestinians in this area. New streets were built on both sides of the municipal boundary, and schools, health services, and other institutions built on these streets served Palestinians on both sides of the border. Due to the permanent shortage of housing solutions in East Jerusalem – a result of discriminatory planning, the failure to issue building permits, and wide-scale demolition of houses – many Palestinians holding the status of Jerusalem residents lived outside the city limits.
The construction of the Separation Barrier along the municipality’s border completely disrupted the fabric of life that had developed over decades, and led to severe infringement of the human rights of residents of the neighborhoods surrounding the city. East Jerusalem residents who live beyond the Barrier, as well as other Palestinians holding permits to enter East Jerusalem, are permitted to enter the city via just three of the checkpoints located along the Barrier. Checkpoints were set up at the entrances to neighborhoods outside the city limits – such as a-Sheikh Sa’ed and a-Nu’man – and restricted their residents’ access to Jerusalem. Residents of these neighbourhoods have to spend much of their time waiting in long lines at the checkpoints, which limit their access to health and education services and to their jobs.
The route of the barrier leaves two large Palestinian neighborhoods – Kafr ‘Aqab and the Shu’afat refugee camp – physically cut off from the city, so their residents have to undergo security checks every time they leave their neighborhood and go to other parts of the city. Residents of the Shu’afat refugee camp can only reach the rest of the city via the checkpoint at the main entrance to the camp. In December 2011, this checkpoint was replaced by a large terminal, like those separating the West Bank from Israel.
Since the Barrier was built, the Jerusalem Municipality and the Israel Police have shirked their responsibilities for life in the Shu’afat refugee camp: drug crimes are rampant, and uncontrolled construction is widespread. The municipality makes no effort to regulate building in the community to meet the residents’ needs.
Al-Walajah: Choked by high walls
In August 2011, Israelʹs High Court of Justice approved the route of the Barrier in the section that encircles the built‐up area of al‐Walajah, a Palestinian village in southwest Jerusalem. The Barrier – in this case a concrete wall nine meters high and 700 meters long – will sever the village from hundreds of dunams of village farmland. Only one opening will be left for exiting the village.
Years earlier Israel expropriated half of the village’s land to build the settlements of Har Gilo and Gilo. Israel began to build the Barrier around the village in early 2010. Residents of the village petitioned Israelʹs High Court of Justice challenging the legality of military orders seizing their land. In December 2010, after most of the village’s built‐up area had already been surrounded by a wall, the Court froze additional construction of the Barrier. Completion of the Barrier will make development of the village impossible because it runs close to the houses. Also, the earthwork and construction have caused serious damage to the Emek Refaim reserve – including the 1,500 year‐old agricultural terraces, some of which were being cultivated by residents of the village who have now suffered a blow to their source of income.
Once the Barrier is completed, villagers wanting to reach their land will need to obtain special permits. Based on the experience in other areas of the West Bank, the Civil Administration gives permits sparingly to farmers and only for short periods of time. As a result, many people with land on the other side of the Separation Barrier have been compelled to abandon these lands and have lost their source of livelihood.
The Human Toll: Killing of Palestinian and Israeli Civilians
Not Just “Rotten Apples:” Violence against Palestinians by Israeli Security Forces
Without Due Process: Detention and Arrest of Palestinians
The Gaza Strip: Isolated and Impoverished
Whose Land is This? Settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem
Turning a Blind Eye: Failure to Protect Palestinians from Violence by Israeli Civilians
Annexation in the Guise of Security: The Separation Barrier
Forbidden Protest: Violation of the Right to Demonstrate
Stifling Development: Restrictions on Construction, Demolition of Homes
A little bit easier to move: Restrictions on Palestinian Movement in the West Bank and East Jerusalem