Diplomats invoke the STFU rule to Bibi

Two very interesting articles from Foreign Policy

Netanyahu eyeing up former ambassador Michael Oren. Photo by Nicholas Kamm / AFP/Getty Images.

Bibipalooza Is a Dangerous Distraction

Why Obama needs to refocus the discussion on our larger Mideast strategy.

By David Rothkopf, Foreign Policy
February 27, 2015

It says something about the state of affairs in the Middle East that from a U.S. foreign-policy perspective it hardly matters that the U.S.-Israel relationship is in the worst shape we’ve ever seen it. It is largely a domestic political issue in the two countries involved. Sadly, however, it is once again distracting the leaders of both countries — and citizens in each — from addressing the much bigger concerns that ought to be commanding their attention.

While it is easy to pin blame on both sides in the current spat, special honors for ratcheting it up go to Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. Since there is literally nothing Bibi can say to the U.S. Congress that will come as a surprise — no new insight he can offer into an Iran nuclear deal that is not yet done — all he can do on his visit to Washington, D.C., next week is posture and vent. Since there is little chance his well-cultivated impression of a volcano spewing righteous indignation will change for the better the opinion of one single U.S. leader or voter (unless, as polls indicate he actually further undermines his position and lowers public opinion of him), the only possible reason he can be doing this is to win votes back home in Israel.

So, with the assistance of House Speaker John Boehner, Netanyahu has appropriated the rostrum of the U.S. congress to serve as a soapbox from which he will make a campaign speech directed to the people of a small country roughly 6,000 miles away. Presumably he feels this will show his influence as a statesman and his tirelessness in their defense. The fact that in making the speech he will actually dramatically diminish his influence in the United States and ensure bad relations with the government in Washington for the next two years suggests a flaw in his reasoning and creates a challenge for the Israeli people. If they really value the relationship with the United States or want a prime minister who can effectively work with their country’s principal ally and sponsor, they’ll take one look at Bibi’s ill-considered star turn and vote for someone else.

Of course, some will argue that the pending U.S.-Iran deal (if it ends up taking the shape that is currently being reported) is a danger to Israel and that Netanyahu is obligated to do everything he can to stop it. Again, if the speech would actually help on that front, delivering it might make sense. But all you have to do is read the comments of senior Obama administration and Democratic Party officials, and it is absolutely clear that what he’s actually doing is undercutting his influence (and likely reducing it on other issues that may arise going forward). Further, given how polarizing the speech seems likely to be, it will only solidify the positions of those who are already for or against the deal with Iran — not change, shape, or impact in any meaningful way the deal’s likelihood of being implemented.

The speech is already a blunder. It’s on Bibi. But it has been made worse by the unnecessary choice of the Obama team to fan the flames of discord. Once again, I invoke one of the most important tenets of all foreign policy, the Rule of STFU. It posits that if what you are going to say does nothing to advance the interests of the country you represent, then, no matter how good it may make you feel to say it, shut the fuck up. This is not the same, it should be said, as my Grandma’s rule that, “if you don’t have anything nice to say, don’t say anything.” Sometimes one has to be tough. Diplomacy is about choosing ways to be tough that are also effective. In circumstances like this in which restraint would allow the other party to be neatly and surely hoisted on its own petard and in which actions speak much louder than words, the White House would have benefited more from silence than from opening itself up to critics who want it to share the blame for this particular stumble in the relationship. (They’ve already got a few of those to their credit as it is.)

That said, the bigger issue is the pending (and seemingly almost certain to happen) nuclear deal with Iran, which warrants a more thoughtful debate than the partisan name-calling and reflexive staking-out of positions that the Bibi speech is helping to encourage. And bigger still than that is the even less widely discussed, vastly more important question of where a nuclear deal — or the U.S.-Israel relationship for that matter — figures in an American regional strategy for the Middle East that at this point is just a distant fantasy on the minds of a few old policy hands who remember when such things were important. (Which, by the way, is always.)

As for the nuclear deal, at least a preliminary take on what it looks like seems to suggest that Bibi’s overall blunder may be compounded by the fact that his own ham-fistedness and arrogance may actually be distracting from a more substantive discussion that could conceivably win over support for his point of view better than his being a high-profile jerk will do.

I say this as someone who would welcome any deal that will achieve the three key goals that a good deal should be directed toward. First, it should materially reduce the likelihood that Iran will develop an atomic weapon. Second, it should reduce the likelihood of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that could greatly increase the risk of nuclear weapons being used. Thirdly, it should advance America’s overall interests in making the Middle East a stable region that threatens neither us nor our allies, that doesn’t draw away too many of our resources (including leadership bandwidth), and is a place where Americans, American companies, and our allies can prosper in ways that benefit us.

I also stipulate that a perfect deal is impossible — indeed, one that completely puts at ease someone like Bibi Netanyahu is probably impossible to achieve. In the first case, this is because Iranian negotiators face political realities at home. In the second, it is because negotiations are always to some degree about compromise. And re: Bibi, it is because however sincerely he may fear an Iranian nuclear threat, he chooses to present it as the biggest existential threat facing Israel because the genuinely biggest existential threat, the growth in numbers of Palestinians within the post-1967 borders of Israel, is one he does not wish to seriously deal with. Within a couple of years, Israel will face the choice as to whether it wishes to be either a Jewish state or a democracy, and Bibi lacks the will, the vision, or the political support from his base on the right to deal with this in a constructive way.

The broad outlines of the pending deal seem to be, based on published reports and conversations with those close to the negotiations: Iran retains a functioning and rather expansive civilian nuclear development program, it retains the right to enrich nuclear fuel, it keeps perhaps 6,500 centrifuges, and it is subject to an inspection program that is broad-based but is not without constraints on the behaviour and purview of inspectors. And all this is meant to be part of a deal that has something like a 10-year sunset provision after which the deal expires. In exchange for agreeing to these terms, Iran will get immediate sanctions relief and gradually increasing relief of all international sanctions. Further, it also seems that some of the key questions regarding Iran’s nuclear weapons program that were posed by the U.N. when it imposed sanctions may be sidestepped or swept under the rug.

It is, in short, another interim deal that will make economic life easier for the Iranians almost immediately but is only likely to reduce the risk of Iran gaining nuclear weapons for a limited period of time. Indeed, if these are the final terms, one area of its slippage from original goals can be found around the idea of the deal’s goal. Once the goal was, at least in theory, to completely end the Iranian nuclear program. Now it seems to be to ensure that Iran stays roughly one year away from the capacity to develop a weapon. In fact, according to the parameters this deal seems headed toward, it ensures that Iran will not only have many of the resources needed to remain a threshold nuclear state, but that it will now be able to have those with the world’s blessing and in the context of a strengthening economy. The problem with this approach is that while it is certainly better than nothing, it poses among Iran’s adversaries at some time in the relatively near future the prospect of a suddenly greater Iranian threat even if Tehran respects the terms of this deal (which, of course, cannot be guaranteed and would be contrary to its past behaviour). This in turn makes it highly likely that those adversaries, such as the Saudis, will ratchet up their own nuclear research programs and in turn will advance us toward a regional arms race, precisely one of the scenarios the deal was supposed to avoid.

Such an escalation might be avoided if the United States were systematically and simultaneously reassuring our allies in the region that we are committed not only to the enforcement of the deal but to a Middle East in which Iranian influence and ambitions were directly, clearly, and comprehensively counterbalanced and that we would work with them and invest in ensuring that was the case. Indeed, that is the kind of strategic “big picture” thinking that could make such a deal not only more palatable to our allies but also more likely to advance our longer-term interests. The president has been advised that such an approach would make sense and that he should carefully frame this big-picture view, but to date has yet to do so. Indeed, failure to have laid the groundwork on this front with our most important regional allies has been perhaps the biggest flaw of the administration’s approach to addressing the Iranian threat — an approach that has been admirably tough at times (on sanctions) and has been nothing if not doggedly determined to see what diplomacy can achieve rather than repeating past mistakes of rushing into wars like the one in Iraq.

Think how our allies must be feeling right now.Think how our allies must be feeling right now. We need them more than ever to help combat violent extremism (as was emphasized at the recent White House conference on this topic). We tell them that. But meanwhile we have at key junctures failed to communicate fully where we are going with the Iran deal or how we will ensure its enforcement, and what we will do to ensure their security. They in turn are understandably surprised when we concede to Iran the same enrichment capabilities we have denied to countries like the United Arab Emirates. Further, some are just upset or confused by our treatment of them on other issues — our waffling on taking early action against extremist threats, for example. Certainly, Israelis fall into this category of allies disaffected by our recent behavior.

Another especially important country has been whipsawed by our behavior, and at a moment of great strategic importance, our relationship with them is in tatters. That is Egypt. Whatever the flaws of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s government may be, a few facts are clear. First, U.S. policy and communications mismanagement has left essentially everyone in Egypt, regardless of affiliation, skeptical of the United States. Second, Egypt is the historical anchor tenant among the region’s more moderate states; there is no alliance of such states possible without them; and there is no comprehensive way to turn back extremists without such an alliance. Similarly, such an alliance is absolutely critical to counterbalance Iran and send a clear message to it that adventurism is dangerous. Third, Egypt is currently surrounded by metastasizing states — failed states in which malevolent forces are seeking to establish bases from which they can destabilize and undercut their neighbors. In Yemen, in Libya, and in Sinai, these threats are real — manifestations of the scope and changing nature of the threat of violent extremism. Finally, should Egypt be destabilized or become weakened, the broader regional alliance will be weakened as well — and the threats on Egypt’s borders are likely to worsen.

There is no way to stabilize the region, no way to combat some of the most imminent extremist threats, no way to create the regional balance required to make the best of a flawed Iran deal, without recognizing that it is necessary to support the Egyptian government, even as we work with them to promote necessary economic and political reforms.

Indeed, the spat with Israel distracts from the disturbing reality that our relations with virtually every single state that is essential to our twin strategy priorities in the Middle East are worse than they were six years ago or at least have been significantly shaken by the White House’s unreliable and sometimes erratic behavior.

It is not too late. If the president and his team believe that they have struck the best Iran deal that is possible and that, though it is imperfect, it will make the region at least a little safer for a little while longer, then they need to step back from the partisan trap that is being set for them by Boehner and Bibi. They need to do what they have only talked about doing and actually frame a real strategy in the region. They need to convince those who worry about the deal’s defects that they are building inspection, diplomatic, and military fail-safes to guarantee that it is honored. They need to convince regional allies who are key to fighting extremism, to the long-term stability of the region, and to America’s interests that they have a plan and that the plan is in the collective interests of our allies. They need to show it with active support (not speeches, not show-and-tell state visits), and they need to swallow hard and accept that in the interest of achieving our major priorities, we will have to accept slower progress on some other fronts. That’s realism.

Also, if they wish to encourage reformers in Iran by moving a deal forward, they need to accept that both because reformers have stumbled in the past and because other important countries fear Iran (based not on its past behavior, but on its current actions regionwide), they need to rebuild and refresh ties with our historical friends — including Israel, but also a vital group of states across the Arab World. Because in the end, history is an indicator of what the future holds. And because if there is a miraculous change in the role Iran plays, we still benefit from balance in the region between forces whose tensions have roots that date back a millennium.

Ron Dermer, Israel’s ambassador the USA, whose brainwave the Congress speech was, addressing the annual Washington conference of Christians United for Israel, July 21, 2014. Photo from CUFI.

Is Obama’s Special Relationship With Bibi Broken?

How to tell whether or not the tension surrounding the Israeli prime minister’s upcoming visit is just fodder for headlines or a sign of something worse.

By Aaron David Miller, Foreign Policy
February 26, 2015

Next week Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu plans to address a joint meeting of Congress. InvitationGate has already triggered a fierce debate and generated some pretty tough words between the prime minister and the Obama administration. National Security Advisor Susan Rice told Charlie Rose on Feb. 23 that the partisanship engendered by Netanyahu’s upcoming visit was “destructive of the fabric of the [U.S.-Israeli] relationship.” On Wednesday, Netanyahu accused the Obama administration and its allies of “giving up” on stopping Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Kerry got into the act too by mocking Netanyahu’s support for the Iraq War and saying he was also wrong on the U.S.-Iran interim agreement.

So what’s really going on here? Is InvitationGate just another episode in the ongoing soap opera that has passed for the pseudo-relationship between Obama and Netanyahu or could it reflect a more permanent dysfunction in relations between the two countries? In short, is this brouhaha a headline or a trend line?

The answer to that question may not be available anytime soon, at least not until the alternative can be tested: Will a new U.S. president — perhaps a third Bush or a second Clinton, let’s say — and another Israeli prime minister get on any better? But right now, that’s still very much a thought experiment. Indeed, depending on the results of the March 17 elections, this very odd couple may have to endure their disgruntled relationship for another 18 months.

But with just a few days to go before Bibi’s big visit, how can we put InvitationGate into perspective and assess its real impact? Here are a few thoughts to get you ready for the main event next week and to help you navigate what may follow.

First, the Obama-Bibi disconnect is hardly the first manifestation of serious tension in the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Other U.S. presidents have tangled with tough Israeli prime ministers.

In 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower threatened sanctions (and he was serious) over Suez if Israel didn’t withdraw its forces; during the Ford administration, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger threatened reassessment over Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s failure to sign a second Sinai disengagement; President Jimmy Carter and Menachem Begin went at it over settlements; President Ronald Reagan delayed F-16 deliveries over Begin’s extension of administrative law to the Golan Heights; and George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker delayed — with the aim of denying — housing loan guarantees because of Yitzhak Shamir’s settlement policies. In 1990, Bush, believing that Shamir had lied to him about settlements during their first meeting, would square off in a nasty battle over housing loan guarantees to Israel, one that included a bruising tousle with AIPAC and Baker telling Congress in open testimony that Israel should call when it was serious about peace (he even provided the White House phone number).

And it’s important to keep these moments of pushback by U.S. presidents fresh in our minds, especially in face of the urban legend that the White House is Israeli-occupied territory and rolls over every time Israel or its supporters say “boo.” Still, what’s happening now between Obama and Bibi stands out as perhaps one of the worst, if not the worst, dust-up since the two countries created what became known as the “special relationship” beginning in the period after the 1973 war.

Second, however deep those tensions ran in those past relationships, previous administrations and Israeli governments actually produced stuff like peace treaties, peace conferences, and disengagement agreements. In this case, for the past five years, we’ve seen tension without much production. And the perfect storm that brought on this latest contretemps — clashing interests over an Iran deal and a Republican-controlled Congress unhappy with the president’s foreign policy all set against the backdrop of impending Israeli elections — isn’t going away. Deal or no deal with Iran, the divide between Netanyahu and Obama isn’t going to get any smaller. Deal or no deal with Iran, the divide between Netanyahu and Obama isn’t going to get any smaller. There are probably no resets here. One or both will need to leave the scene if trust and confidence is to be restored.

Third, at the same time, it’s critical to realize that InvitationGate or any other problem between Washington and Jerusalem goes well beyond personalities.

There is one elemental fact in the U.S.-Israeli story that must be factored in — always. Where a nation stands on a given issue is often determined by where it sits. No matter how close the United States and Israel may be as friends and allies, there are practical limits to how much the United States and Israel can agree on.

This has little to do with personalities and everything to do with geography and history. Israel is a small country in a dangerous Middle East that’s only getting worse. America has its own interests and a global role to play and can’t be expected to agree or support Israel on every issue. U.S. and Israeli interests simply can’t align across the board. And expecting them to do so puts unrealistic strains on the friendship. And that’s doubly true when the issues on the table are loaded with potentially existential security challenges also pregnant with political consequences. Strict alignment of interests on one such issue would be hard; on two, particularly Iran and the Palestinians, it’s hard to imagine, regardless of who is prime minister and who is president. In a way, Obama and Netanyahu are saddled with mission impossible and face the kind of complex challenges — perhaps even problems without comprehensive solutions — that neither of their immediate predecessors faced.

Fourth, the blowup over Netanyahu’s speech to Congress has created an image of an Israel that is going its own way. The Netanyahu-Obama relationship has been tense for so long that it’s now even on the radar screen of the public — and one that’s willing to weigh in.The Netanyahu-Obama relationship has been tense for so long that it’s now even on the radar screen of the public — and one that’s willing to weigh in. A recent CNN poll found 63 percent of Americans opposed to House Speaker John Boehner’s invitation to Netanyahu. Another poll, commissioned by the pro-Israeli Israel Project, found more public support for Netanyahu presenting his views but were opposed to both the way Boehner and the Obama administration had handled the invitation. As the Gallup sympathy polls conducted since 2001 reveal, support for Israel runs deep, largely because of the perception that the United States and Israel share common values in a turbulent Middle East. Still, the argument that the occupation of the West Bank, Israeli settlement policies, and the changing demographic character of the Israeli electorate are eroding the democratic and even Jewish character of the state can over time erode that sense of value affinity, particularly among a younger generation of Americans. That Israel and the United States appear to be at odds with one another at the official level can only reinforce the perception among the public that something is amiss. Indeed, when the image of Israel as an ally of the United States changes in the mind of America, so too will the U.S.-Israeli relationship change — for the worse.

Fifth, the above leads to perhaps the most damaging feature of InvitationGate: the way a traditionally bipartisan issue — deemed to be a long-standing national interest — has been compromised by the partisan tactics of both the prime minister and the Republican leadership and perhaps some Democrats too.

This business played out in a way that it was seen to be far more than only being about Israeli fears of a bad U.S. deal with Iran. The prime minister might have approached both Republicans and Democrats in a more direct manner and asked for an opportunity to speak to Congress, or even to a bipartisan group of senior lawmakers. The White House would have still been opposed. But Netanyahu would have demonstrated that he was prepared to go to great lengths to defend Israeli interests and still preserve bipartisanship. But InvitationGate wasn’t just about Iran. It was also about how Netanyahu could frame a campaign commercial weeks before the Israeli elections and how the Republicans could steal a march on the president, put a unique stamp on the party’s foreign policy, and slam an Iran deal that the Republicans fear, too. And those factors made a legitimate concern also a highly politicized one.

Finally, while it’s by no means a perfect alignment, there’s a growing tendency for Republicans to identify with Likud and harder-line Israelis while parts of the Democratic Party align with Labor and the left. The CNN poll cited above also found 52 percent of Republicans supporting the Boehner invitation to Netanyahu and only 14 percent of Democrats. The partisan divide is certainly the case when it comes to the Palestinian issue, settlements, and the occupation of the West Bank. And the longer this issue remains unresolved, the more fractious both the Israeli and American political scene is likely to become and the greater the danger to the bipartisan support we’ve witnessed in years past.

So what does all of this really mean for the future of the U.S.-Israeli relationship? Public sympathy for Israel remains strong and the pro-Israeli community, together with a largely pro-Israeli Congress, will make supporting Israel a key factor in U.S. election politics. The behaviour of any number of actors in the region — from Iran to the Islamic State to Hamas to Assad to Hezbollah and the other, many cruel realities of the neighbourhood — will solidify the special relationship.

I’ve said many times now that, unlike Lehman Brothers, the U.S.-Israeli relationship is too big to fail. I’d bet that under either a third Bush or a second Clinton, things might not be great between the United States and Netanyahu, but they would be better than they are right now. And a violent and dysfunctional Arab world remains the most compelling set of talking points for an enduring U.S.-Israeli relationship. But that doesn’t mean these ties are immune from stress or that we’re in for a smooth ride ahead.

So buckle your seat belts. Beginning next week that ride could get a whole lot bumpier.