Muslim in-fighting in the MidEast

The articles in this posting come from Al Monitor (1-3) and The Week (4).

Palestinian Salafists take part in a protest against Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, Feb. 24, 2012. Salafists are a sect within Sunni Islam; Alawites (Syria’s ruling clique) are doctrinally and in practice closer to Shi’ite Islam. Photo by Ibraheem Abu Mustafa / Reuters

Why Salafists see Shi’ites as their greatest enemy

Many Salafists see Shi’ites, not Jews and Israel, as the greatest threat to Islam.

By Ali Mamouri, trans.Rani Geha, Al Monitor
February 11, 2015

Helping Shi’ite groups in their military operations against Israel or the United States has always been a source of discord among Salafists. Radical Salafists consider both Shi’ites and Jews the enemies of Islam. But anti-Shi’ite enmity is often stronger than that against Jews among Salafists, who consider the Shi’ites a fifth column and thus see “damage” by Shi’ites as more serious than that caused by others.

In the latest chapter of this contentious relationship, a number of Salafist clerics praised the deaths of Shi’ite leaders in an Israeli airstrike on the Syrian Golan Heights on Jan. 18. Among the most prominent of these Salafist clerics is Mohammed al-Barrak, a professor at Umm al-Qura and a member of the Muslim Scholars Association in Saudi Arabia. He tweeted: “When the [Shi’ites] die at the hands of the Jews we thank God that he answered our prayers,” and “The damage inflicted by the [Shi’ites] on the Muslims is more than that inflicted by the Jews.” He also criticized Hamas for issuing a statement of condolence to the leadership of Hezbollah after the event. Barrak said that the statement “shows a theological deficiency within [Hamas], which is not fighting the Jews according to doctrine.” He asked Hamas’ leaders not to be courteous at the expense of doctrine and the community, adding, “No matter what they [Shi’ites] gave to Hamas, it does not justify appeasing them or supporting them.”

Comparing Shi’ites to Jews, Barrak said over Twitter: “Shi’ites are more harmful [to the Muslims] than the Jews because the [Shi’ites’] crimes in four years have exceeded all the Jews’ crimes in 60 years,” adding, “Shi’ites are the Muslims’ worst enemy because they are polytheists in terms of belief and religion and because their religion is creation of the Jews, making [the Shi’ites] worse enemies than the Western infidels or the Jews loyal to the State of Israel.”

Most Sunni radicals believe that Shi’ism emerged as a result of a Jewish infiltration by a legendary character named Ibn Sabaa. According to them, he was a Jew who falsely claimed to be Muslim in order to introduce Jewish beliefs to Islam and succeeded in forming the Shi’ite sect. According to the legend, the Shi’ites are considered a fifth column. The Shi’ites are thus blamed for the major defeats in the history of Islamic confrontation with the enemies of Islam — including the Crusades, the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate and the control by the Tatar armies over Islamic countries. Sunni historical texts include dozens of stories woven around the role of Shi’ites in those events.

This hard-line Salafist attitude is due to a doctrinal dispute among Salafists about the jurisprudential rule regarding co-operation with “misguided groups” such as the Shi’ites. Most Salafists, especially the radicals, contend that co-operating with Shi’ites is completely prohibited because the Shi’ites follow a “bidaa” (heretical belief), while the followers of other religions, such as Jews and Christians, don’t represent a bidaa position within the Islamic religion. Thus, a number of Salafist clerics, including Ibn Hanbal, issued a religious edict permitting the acceptance of help from “infidels” in cases where there is a benefit. However, he still ruled that it was forbidden to use the help of those who follow a bidaa, like the Shi’ites.

This hostile position against Shi’ites represents a principle that remains with the Salafists today. For example, Saudi Arabia’s former Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Baz issued a religious edict at the time permitting the use of help from the Western alliance against Iraq in 1991. He deemed it permissible for Saudi Arabia to open its land to the alliance to carry out attacks from Saudi territory against Iraq. The Salafists have no objections to using unbelievers to kill an enemy that has usurped land. But bin Baz hesitated about whether it was right to co-operate with the Shi’ites against Israel by questioning the intentions of the Shi’ites.

Historically, the Sunni-Shi’ite relationship has been affected by majority-minority logic, whereby the Shi’ite minority tries to link itself to the general Islamic entity and thus gain the majority’s recognition as an equal. However, the majority has usually been suspicious and distrustful of the Shi’ites and considered them inferior.

Here appears one of the fundamental differences between the two fundamentalist currents in the Muslim world. There is ideological Salafism, which makes ideology a strict principle in dealing with politics and is often influenced by Wahhabi ideology. Then there is political fundamentalism, whose principles serve the groups’ political goals. The Muslim Brotherhood and its extensions in the Middle East are of this second kind.

Therefore, Hamas, which is close to the Muslim Brotherhood, tolerates dealing with Iranian Shi’ites. However, ideological Salafists have never dealt with Iran, either in Palestine or elsewhere. The ideological Salafists even reject Hamas’ legitimacy because the group doesn’t strictly adhere to ideological principles from the Salafist perspective. The ideological Salafists demand Hamas not treat the question of Palestine from a national perspective but from the perspective of the umma and doctrine.

Political fundamentalism is somewhat politically pragmatic. Ideological Salafists oppose this pragmatism as incompatible with religious principles. This conflict reveals that the two sides disagree on the identity of the No. 1 enemy. While the likes of Hamas consider Israel the primary enemy, ideological Salafists believe that the Shi’ites are the most dangerous. This difference allows each party to ally with the enemy of its enemy when necessary. Just as Hamas accepts Iran’s help to fight Israel, ideological Salafists have no objections to allying, if necessary, with the Jews or Christians in fighting the Shi’ites.

This whole relationship shows that the history of religious conflicts among the sects in the region is still alive and active in the political world, and further paves the way for sectarian conflict to play a crucial role in the Middle East.

Palestinian mourners carry the body of Salafi militant Hisham Saedni during his funeral in Bureij refugee camp, central Gaza Strip, on Oct. 14, 2012. Photo by Hatem Moussa / AP

Salafists Betrayed by Hamas’ Moderate Stance

Since Hamas took power in 2006, Salafists in Palestine have been disappointed by its reluctance to impose an Islamic emirate.

By Adnan Abu Amer, trans Kamal Fayad, Al Monitor / Palestine Pulse
February 06, 2013

From the very first day after Hamas won the legislative elections in early 2006, the decision-making circles of some neighbouring countries feared that an “Islamic emirate,” as they called it, would be established on Palestinian lands.

Subsequent events revealed that Hamas did not establish an Islamic emirate in Palestine, nor did it enforce Shariah law either regionally or internally, out of a desire not to draw, at that particular stage, the ire of factions hostile to it. But by so doing, Hamas provoked the anger of extremist Islamic movements, which believed this inaction belittled their desire to impose a long-lost religious obligation.

Islamizing society

Throughout its 25-year history, Hamas has succeeded, to a great extent, in merging nationalism and religiosity, as well as political discourse and Muslim thought. Yet, the current atmosphere has led to the rise of religious movements that want to adopt an Islamic discourse that transcends that of Hamas. They focus on the jihadist religious aspects at the expense of Palestinian political nationalism, and justify doing so by saying that the roots of the ongoing problem can be traced to the old historical conflict between Islam and Judaism.

Since the early days of Hamas’ entry into the political arena, it has espoused moderate leanings, and did not hasten to impose Shariah Law or establish an Islamic state. Its political performance and its behavior in society supported this observation, despite the urgent appeals by its members for the adoption of broad rules of conduct. But Hamas’ Muslim scholars exhibited a greater audacity than their counterparts in other Islamic movements by issuing religious edicts that suited Hamas’ interests alone.

While Hamas entrenched itself on the Palestinian Islamist scene, the political scene underwent a qualitative change that saw an increase in the influence of Salafist factions. Despite the fact that the shift toward Islamism started at the onset of the 1987 Intifada, the current change among Islamists has come in favor of their Salafist offshoot.

Many Salafist movements appeared on the scene to call for the establishment of an Islamic emirate, with some of them rising to the forefront in a manner that might cause Hamas some concern. Most prominent among these movements are the Army of Islam — Tawheed and Jihad Brigades, which just released its founding statement and declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda; the Nation’s Army — Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (The Companions of the Prophet), which issued an urgent appeal for all Salafist factions to unite and repel the attack perpetrated by the “Crusaders,” the Jews and their supporters; and the faction commonly known in Gaza as “Jaljalat,” which is composed of ultra-religious youth, whose activities started at the beginning of Hamas’ reign in Gaza in 2007, but whose influence and number of supporters has grown, following their bombing campaign against Internet cafes several years ago.

Many other Salafist factions have issued their own statements, such as the Swords of Righteousness Brigades — The al-Qaeda Army, led by Abu Sahib al-Makdissi; Junud Allah and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, as well as other factions whose presence on the ground has not been ascertained, such as the Tawheed and Jihad Legions, the Islamic Army of Jerusalem, the Jihadists of the Islamic State of Palestine, Fatah al-Islam, Osbat al-Ansar and the Swords of Righteousness. Furthermore, the most prominent Salafist leader has called for the merging of all Salafist-jihadist groups into one faction called “the Brigades of Tawheed and Jihad,” which would have a single unified command.

The causes behind their proliferation

All of these Islamist movements are located in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While Hamas succeeded in minimizing their visible presence, these movements are but the tip of the Salafist iceberg. Some expect their numbers to increase, either because of divisions that will take place in their midst, or the spawning of more of them as a result of the religious changes that Palestinian society is currently undergoing.

A number of different factors helped in the proliferation of the Salafist jihadist phenomenon in the Gaza Strip. Most important among these was the political atmosphere, in which the Salafists began to preach that elections were a sin that served to make people comply with laws other than God’s, and led to the acceptance of an “ungodly democracy.” The relationship between Hamas and Fatah during different stages of the unity government, the warring between them and the Mecca Agreement all served to spread Salafism among Hamas’ members, at a time when the Salafists accused Hamas of “corrupting the doctrine, siding with the secularists and resorting to earthly laws.”

The truce with the Israeli army and Hamas’ occasional abandonment of military activities created a misconception among these Salafists, who felt that Hamas had forsaken the resistance. Some of them even went so far as to accuse Hamas of doing so to gain political favor, which they considered a manifestation of its leaders’ lack of religious faith, desertion of principles and loss of hope for internal reforms and change.

The economic situation further fueled the rise of Salafists. The siege imposed on Gaza and the hardships that Gazans endured as a result drove some of them to accuse Hamas of causing the crisis, while smooth talkers and instigators exploited the harsh situation to influence the young and unemployed.

On an educational level, the lack of religious teaching helped in the proliferation of Salafist elements, as the youth were left ill-versed in jurisprudence and the objectives of Shariah. This was a situation that was further exacerbated by the lack of popular justification and explanation for the contentious accusations that Salafists levelled at Hamas in their teachings and bulletins.

The Palestinian Salafists, or “Binladenists,” whose resistance efforts were confined to the occupation, blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for not calling for worldwide jihad against the “infidels.” They considered Hamas to be a national movement that participated in legislative committees, more than a legitimate “Islamist movement” that ruled through Shariah. These Salafists’ rise came as a result of them calling for a return to the “jihadist approach,” the rejection of political and legislative platforms and compliance with Shariah instead of worldly laws. They also harshly criticized Hamas for not declaring the establishment of an Islamic emirate.

The emirate project

The prevailing belief is that Salafist organizations existed in Gaza only as secret, dormant cells that sprung to life and entrenched themselves during the second year of the al-Aqsa Intifada, when they took advantage of the movement’s momentum and militaristic nature, the collapse of the Palestinian Authority’s security apparatus, the fact that large numbers of their members took part in resistance operations and the constant internal bickering and conflict among the different Palestinian factions.

But news of their existence was intentionally suppressed due to a fundamental difference between their ideology and that espoused by the Palestinian regime under the late president, Yasser Arafat. Their presence as organizations connected to and allied with Salafism was also hampered by the fact that the Palestinian Authority’s security agencies were both powerful and effective, maintaining intelligence and security coordination with Israeli as well as some Arab security agencies.

The beginnings of the intellectual and religious dispute between Hamas and the Salafists, especially on the issues of establishing an Islamic state and implementing Shariah, can be attributed to the public statements of some Salafist leaders who objected to Hamas’ respect for international conventions, its rule based on a “secularist worldly” constitution and its abiding by the Oslo Accord, which resulted in the relinquishing of more than three quarters of Palestinian lands to the Israelis and the implicit recognition of Israel’s existence.

But the relationship between Hamas and the Salafists truly worsened when the former announced that it was not seeking to Islamize Palestinian society, and was not demanding that the political arena be governed by Shariah Law during its reign. Furthermore, the Salafists were not convinced by Hamas’ policy of “gradually” implementing Sharia Law.

Hamas tried to regain the initiative in two ways — first through “ideological orientation,” whereby it sent its clerics to the mosques in order to “raise awareness” among young people who were attracted by Salafist ideals. It also aimed to control infiltration and the smuggling tunnels, and began to “intellectually rehabilitate” Salafists whom it arrested, following their declaration of the establishment of an “Islamist state.” Tens of them were later released after being “rehabilitated” and promising to never again conduct activities that might destabilize society or adversely affect the lives of the people.

In addition to the intellectual aspect, Hamas adopted security measures, including surveillance operations and arrests, in an attempt to regain the mosques through which Salafist organizations had tried to spread their ideals. All of this means that, both as a government and a movement, Hamas’ relationship with the Salafists went through many phases and periods of tension, confrontation and waiting.

Adnan Abu Amer is Dean of the Faculty of Arts and head of the Press and Information Section as well as a lecturer in the history of the Palestinian issue, national security, political science and Islamic civilization at Al Ummah University Open Education. He has published a number of books on issues related to the contemporary history of the Palestinian cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Follow him on Twitter @adnanabuamer1.

Salafists showing off somewhere in the West Bank. Photo by i24, AFP.

Armed Salafist movement emerges in West Bank

Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas are all concerned about the changes underway in the West Bank’s Salafist movement, which is transforming itself from a welfare organization into an armed terrorist organization.

By Shlomi Eldar, trans. Danny Wool and Ezgi Akin, Al Monitor
December 03, 2013

We learned last week that Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas have at least one thing in common. They are all concerned about the changes underway in the West Bank Salafist movement, which is transforming itself from a welfare movement into an armed terrorist organization that is actively planning attacks. Three Salafist terrorists from the Hebron region were killed Nov. 26 by Israeli counterterrorism forces in the village of Yatta after plotting to launch a major attack in Israel. Overnight, the Salafists of the West Bank became known as a terrorist organization.

The Salafist movement in the West Bank was founded in the 1950s. According to current estimates, it has a few thousand supporters, most of them in the Hebron region, who view the establishment of an Islamic caliphate as a supreme value. Despite the movement’s name, the Freedom Party never was a political movement, if only because it did not recognize the Palestinian Authority as a governmental body with which it could cooperate. Most of its resources were spent recruiting supporters, establishing welfare and communal institutions and aiding the weaker segments of society.

Like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, the movement’s welfare institutions are known as dawa. The literal meaning of the word is “call to prayer,” but over time it has become a comprehensive term among all the Islamist movements for their communal branches, which act zealously to help the needy, while at the same time preaching the groups’ beliefs and objectives.

Animosity between the Salafists and Hamas is intense, both in the West Bank and in Gaza. Nevertheless, the two movements have much in common. Hamas was also founded as a welfare and community organization by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. The Islamic Center he headed raised enormous sums of money to establish that movement’s dawa institutions, which cared for the needy in Gaza’s refugee camps. Until the first intifada erupted in December 1987, activists affiliated with the Islamic Center received the backing and support of the Israeli Civil Administration.

The dawa created by Hamas, just like the Salafists’ dawa, operated on the basis of religious principles that called for cleansing society of its ills; aiding the needy, the elderly, and the sick; and bringing them into the embrace of religion. Hamas emerged from Yassin’s Islamic Center and the dawa institutions of the Gaza Strip and became an armed movement that placed jihad against Israel at the top of its priorities.

With Hamas, the transition from dawa to jihad occurred in the late 1980s. The same process is taking place in the West Bank with the Salafists, but with one important difference: The Salafists dream of establishing an Islamic caliphate without any borders, headed by an emir who inherits the role of the Prophet Muhammad and restores the Golden Age of Islam. The current emir of the Salafists is Ata Abu Rashta, a native of Hebron, whose current place of residence is kept secret.

The Salafists boycott the Palestinian Authority because they regard it as a secular government with no religious authority to rule over Muslims. They believe it is incumbent on every Muslim to oppose this illegal rule. But they also consider the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip unsuitable, because the Salafists believe that Hamas has abandoned its objectives and ideological ideas, such as jihad against Israel, in favor of the benefits of power.

Why did Salafist activists in the West Bank transition from a focus on productive and free welfare activities to the establishment of an underground jihadist movement? One official within the Palestinian Authority believes that there are several reasons behind the creation of the movement’s military wing. One of these is the weakness currently exhibited by Hamas, combined with the desire to replace it as the group that raises the banner of jihad against Israel. Furthermore, difficult economic conditions in Palestine, particularly in the refugee camps, attract young and old alike to the Salafist movement, where they can benefit from the aid offered to the needy, just like they would have received from Hamas in the past.

But the same source said that the most significant reason is the rise of the Salafists in Egypt, who were transformed overnight from an underground group to a widespread movement that won almost a third of all votes in the country’s last election.

On Nov. 30, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank made a wave of arrests of Salafist activists, who until then were considered religious figures and community activists. More than 20 activists were arrested, and another wave of arrests was anticipated soon. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas also conducts occasional arrest operations of Salafist activists who threaten its hold on the government, but the main concern is Salafist terrorism in the Sinai, where it would be detrimental to the already shaky relationship between Hamas and Egypt. The last thing that the government in Gaza needs right now is another conflict with General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and with public opinion in Egypt, which is already hostile to Hamas.

And so, almost overnight, Hamas, the Palestinian Authority and Israel all found that they have a common enemy. It can only be hoped that by working together, whether directly or indirectly, all sides will succeed in preventing this relatively young fundamentalist movement from growing. It can also be hoped that the way Israel handles the change will be better and more effective than the way it tackled the rise of Hamas when it was a nascent terrorist organization.

What is Salafism and should we be worried by it?

Salafi violence is on the rise across the Arab world – and may be gaining a dangerous foothold in Europe

The Week
January 15, 2015

In the days after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and a Jewish supermarket in Paris, attention has focused on the rise of Salafism in Europe.

Salafism is described as “the fastest-growing Islamic movement in Europe” by Soren Kern of the New York Daily News. He accuses European leaders of failing to confront the rise of a dangerous ideology on their own turf.

Germany’s intelligence chief, Hans-George Maassen, says the number of active Salafists in his country has grown from 3,800 to 6,300 in three years, according to Deutsche Welle.

Maassen says that most recruits are men aged from 18 to 30, with families from migrant backgrounds who have struggled to adjust to their new home. Salafism provides them with a sense of belonging and purpose, he said, “giving the impression that they will go from being underdogs to top dogs”.

What is Salfism?
Salafis are fundamentalists who believe in a return to the original ways of Islam. The word ‘Salafi’ comes from the Arabic phrase, ‘as-salaf as-saliheen’, which refers to the first three generations of Muslims (starting with the Companions of the Prophet), otherwise known as the Pious Predecessors.

What do Salafis believe?
The 100-year-old Sunni-based Salafi school of thought aspires to emulate the ways of the Prophet Mohammed. Recognisable from their distinctive long white robes, long beards and flowing head scarf, Salafis are socially and religiously conservative.

Although they believe in a unified Islamic state and Sharia law, they are not always politically radical, because they regard political involvement as un-Islamic.

That said, Salafism encompasses a huge range of beliefs – extending from non-violent religious devotion at one extreme, to Salafi Jihadism at the other.

How popular is Salafism around the world?
Salafism offers what many see as a purer form of Islam, stripped of cultural and national associations. This, coupled with its traditional lack of political involvement, makes it especially popular with new converts.

It is the predominant form of Sunni Islam in the Arabian Peninsula, where most people are Wahabis, subscribing to a far-right interpretation of Salafism. In Egypt, around 5-6 million of the 82 million population are believed to be Salafis. It can also be found in Britain, where Salafism is apparently increasingly popular in universities.

What about the rest of the Middle East?

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Salafis received an unusual amount of press due to their growing involvement in politics. Following the toppling of president Hosni Mubarak, Salafi groups in Egypt have been responsible for a number of violent attacks on Coptic Christians. They burnt two Coptic Christian churches in 2011 and were responsible for a death during a clash with a Christian alcohol shop owner, while another fight with a Coptic Christian led to his ear being cut off.

At about the same time in Jordan, during protests in Zarqa around 350 hardline Salafis took to the streets to demand the imposition of Sharia law. Violent clashes led to 83 police offers being injured. And in Gaza, a Salafi group called Tawheed and Jihad claimed responsibility for the brutal kidnapping and murder of Italian activist Vittorio Arrigoni, claiming he had spread “corruption”.

Where else is Salafism growing?

Outside Europe and the Middle East, Salafism is also on the rise in China. “Among China’s Hui ethnic group, Saudi-influenced Salafism has been present for nearly a century,” reports The Diplomat. Salafism is confined to small pockets of the Northwest and Yunnan provinces, but in recent years the Chinese government has begun to keep closer checks on the group.

“Since the 1990s, and particularly following 9/11, the Chinese state has placed the Salafi community under close surveillance,” The Diplomat says. The government fears that Salafism’s “close connections with Saudi Arabia as well as presumed Uighur Salafi networks … might herald political and religious violence in the future”

How organised are the salafis?
They have no coherent policy or ideology and there is no governing body to control various Salafist elements either in Egypt or elsewhere. As a result, there is a wide range of Salafist movements pursuing various agendas, and they are accountable to no-one. It is this that makes them potentially dangerous.

A recent documentary on Muslims extremists in Britain, Muslim Resistance, looked at a Salafi group in Luton. The film-maker Masood Khan insists that most Salafis have spent the last 20 years “trying to persuade Muslims not to get involved with [extremist] groups”.

But Dr Ghayas Saddiqui from the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain told The First Post that there was “no moderation in [the Salafis’] approach”. He added: “It is a very strict interpretation of Islam, and their attitude to both non-Muslims and Muslims who are not with them is very harsh.” ·