New hope for anti-racist Left in election

Articles from 1) +972, 2) Washington Post and 3) Communist Party of Israel.

[Not sure what event this pictures; it is +972’s banner for the article below.]
A new activism, a new politics, a new generation of Palestinians in Israel

+972 sits down with four young, prominent, politically active Palestinian citizens of Israel to discuss their demands, how they are different than the generations that preceded them, and their hopes for the Joint List.

By Henriette Chacar, +972
March 11, 2013

To most Jewish Israelis they don’t have names or faces — they are at worst rioters and stone-throwers waving Palestinian flags; at best they are a discriminated-against minority.

Their new activism is partly the result of generational divides and new technologies that have connected them to the rest of the Arab world that had been shut off since the birth of the State of Israel. In part it is the result of recent Israeli attacks against their relatives in the West Bank and Gaza, discriminatory police violence and a long history of political repression.

No small number of factors has helped shape this new generation of Palestinian activists in Israel. They go by different names, define different identities for themselves and have different political tactics and goals. They fight for Palestinian national liberation and Israeli civil rights, prioritizing each based on strategic and tactical considerations, and have varying approaches to mainstream politics.

Most of the young activists describe themselves as Palestinian, and when they take to the streets they wave the Palestinian flag, something that was almost unheard of in previous generations inside Israel. Their national identity and its expression, however, are greatly influenced by living in the Jewish state.

“The first time my father saw me carrying the Palestinian flag, he lost his mind,” says Abed Abu Shhadeh, 26, from Jaffa. “Before Oslo it was illegal to do that, and Palestinians would have been extremely afraid of the flag. Today, we have dozens of them.”

A young woman holds a sign at a demonstration commemorating Land Day in Jaffa, March 30, 2014. Land Day marks the deaths of six Palestinians protesters at the hands of Israeli police and troops during mass demonstrations on March 30, 1976, against plans to confiscate Arab land in Galilee. Photo by Activestills.org

Technically, the flag of the Palestinian Liberation Organization is illegal to display in Israel, and the PLO is still listed as a terrorist organization. In practice, that prohibition hasn’t been enforced since Israel began dealing directly with the Yasser Arafat and the PLO in the 1990s. Much has changed.

This is the third generation of Palestinian citizens of Israel. The first generation experienced the Nakba, the displacement and expulsion of the majority of Palestinians from the borders of present-day Israel in 1948, along with the destruction of nearly all of their villages. The second generation was raised in fear: they were raised by survivors of the Nakba, lived under Israel’s military government and were constantly threatened and controlled by the State, Rawan Bisharat explains.

“The third generation, especially since the Intifada of 2000, is the generation that is rebelling. They are characterized by strength,” she continues. But often times their parents tried to reel them back in. Because of the oppression faced by the previous generation, they are scared by their children’s political expression and its consequences. “They don’t want us to discuss Palestinian national identity with their children, out of fear.”

Rawan, 32, originally from Nazareth, has been living in Jaffa for the past five years, where she is active in political and social movements. She is the Palestinian coordinator of the youth program at Sedaka-Reut, a non-profit focusing on educating Palestinian and Jewish youth to be politically and socially active and on creating bi-national partnerships for social change. She has volunteered with an organization called “Women Against Violence” in Nazareth for over a decade, and works with a group preparing Arab high school students for higher education. “As a Palestinian minority, education is our weapon,” she declares.

Palestinians citizens of Israel at a demonstration in Jaffa against the Israeli attack on Gaza, July 21, 2014. Photo by Activestills.org

Arab-Israeli or Palestinian-Arab: A struggle for identity

While all of the activists I spoke to define themselves as Arab, all of them also put great importance on their Palestinian identity — something that is not self-evident, and which most feel the need to demonstrate and declare.

“Palestinians in Ramallah can say they’re Palestinian and khalas – nobody questions it. But for Palestinians in Israel, we have to stress that component,” Rawan says, adding that when she speaks to Israelis, “I like to say that I’m a ‘48 Palestinian, or a Palestinian with Israeli citizenship, to clarify that there are Palestinians here [in Israel]. There was never a Palestinian state, but Palestinians lived here. My grandmother was Palestinian, and so I am clearly Palestinian.”

Palestinian identity is the fulcrum of this generation’s struggle, explains Hanin Majadli, 25, from Baqa al-Gharbiyye, who has built a sizable Jewish-Israeli fan-base of sorts on Facebook, where she publishes daily Arabic lessons. “We are Palestinians; we are Palestinians who are prevented from self-identifying as such. It’s important for me that Israelis know that I’m not only an ‘Arab-Israeli’ but an Arab-Palestinian. This is a nationality they are trying to obscure.”

Society has come to a point where you can’t even think of an Arab-Jewish coalition. Aned Abu Shhadeh

In many ways, the growing expression of Palestinian national identity among Arab citizens of Israel is a reaction to contemporary Zionism. As Israeli politics and society shift rightward, Palestinian citizens grasp onto their Palestinian heritage and nationality ever more tightly. According to Abed, far-right nationalist politicians like Avigdor Liberman and Naftali Bennett actually help boost the Palestinian national minority in Israel.

“The crazy laws being passed in the last few years affect people and the way they identify themselves. It’s amazing how a very small group in Israeli society managed to pull everyone to the extreme right,” Abed says, explaining that by everyone, he is also referring to Palestinians.

Even those who wouldn’t otherwise be drawn to Palestinian nationalism embrace it as a defense against the parallel radicalization and intensification of Zionist nationalism, Hanin explains. “I experience the need to hold onto who I am. Palestinians today feel a greater need to stress that they are Palestinian.”

“Just like Hamas, extreme-right religious Jews really believe this is a religious struggle, and in a short period of time they have managed to pull everyone toward the extreme right. Society has come to a point where you can’t even think of an Arab-Jewish coalition. We’ve been pulled so far apart from each other that we can’t even cooperate,” Abed stipulates.

Activism as a product of failed politics

Those same cleavages between Jews and Arabs and the resultant cohesion among them also play out in politics, most recently evidenced by the formation of the Joint List of Arab parties running together in Israel’s upcoming elections. Along with whatever hope the Joint List brings, however, it must deal with a legacy disappointment.

The political organizing and the existence of Arab political parties in Israel is important, Rawan says, but they are unrepresentative of the younger generation and its worldview. “The politicians need to be replaced. Thank you for your hard work, but it’s time to give others a chance.”

To some of these young Palestinians, Arab Knesset members might as well be ornaments on the shelf displayed alongside the Palestinian flag; their presence is merely symbolic.

“Their role is more declarative, rather than as agents for actual change,” explains Majd Kayyal, 23, a journalist and activist from Haifa. The presence of Arab representatives in the Knesset strengthens the existence of political parties and maps out the Palestinian political reality, which is important. “It grants them access to vital information that we are in need of. The transformation that they go through in the Knesset is also important. When they are suddenly silenced, or forced down the podium, it’s a reflection of what’s going on in Israeli society as a whole.”

Despite the festive atmosphere surrounding the Joint List, the younger generation is not compromising; it has high expectations. “There are issues substantial to Palestinians: the return of refugees to their villages, Zionism as a racist, colonial movement, and the inherently racist definition of the state. If the Joint List ignores these and other critical issues, it will become nothing more than a technical channel with access to the Knesset,” Majd adds.

Hanin reaffirms Majd premise: “I generally don’t believe that any change will come out of the Knesset. I don’t believe that the Arab members of parliament are in a position to really change our situation.”

Without a dominant personality taking the lead, these young activists have learned to rely on nobody but themselves to bring about the change they believe they deserve, which primarily bolsters their faith in power of the people. However, not having a dominant, effective leadership has its consequences. Without a central power base, much of their activism takes place without proper coordination or specific demands.

“I do not think there is an organized goal for the future and this is where the problem lies. As Palestinians, we’re not organizing ourselves,” Rawan laments. “These are problems that we have to work on internally.”

The announcement of the Joint List brought winds of hope, and softened many of the younger generation’s sharp stances towards their political leaders. Many view this as an historic moment. Calls to boycott the elections have been replaced with the potential for change promised by the Joint List.

“Before the Joint List was announced, I was against the elections. I was personally going to boycott, even though individual acts of boycott don’t really affect a change,” Rawan reflects in a follow-up interview following the announcement of the Joint List.

“I am going to vote for the List, not only because their decision to unite is encouraging, but also because I honestly fear that our interests won’t make it past the [election] threshold,” explains Hanin. “For me voting is just another tool for fighting the repressive Israeli regime. I might not get much through voting, but I could make their lives harder and expose this fake democracy, which is actually based on religious supremacy,” adds Abed.

By no means does unity conceal some of the very basic and inherent internal differences among the parties, but what Palestinians in Israel understand is that a united front is necessary if any progress is to be made on issues concerning them. “While the Arab world is being divided into religious groups and tribes, we are uniting,” Abed says with pride.

This new political unity, like the new generation of activists witnessing it, is undoubtedly a product of changing times.

Most of those with whom I spoke pointed to the past 15 years as a point of departure for Palestinian citizens of Israel, a markedly new era — both in the way the State views and treats them, and how their generation began standing up to those challenges.

October 2000, Intifada and the Arab world

But something changed in the year 2000. The Oslo peace process of the 1990s gave people hope for a better future, a future of Palestinian national self-determination and for Palestinian citizens of Israel, a future of equal rights and opportunity.

In early October of 2000, coinciding with the failure of the peace process and the start of the Second Intifada, Israeli police killed 13 Arab citizens while breaking up protests in Nazareth and throughout the Galilee.

The killings verified the Palestinian minority’s worst fears: no matter what they did, or how much they were willing to compromise, they would always be treated as second class citizens, simply because they are Arabs.

“The Intifada of 2000 is when everyone experienced a change,” Rawan says. “The political awareness was very evident, and it was clear that we [Palestinians] are all related to one another. On the one hand we have a rise in political awareness, and on the other hand we have a loss of hope in Israeli institutions.”

“Every war and intifada, when people in Jaffa watch the news, they don’t see random people in the streets of Ramallah, they see their relatives in the West Bank or Gaza,” Abed adds. These young activists feel inseparably part of the entire Palestinian people, and that their fates are intertwined.

Yes, I live in a Jewish state, but I’m not Jewish, so I’m not a normal citizen. Hanin Majadli

The year 2000 is also cited as an imperative point in the history of Palestinians in Israel for other reasons. Being largely cut off from the rest of the Arab world up until then, technological progress allowed Palestinians in Israel to reconnect with other Arabs in the region.

“With the introduction of satellite television and the internet as new channels of communication, there was an increase in awareness, in knowledge,” explains Majd Kayyal. “This brought about greater opportunities for sharing information, as well as greater activism. Something began to move since October 2000. People became more impudent, in a positive sense. Several movements became less idle, less afraid.”

Last year, Majd was arrested and held incommunicado for five days upon his return from Beirut where he attended a journalism conference. His visit to Lebanon and his subsequent arrest, was a flag of resurgent pan-Arab Palestinian identity, waved by many Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Majd Kayyal at his home in Haifa. Photo by Shiraz Grinbaum/Activestills.org

“Our identity is defined according to our struggle. We are Arab Palestinians. We want to be free Palestinians in order to be Arabs. We want to be free Palestinians so that we can naturally integrate in the Arab world without being disgraced one way or another; so that I can have the opportunity to leave the city and easily live in Cairo, for example, without any headaches,” Majd continues. “The Palestinian identity is crucial for this, just as the Arab identity is needed in order to confront colonialism. The Arab identity, if it weren’t to resist Western, European colonialism, would also become fascist, very much like Saddam Hussein’s regime.”

But identity is neither binary nor a simple idea, whether in the realm of the personal or the political. While these young activists increasingly identify with the Palestinian national movement, they are also Israeli citizens and are struggling for civil rights inside the Jewish state. The idea and reality of being a non-Jew in the Jewish state is a major part of that struggle.

“We are not Israelis,” Hanin says. “We are not Israelis in the most basic sense: the Israeli is Jewish, and the Jew is Israeli. In my opinion the two are synonymous. Israeli is considered a nationality here, and not only a citizenship. Our nationality is Palestinian, and we are a part of the Palestinian people. Yes, I live in a Jewish state, but I’m not Jewish, so I’m not a normal citizen. I am an Arab citizen in an occupying state with a Jewish national identity.”

A struggle for civil rights or national liberation?

So what are young Palestinian Israelis demanding, exactly? Are they leading a civil rights movement or are they part of the Palestinian national struggle?

“I don’t separate between the two nor do I see how they differ from each other,” Rawan answers. “I live here, I want to be a part of this institution and I also want civil equality, but that doesn’t mean I have forgotten the Palestinian cause. I want the Jews to acknowledge the crimes they committed against my people. There is no contradiction: I want them to recognize their wrongs, take responsibility for their actions and make them right, and I also want them to grant me the equality I deserve.”

Hanin elaborates: “The end goal is total liberation from Zionism, but of course any temporary steps taken to improve our status as Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel are welcome. We shouldn’t forget that, despite our long-term goal, we are also citizens of this place, and we want to claim what we deserve as citizens as well.”

Zionism is perceived to be the primary obstacle, both for attaining civil rights, and for achieving freedom for the occupied and besieged Palestinians, Majd explains: “As long as the current political structure remains in place we cannot achieve our civil rights, national independence, or a state within 1967 borders — nothing. As long as there is something called a ‘Jewish state’ built on the foundation of racist, Zionist principles, there is no prospect for change of any kind. No matter how ‘small’ your demands may be, you won’t be able to achieve any progress for Palestinians if that matter remains unaddressed.”

Arab youth clash with Israeli riot police in Kafr Kanna, Israel. The protests come less than a day after an Arab man from the village was shot and killed by Israeli policemen. Security cameras caught the man attempting to attack the policemen, as well as the shooting, which took place after the man had already backed away considerably. (photo: Oren Ziv/Activestills.org)
Youth clash with Israeli riot police in Kafr Kanna, Israel. The protests came less than a day after an Arab man from the village was shot and killed by Israeli policemen. Security cameras caught the man banging on a police van, and an officer shooting him as he attempted to flee. (photo: Oren Ziv/Activestills.org)

The end game

“When people talk about the conflict, it’s as if they are talking about a conflict between two equal parties,” Abed says. “In reality, one party is significantly stronger than the other, not to mention occupying them and confining them without any space to maneuver political.” Part of protesting and taking to the streets, he adds, is getting Jewish Israelis to “rethink their views about Palestinian citizens, and start to understand that more power won’t get them anywhere.”

While the majority of these activists aspire to change the regime entirely, they operate on an ad hoc basis, and their struggle has no clear vision for the future. “Our ambition is to live in one state where citizenship grants equal to Jews and Arabs, and which doesn’t prefer one over the other or distinguish between Arab and Jew. It might sound a little insane, but if the Berlin Wall was destroyed, and the Ottoman Empire fell after 700 years, then there is hope. Either we do nothing, because nothing is going to change. Or we do something, and believe that it might change things even slightly,” says Hanin.

Rawan even suggests structural ethnic separation as a possible solution: “I think that we as a Palestinian minority in Israel have to start establishing our own organizations and institutions to serve us. We’re still not ready to take on a project like this, and perhaps we don’t have the skills or resources yet, but we at least have to start thinking in this direction.”

“Things might get worse or better. This is something we Palestinians tend to forget – national struggles tend to take hundreds of years. I don’t see a solution in the next 10 years, but as long as there is a will, there is a way,” Abed says. “As long as refugees still want to come back and fight, it is only a matter of time until they do.”

A new role for Palestinian citizens in Israel’s election

By Yousef Munayyer, Washington Post
March 11 , 2015

Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCIs) are primed to play a larger than usual role in Israel’s March 17 parliamentary election. The implications of their changing role could have a big impact on coalition formation as well, for reasons that may not be obvious. Until now, most attention, in Israel and internationally, has focused on the tight race between Israel’s two largest parties: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud and Isaac Herzog’s Zionist Union. But PCIs offer a particularly useful window into the potential effects of the elevated threshold in new electoral rules, the structure of the electorate and potential changes in voter turnout.

Electoral turnout among PCIs has declined over the past 20 years. The turnout in the last election for Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, in 2013 was approximately 64 percent of the total electorate, but the average turnout among Arab voters was notably lower, at closer to 54 percent. In 1999 Arab voter turnout was 75 percent. My research suggests that this decline is in large part due to great dissatisfaction among PCIs with an Israeli state-society system that discriminates against its Palestinian citizens and increasingly defines itself in ethno-religious terms (i.e., as a Jewish state). The extent of divisions between parties that aspire to represent Palestinian citizens also contributes to the demobilization of the PCI vote. These divisions and infighting have led to a great deal of apathy among Palestinian citizens over the lack of influence and strength that their representatives have in the state system.

Joint List election poster: “Building a Democratic Camp”

Today, however, this is changing. This election will be the first test of a higher threshold that political parties must cross to receive any seats in the Knesset. Previously, this threshold was at 2 percent of the electorate. Now, parties getting less than 3.25 percent of the vote will not get any seats within the parliament, while parties that get 3.25 percent or just above will receive four of the 120 seats. In other words, a swing of .01 percent of the electorate can result in a four-seat swing. Moreover, the chance of parties falling off the threshold has bigger implications. Since the 120-seat Knesset pie doesn’t change size and only those who have passed the threshold will get a seat at the table, the slice each party at the table gets could grow beyond what was predicted by the polls if parties on the edge drop below the threshold. If this scenario plays out, a number of seats could be reapportioned to the parties that made it past the threshold.

In the 2013 election, some 8 percent of the electorate’s ballots went to parties below the threshold. When the reapportioning was done, the Netanyahu-led list, which got 23.34 percent of the ballots cast (28 seats), received an additional three seats for a total of 31. In an election where the two main parties are running close and each will have to wheel-and-deal with other parties to get to a 61-seat coalition, this reapportionment could play a key role in reconfiguring the dynamics into something the polls are not capturing.

The main proponent of reforming the threshold was Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, leader the Yisrael Beiteinu party. This party, whose name translates to “Israel is our home,” has often focused on verbally attacking PCIs. At a recent election conference Lieberman called for the beheading of Arab citizens who are disloyal to Israel. By advocating for raising the threshold, it was widely understood that Lieberman aimed to effectively eliminate at least two of the three Arab parties from the Knesset that had barely achieved the 2 percent threshold in 2013. Ironically, in recent polls it is Lieberman’s party and a few others are teetering very close to the threshold. Some polls show Yisrael Beiteinu winning only five seats, other parties like Meretz on the left and the Yachad party on the far right have polled as low as four seats.

The announcement of the higher threshold created new incentives for the Arab parties on the threshold chopping block to form a unified list. This was not an easy process, and Arab parties – which include secular nationalists, communists and Islamists – had to make difficult compromises to join a shared platform. Due to this effort to unify the smaller parties, the new Joint List now polls as the third or fourth largest party in the Israeli political system. This newfound political clout undoubtedly energizes and mobilizes those voters who had long grown apathetic within this community over the divisions that existed. As a result, higher PCI voter turnout can be expected in this election.

Such success could have unexpected implications for coalition formation. A growing and more unified PCI voting bloc undergirds a party which is not only unlikely to sit in a right-wing government but is also unlikely to sit in any government at all. This is likely to shrink the opportunities to combine parties and create stable, workable coalitions, especially non-right-wing coalitions. If the seats won by Arab parties are not available for coalition forming, where else can would-be governments look? For one, they can look to voters in Israeli settlements, where in 2013 electoral turnout was upwards of 75 percent.

Between the 2009 and 2013 elections, voters in the settlements shifted in significant numbers from the Likud party to the Jewish Home party. That shift, which will likely carry over into this election, has solidified a party that is far less likely to sit in a non-right-wing coalition. All of this suggests strongly that the structure at play within the Israeli electorate is geared toward producing right-wing governments, and in the event that a non-right-wing government should be able to form a coalition, it certainly would not have the mandate or the stability with which to move forward in any significant way on the question of peace.

There is a real possibility that the Joint List representing PCIs might get even more than the 12 seats that it is expected to win based on a series of recent and consistent polls. The implications of this are significant. Although the Joint List has expressed unwillingness to join a coalition, it could become key to forming a non-Netanyahu government and it could play a bigger role in opposition. At a minimum, a bigger Joint List that stays out of a coalition means a more difficult path to 61 for a non-Netanyahu government simply because fewer seats are available to combine with that are not Netanyahu’s natural allies. Also, it could unify a long-divided Palestinian constituency. Palestinian leaders might then be able to speak with a more assertive voice in the broader Palestinian geographic realm and political spectrum. At a time when divisions between Palestinian political parties in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are deep, Palestinian representative structures are in tatters, and PCIs are excluded from meaningful participation in political life, the rise of a unified Palestinian party could introduce a very new dynamic into Israeli politics — giving some Palestinians a stronger voice in a system that rules over the vast majority of them who are kept voiceless.

This probably will not mean a renewed interest in peace between Israel and Palestine, however. One of the grave dangers in the lead-up to this election is operating on the assumption that a defeat for Netanyahu and his replacement with a Herzog-led government would in fact improve the prospects for a renewed and successful peace process. Nothing could be further from the truth. The most effective challenges to the recent right-wing governments from within this portion of the electorate focus on economic issues and not on the question of peace or Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. The foundational problem is that the Israeli electorate is simply not there, and there are no signs of internal change on the horizon. Catalysts for change will likely have to come from the outside. Both practically and normatively speaking U.S. policymakers with peace on the agenda should not weigh the outcome of the Israeli election, whatever direction it goes, in terms of peace and Palestinian rights.

Yousef Munayyer is the executive director of U.S. Campaign to End Israeli Occupation and a doctoral candidate in government and politics at the University of Maryland. He is the former executive director of the Jerusalem Fund

The Political Platform of the “Joint List”: Our Answer to Racism

By Communist Party of Israel
February 26, 2015

In the elections for the 20th Knesset to be held on March 17, 2015, as an expression of political responsibility and in response to calls from its respective publics, the Joint List was formed by and is running as a partnership of four political parties: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, Communist Party of Israel), the Islamic Movement, the NDA (National Democratic Assembly), and the AMC (Arab Movement for Change).

The Joint List constitutes a resounding slap in the face to the right wing in Israel which is attempting to eliminate the voices of the Arab minority and progressive Jews in the Israeli parliament. The list is our answer to the fascist attacks and racist policies expressed in the barrage of discriminatory and anti-democratic legislation, so detrimental to the citizens of this country, the most prominent currently being a bill proposing the enshrinement of Israel as a Jewish State – the Jewish Nation State law.

The Joint List is an expression of the unity of the struggle of the Arab-Palestinian public against all branches and parties of the government, and its joint efforts with Jewish progressive forces fighting against the occupation, racism, and discrimination.

The Joint List is our political response to the fascist threat to exclude the Arab public from the political arena by raising the electoral threshold. Our response transforms that threat into an opportunity to close ranks and initiate a joint struggle against racism and racists, against fascism and fascists, and to remove the right wing from power and repel colonial and racist programs.

The Joint List is a milestone in the history of parliamentarian political work among the Arab-Palestinian public in Israel, and a democratic framework for all progressive forces in Israel. It constitutes a force for joint collective work empowering the representative institutions of the Arab public, such as the National Committee of the Heads of Local Arab Authorities, the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel, the Arab Student committees, as well as the entire political and social world of Arab society in Israel, so desperately in need of unifying values and a patriotic partnership alongside values of pluralism, diversity, and uniqueness.

The Joint List was formed with the aim of reinforcing and uniting the ranks against racism, and increasing the political weight and influence of the Arab public and all forces fighting against the occupation and racism. Each of the four parties composing the list retains its ideological identity while all partners act together in accordance with the list’s fundamental principles and the agreed upon platform.

Fundamental Principles:

The Joint List will fight for a just peace in the region, based on the United Nations’ resolutions, and calling for: an end the occupation of all territories conquered in 1967; the dismantling of all Israeli settlements and the racist separation fence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories; the release of all political prisoners; the establishment of a sovereign, independent Palestinian state within the June 4, 1967 borders, with its capital in East Jerusalem; and finding a just solution for the problem of the Palestinian refugees which assures the right of return in accordance with to UN General Assembly Resolution 194.

The Joint List will fight for full national and civic equality for the Arab-Palestinian public in Israel as a native minority with collective and individual rights. The list will demand recognition of the Arab public as a national minority with the right to self-administration in the fields of culture, education, and religion, as part of the Arab-Palestinian people and the Arab nation.

The Joint List will act to assure full equality in all walks of life, and will struggle against the regime of racist discrimination and national oppression, in order to achieve equal opportunity, material equality, and corrective and distributive justice.

The list will fight against the confiscation of lands and the demolition of homes and for the recognition of all unrecognized villages, in order to provide land for homes, for industrial areas, and for places of employment.

The list will battle for recognition of the rights of displaced persons, including their right to return to their villages and lands; will fight to annul compulsory military service for the Arab-Druze community, and against all programs of military recruitment and national service for young Arab people; will act to impart the values of pluralism and tolerance, and will grapple with the afflictions of violence, crime, and the anarchy currently rampant in the possession of weapons.

The Joint List will fight against all manifestations of racism and fascism, and for the democratic rights of all citizens. The list will fight to annul the Defence (Emergency) Regulations and all legislation which violates rights and restricts liberties, and for the writing and implementation of a democratic constitution for Israel based on the values of equality, justice, and human rights, as well as basic social rights and democratic liberties.

The Joint List will struggle for workers’ rights and social and environmental justice, and will fight for the interests of the weaker classes in our society against governmental policies which make the poor even poorer, and the rich richer. The list will battle against poverty and unemployment in general, but particularly within Arab society, and for raising the minimum wage to at least 60% of the average wage in the marketplace, and for the assurance of the basic rights of health, education, welfare, and residence for all citizens.

The Joint List will fight for equal rights for women in all areas of life, and against all forms of oppression, exploitation, discrimination, and violence against women in the family, at work and throughout society, in particular the murder of women. The list will struggle to assure the rights of women to education and employment, as well as political, social, and cultural involvement.

The Joint List will battle for public support and empowerment of culture and art with no discrimination or exclusion. The list will fight to preserve the status of Arabic as an official language, and for such status to be given expression in all areas of life. The list will struggle for the right to develop Arab culture freely and independently, to enhance national belonging and identity, and to impart a culture of democratic dialogue.

The Joint List rejects imperialist intervention in the affairs of the countries of the region and the world, the policy of “divide and rule,” and ethnic, religious, and community sectarianism, and the dissolution of countries and peoples. The list supports the rights of nations to independence, freedom, justice, and democracy.
The Joint List will fight for nuclear disarmament in the Middle East, including Israel, and the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction, as part of an effort to create a world free from nuclear weapons.

Against the Occupation and For a Just Peace in the Region!
National and Civic Equality for the Arab-Palestinian Minority!
Against Racism and Fascism, and for Democratic Rights of All!
Workers’ Rights and Social and Environmental Justice for All!
Equal Rights for Women in All Areas of Life!
Empowerment of Culture, Language, Belonging, and Identity!
Against Imperialism and Sectarianism, and For the Rights of Nations!
For the Disarmament of the Middle East from Weapons of Mass Destruction!