Commons queries sales of equipment that Israel could use for attack


June 13, 2013
Sarah Benton

This is  a photo of one of Meprolight’s  new weapon sights, including the Mini-Hunter, a lightweight night vision weapon sight, and NOA NYX, an uncooled thermal weapon sight with 2x magnification. Meprolight, a US company, sells many of its small arms to the IDF. An unnamed British company was granted licenses to sell its weapons sights to Israel for military and non-military purposes.

Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012), First Joint Report of Session 2012–13

[Actual title:] UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government’s Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues

By the House of Commons departmental select committees for
Business, Innovation and Skills,
Defence,
Foreign Affairs and
International Development

Note:
SIEL Standard Individual Export Licence, allows the export of specific items to a specific destination and to a stated consignee and/or end-user, up to the quantity and value described on the licence.

OIEL Open Individual Export Licence, specific to an individual company and covers multiple shipments of specific goods to multiple destinations. There are different types of OIELs including military/dual use, media, dealer-to-dealer and UK Continental Shelf OIELs   …. OIELs are a concessionary form of licence issued to exporters with a proven track record in dealing in controlled goods.

EXCERPTS
The Committees’ 2010 Quarter 3 (July – September) questions and the Government’s answers
The Committees would be grateful for more information about why the following licences
were granted or refused during the third quarter (July-September) of 2011:

Israel: SIELs issued for components for naval electronic warfare equipment (2 licences),naval electronic warfare equipment, imaging cameras and nuclear grade graphite.

Naval electronic warfare equipment
These goods were for use in submarines. We have no evidence to suggest that the use of this class of submarine by the Israeli Defence Forces would cause concern under the Consolidated Criteria.

Imaging cameras
Applications included:
a) equipment being returned to the Israeli manufacturer after demonstration in the UK. The unit was a demonstration unit which was originally manufactured in Israel and so would not supply Israel with additional capability it did not already have.Therefore the export did not raise concerns under the Criteria.
b) a camera intended for academic experimental research. Given that these goods wereintended for use in a university for research purposes we had no concerns under the Criteria. Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012 175
c) an application for a temporary SIEL for a camera for use by the applicant’s distributor in Israel to be demonstrated in Jerusalem and compared to standard CCTV cameras. As the goods were to be returned to the UK the application did not raise concerns under the Criteria.
d) a camera being returned to Israel after repair carried out by the UK manufacturer.
The camera was to be used for research purposes by a scientific institute. Therefore the
export did not raise concerns under the Criteria.
e) an application for a temporary SIEL for a camera to be loaned for demonstration to potential clients for commercial applications. The goods were to be returned to the UK. Therefore the export raised no concerns under the Consolidated Criteria.

Nuclear grade graphite
These goods are to be machined into consumable products (crucibles, dies etc) to be used in the metallurgical industry. Given the legitimate end-use of these goods this
export raised no concerns under the Consolidated Criteria.

OIELs refused for: americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural uranium, materials containing
thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers,
technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the use of linear
cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non-military detonators, technology
for the use of non-military firing sets; software for the use of test equipment for aircraft
missile protection systems, test equipment for aircraft missile protection systems.

Given the nature of the goods and the destination the applications for OIELs were
rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs instead so that greater scrutiny
could be given to specific exports.


The Committees’ 2010 Quarter 4 (October – December) questions and the Government’s answers
Israel: Given the actions of the Government of Israel in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in recent years, the Committees would be grateful for further information regarding the following SIELs that were granted during this period:

all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for unmanned air vehicles,
launching/handling/control/support equipment for unmanned air vehicles, military utility
vehicles, small arms ammunition.
…….
Israel: Given the controversy that occurred over “Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza, which is part of the Palestinian Occupied Territories, in late 2008 and early 2009, the Committees would be grateful for further information regarding the following SIELs that were granted,inter alia, during this period:

components for electronic warfare equipment, componentsfor military aircraft head-up/down displays, small arms ammunition.

Many of the applications under reference were for components and goods whose end use was in third party countries where we assessed there were no Consolidated Criteria concerns. Details of other specific applications are found below.

A licence was granted for components for use in the head up display of military training aircraft which is not front line aircraft. We had no Consolidated Criteria concerns and recommended approval.
……..
Israel: Given the controversy that occurred over ‘Operation Cast Lead’ in Gaza, which is part of the Palestinian Occupied Territories, in late 2008 and early 2009, the Committees would be grateful for further information regarding the following SIELs that were granted, inter alia, during this period: components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment for the use of military equipment for initiating explosives, launching/handling/control/support equipment for unmanned air vehicles and why these SIELs were granted.

The Government considers all applications case by case against the Consolidated Criteria. We recognise Israel’s right to self defence but pay particular attention to risks.

In several instances electronic warfare equipment was exported to Israel for incorporation, after evaluation or repair, into an electronics system that was destined for ultimate end use in a third country. As the end user was not Israel, no criteria concerns for export to Israel were noted. In other instances, electronic warfare equipment was exported to end users within Israel for laboratory use only.

Assurances were received that the goods would not be re-exported, sold or otherwise transferred. It was judged that, since the equipment was for testing purposes only, this did not breach the Consolidated Criteria. Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012 197

Several of the components for military aircraft head up/head down displays that were approved were to be incorporated in Israel into other parts being sent on to other ultimate end user countries. Since the end user was not Israel and there was documentation linking the equipment to third party end users outside of Israel, this equipment was approved for export. Other components for different military aircraft head up/head down displays were, however, destined for end use in Israel. These components were to be installed on decommissioned military aircraft that are now usedexclusively for training purposes.

Based on this assessment it did not breach the Consolidated Criteria. Several licences for equipment used to initiate explosives were also approved. The end user stated in both cases that the goods were to be used for defensive purposes in explosive ordnance disposal and destruction of improvised explosive devices within the Israeli state. Given the legitimate use of the goods in the disposal of explosive devices the decision was made to approve the export applications.

In a further case, similar equipment was exported to Israel after it was returned to the
exporter for repair. Again the stated end use is explosive ordnance destruction. Given its legitimate use, the export was approved.

Equipment for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) was approved for export. In one instance the equipment was to be used solely by the commercial end user. Given that the goods were not going to be used in an operational manner and were destined for a commercial end user, the licence application was approved. Another application proved similar: the goods were being exported for test and evaluation purposes at the commercial end user’s facilities and were to be handled by the end user’s employees only. The goods in this case were for small surveillance UAVs which were unarmed.
………………..
The Committees’ 2011 Quarter 1 (January – March) questions and the Government’s answers

Israel: Given the controversy that occurred over “Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza, which is part of the Palestinian Occupied Territories, in late 2008 and early 2009, the Committees wish to have further information regarding the following SIELs that were granted, inter alia, during this period: components for weapon sights, general military vehicle components and weapon sights and why these SIELs were granted. Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012 206

The Government considers all applications case by case against the Consolidated Criteria. We recognise Israel’s right to self defence but pay particular attention to risks.

The components for weapon sights were intended solely for marketing and demonstration purposes to a range of customers. Any actual supply of product would require further licence applications which would be assessed fully against the Criteria, taking into account full end user details, specific end use, quantities and prevailing circumstances.

The general military vehicle components were a protective seat designed to absorb blast shock in the event of a vehicle going over an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or mine. The licence was approved on the basis that the goods were for use in a development programme for a foreign government and were not for operational use by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).

Weapon sights were approved as they were for use by an individual for competitive target shooting and not for military use.
…………………………..
Annex 7: Selected arms export licence approvals to FCO “countries of concern” of arms or components of arms which might be used to facilitate internal repression for the period 1 January until 31 December 2011

Approved arms exports, 1 January – 30 September 2011
Israel and the oPt.
General military vehicle components, small arms ammunition, equipment employing cryptography, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, military support vehicles, components for weapon sights, weapon sights, military communications equipment.

REFUSALS
Israel SIEL (Permanent) 2, 3 components for helmet mounted display equipment ML11
Israel SIEL (Permanent) 2, 3 components for helmet mounted display equipment ML11
Israel SIEL (Permanent) 2, 3 components for ground vehicle military communications equipment ML6
Israel SIEL (Transhipment) 2, 3 explosives ML8
Israel SIEL (Permanent) 2 components for naval radars ML5
Israel SIEL (Permanent) 2, 3 components for optical target acquisition equipment ML5
Israel SIEL (Permanent) 7 semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers 3C001

Notes and links
UK Military end use control , guidance for British exporters from Department for Business, Innovation & Skills

Promoting human rights in Israel

Foreign & Commonwealth Office
April 03, 2013

Although we welcomed the steps that Israel and the Palestinian Authority took to protect human rights during 2011, the situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) continues to concern the UK.

Concerns include Israeli demolitions and evictions of Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank; the human rights effects of restrictions on Gaza; the increase in the number of attacks by extremist Israeli settlers; the treatment of Palestinian suspects, including children, within the Israel justice system; the high proportion of civilian casualties and fatalities resulting from Israeli airstrikes on Gaza; instances of incitement to hatred or violence; an increase in indiscriminate rocket fire from Gaza; reports of human rights abuse under the de facto Hamas rule in Gaza, including the imposition of the death penalty; and allegations of abuse of detainees in Palestinian Authority prisons.

Actions
The Foreign & Commonwealth Office’s annual human rights and democracy report outlines UK concerns and actions on the human rights situation. We have continual discussions with the Israeli and Palestinian authorities on these issues.

FCO Countries of Concern 2012
Israel is one of the FCO’s countries of concern, where particular scrutiny has to be applied to any proposed sales of equipment that can be used for internal repression or military warfare.
The others are:
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Belarus, Burma, Chad, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

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